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The purpose of this study was to determine important factors in winning 
conventional and irregular conflict. The research sought to identify variables and trends 
for conventional and irregular warfare as a means for predicting battle outcomes. The 
variables related to conventional and irregular warfare differ. There are limited variables 
for analysis of irregular conflicts due to the complexity of data collection during these 
conflicts. Selected variables from both types of conflict were synthesized using a 
descriptive statistics and decision tree methodology to identify important trends in 
warfare. The analysis indicated that cavalry, artillery, close air support, air superiority, 
leadership, and initiative played vital roles in deciding the outcome of conventional 
battles over time. The exploration of irregular warfare revealed that the population plays 
a major role in these conflicts. The numbers of participants are higher and the duration is 
longer in irregular conflict than in conventional warfare. These irregular conflicts 
primarily occurred in areas of low gross domestic product, low employment-to-
population ratio, and government ineffectiveness. 
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Understanding the winning of battles is becoming more arduous with the 
dynamic, ever-evolving nature of warfare. It is critical for military leaders to forecast the 
future of warfare from the prism of the past. The twentieth century saw a transformation 
from conventional to irregular warfare in which armies started combating non-state, 
widely dispersed groups. Although this change appears to be quite simple, it has had a 
deep impact on military strategy, organization, and the way wars are fought. Non-state 
actors are challenging the technological, financial, and organizational superiority of well-
trained armies by using terrorism as an instrument for perpetuating their agendas. Non-
state actors have been successful because many armies around the globe are still 
primarily focused on fighting conventional wars rather than countering evolving threats.  
There has been little work that bridges the gap between qualitative and 
quantitative analysis in this area. It is this void between the two methods of studying 
warfare that results in misunderstandings at the executional end. For the most part, 
warfare has been studied separately in the two spheres. This research aims to merge 
qualitative and quantitative methods to explain similarities and differences between 
conventional and irregular warfare. The research used four different datasets to explore 
trends in both conventional and irregular warfare. For conventional warfare, the CDB90G 
dataset compiled by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) was used to identify important 
trends and associated factors with winning across different time frames. For irregular 
warfare, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), Correlates of War 
(COW) Project, and University of Uppsala (UCDP) datasets were used to explore trends 
along with potentially causal factors. 
Statistical techniques can provide military planners detailed insight into 
distinctive aspects of evolving warfare. The research used both descriptive statistics along 
with decision tree and boosted tree modeling techniques to determine important variables 
associated with different kinds of warfare over time. Analysis of the CDB90G dataset 
revealed that the important variables associated with winning battles have changed over 
time. In the fifteenth century, leadership, cavalry, force ratio, and initiative were the 
 xxii 
major variables for winning battles. In the sixteenth century, leadership, cavalry, artillery, 
and terrain became the most important variables. In the nineteenth century, which 
overlaps with the Industrial Revolution, cavalry, leadership, and artillery emerged as the 
most important variables. Beginning in the twentieth century, conventional warfare 
became more dependent on modern technologies. Between 1900 and 1920, artillery, force 
ratio, and initiative became more dominant. Between 1937 and 1945, air superiority, tank 
ratio, force ratio, initial force ratio, artillery, scheme of attack, and weather gained 
prominence. Finally, between 1951 and 1982, close air support, air superiority, force 
ratio, initial force ratio, defensive posture, and weather were the factors most associated 
with battle outcomes. 
The analysis of datasets for irregular warfare revealed that these conflicts are 
more complicated and more difficult to understand than conventional battles. The 
variables that differentiate irregular warfare and tend to make it more complicated are the 
number of participants involved, involvement of civilian populations, foreign government 
involvement, duration of conflicts, categories of violence, seasonality (weather) effect, 
geographical location, and the tendency for events to spill outside national borders.  
The analysis of irregular warfare identified the following participant trends. The 
numbers of participants involved in irregular warfare were far greater than those in 
regular warfare, especially when the conflicts involved foreign elements. Another 
noticeable pattern was that non–state actors involved in these conflicts operate within 
relatively small networks. These networks have the ability to conceal themselves within 
civilian populations, which makes it difficult to identify them. This is in contrast to the 
conventional battles in which organized armies practice Clausewitz’s principle of 
massing power at one decisive point. These give non-state actors the capability of 
engaging multiple different fronts simultaneously. This network approach also makes 
them more resilient to action by militaries. The major difference between irregular and 
conventional warfare is that in irregular conflicts, civilians, as opposed to military units, 
are major targets. Non-state actors use civilian populations to perpetuate their agendas, 
coercing them to support their cause or suffer brutal consequences. Another significant 
trend that emerged in irregular warfare is participation of foreign governments. Foreign 
 xxiii 
governments have been involved in supporting local governments directly and indirectly 
to overcome non-state actors.  
Interestingly, the durations of irregular conflicts, compared to conventional ones, 
tend to be longer. This is due to the ability of non-state actors to prolong war without 
burdening economies. In the case of conventional warfare, countries cannot afford to 
prolong conflicts because it drains their economy considerably. Another trend is that in 
irregular warfare, the types of events are quite different from conventional battles: instead 
of mounting offensive operations on opposing armies, most of the events that take place 
are battles with no change of territory. Moreover, in irregular conflicts, non-state actors 
tend to increase violence to destabilize the government. An analysis of irregular conflicts 
also revealed that weather is a dominant factor used by non-state actors to support their 
campaigns against governments. It is common for non-state actors to launch their 
campaigns in moderate weather and essentially hibernate during extreme conditions.  
From the data on irregular warfare, research identified geography as playing a 
vital role in irregular conflicts. Non-state actors tend to establish their footholds within 
remote territories. Non-state actors mostly use mountains, ravines, and harsh terrain to 
their advantage. Moreover, the use of cross-border movement by non-state actors from a 
country where conflict is occurring into a neighboring country usually takes advantage of 
unguarded borders. The analysis of data revealed that irregular conflicts tend to spill 
outside the country of origin and, in most cases, lead to events in neighboring countries. 
Out of all the regions analyzed, Africa has exhibited an exponential growth of 
violence in the last few years. However, the dataset was missing information on other 
regions of extreme violence, including Afghanistan and Iraq. If these conflicts are not 
addressed, Africa has the potential to become the future hotspot where non-state actors 
and terrorist organizations can train and flourish. The research was extended to gain 
insight into factors that cause these conflicts using a boosted tree method. The analysis 
revealed that poor political stability, low gross domestic product, low population to 
employment ratio, and government ineffectiveness are some of the factors associated 
with these conflicts.  
 xxiv 
This research is a first step in uncovering some of the intricacies associated with 
warfare. The subject is quite vast, so this project focused on just a few aspects. There are 
many aspects related to warfare, especially to irregular warfare, that need exploration. 
The first and most important thing for gaining more insight is through formulating a 
database from a military perspective to analyze these conflicts. This can give us more 
detailed insight and help future military leaders to plan based on mathematical analysis. 
The second thing that needs more exploration is causal factors for irregular conflicts. By 
identifying and addressing these factors, world leadership may be able to considerably 
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“We make war that we may live in peace.” 
–Aristotle 
 
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Armed conflicts develop when there are disagreements. Disagreements can be 
over conflicting domains or over a wide spectrum of interests including power mêlées, 
territorial control, financial interests, politics, and ideology.1 Disagreements can result in 
armed conflict if unresolved.2 Armed conflicts can be categorized into conventional, 
unconventional, and irregular warfare. The oldest forms of conflicts were irregular in 
nature. Military analysts also classify warfare into four generations; the first, second, and 
third generations fall into the category of conventional warfare, while the fourth 
generation is considered irregular warfare.3 The classification of warfare into overlapping 
generations seems to correspond with the evolution of human society.  
The Romans marked the transition from irregular to conventional warfare by 
introducing the concept of the formal army.4 The Romans introduced military formations 
and organized the army along modern lines to fight national adversaries. The Romans’ 
military model was neglected “in the west,” according to Strong and Gillum, by the 
European Middle Ages, when battles were mostly confined within the realm of small 
skirmishes, raids, ambushes, and unconventional techniques.5 
                                                 
1 Morton Deutsch, Coleman T Peter, and Marcus C Eric, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: 
Theory and Practice (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011). 
2 Thomas X Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 
9 (1994): 35–44. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Carol Strong and Joshua Gillum, “Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Strategic U.S. Military 
Engagement: Asymmetrical Relationships, Unconventional Means and International Conflict,” Paper 
prepared for Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations: New Actors, New Initiatives and New 
Targets Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany 15–18 November, 2011. 
5 Ibid. 
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However, during the seventeenth century, warfare again witnessed a shift from 
irregular to conventional following the Roman style.6 This transition from irregular to 
conventional warfare resulted in the first generation of warfare. This was characterized 
by formation of formal armies, line-and-column tactics, and identification between 
civilians and soldiers.7 The major reason for the shift from irregular to conventional 
warfare was the development of nation-states.8 The development of nation-states shifted 
the power dynamics from small tribal structures to well-defined national systems 
enforcing taxation and conscription.9 The concept was further consolidated and 
developed with transition into the Industrial Revolution of the late 19th century.10 The 
development of machine guns and indirect firing weapons became the catalyst for the 
second generation. The newly developed machine guns and artillery pieces were more 
lethal than the weapons used in previous wars. These inventions changed the pace of 
warfare and achieved attrition of enemy forces in limited time by massing firepower.11 
However, along with advancements in technology, warfare continued to transform. The 
development of armored vehicles moved the world into the third generation of warfare. 
Speed, surprise, maneuver, attrition, and physical dislocation to collapse the enemy 
forces characterize the third generation of warfare, commonly known as Blitzkrieg. 
Military order also witnessed a shift from imposed discipline to self-discipline.12  
As warfare evolved through the first three generations, it became more civilized 
with greater respect for adversaries, civilians, and infrastructure. The armies emerged as 
the primary instrument of national security. War between nations resulted in evolution of 
modern just war theory based on the philosophy of Saint Augustine. Just war theory has 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
  7 William S Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare,” Military Review no. 5 (2004): 12–16. 
8 Michael Howard, “War and the Nation-State,” Daedalus 108, no.4 (1979): 101–110. 
9 John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of the French, 
Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and its Conduct (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 1992). 
10 Ibid. 
11 William S Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare,” Military Review no. 5 (2004): 12–16. 
12 Thomas X Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation,” Contemporary Security Policy 26, 
no. 2 (2005): 189–221. 
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three parts: jus ad bellum, justice before resorting to war; jus in bello, justice during war; 
and jus post bellum, justice at termination of war.13  
The fourth generation of warfare differs from the first three generations in that it 
uses irregular means to achieve victory over superior forces.14 The fourth generation of 
warfare has challenged the military structure established by the first three generations and 
has marked the transformation from conventional back to irregular warfare. Irregular 
warfare is considered an effective instrument against a superior force and challenges 
hegemony by using pre-modern tactics.15 The focus of this kind of warfare is to use 
unpredictable, unconventional means against a superior power to weaken its will to fight.  
The properties that differentiate irregular from conventional warfare effectively 
“blur the lines” between state and non-state actors, soldiers and civilians, politics and 
war, and peace and conflict zones.16 The population is considered the vital instrument for 
waging irregular warfare. Individual citizens are both victims and have the potential to 
become combatants. There are no defined boundaries for the battlefield; all population 
centers have the chance to become battlegrounds. The al-Qaeda attack on New York’s 
Twin Towers; the Taliban’s attack on the school in Peshawar, Pakistan; and the 
kidnapping of innocent schoolgirls by Boko Haram in Nigeria are examples of irregular 
warfare’s undefined boundaries, and indiscriminate violence against civilians. In these 
events the initiative is in the hands of the perpetrators. 
In the twenty-first century, there have been very few conventional conflicts fought 
by Western powers. The major conflicts in which Western powers remain entangled are 
irregular in nature and fought outside the West. The adversaries in these types of conflicts 
are non-state actors with their own ulterior motives. Recently, the major actors in these 
conflicts have been radical Islamic organizations that question the legitimacy of their own 
governments and the West at the same time. The religious legitimization of the conflicts 
has made them a complex phenomenon difficult to defeat. Strong and Gillum assert that 
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the distinct characteristics of irregular warfare are not easily transferrable to the dialogues 
associated with conventional warfare.17 The patterns of irregular warfare are so diverse 
that strategy and tactics used to win conventional warfare are not applicable. In the 
succeeding paragraphs, theoretically established definitions of conventional, 
unconventional, and irregular warfare are discussed to develop a foundation for this 
research. 
1. Conventional War 
Conventional warfare is considered the most well-established and customary form 
of conflict between states. Conventional war, as previously discussed, is often fought 
with civilized norms, following rules set by the international community. The main focus 
in conventional war is to defeat the enemy force while ensuring a minimum loss to the 
opponent’s population. The U.S. Army describes conventional warfare as: 
A form of warfare between states that employs direct military 
confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an 
adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to 
force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. The focus of 
conventional military operations is normally an adversary’s armed forces 
with the objective of influencing the adversary’s government. It generally 
assumes that the indigenous populations within the operational area are 
non-belligerents and will accept whatever political outcome the belligerent 
governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. A fundamental military 
objective in conventional military operations is to minimize civilian 
interference in those operations.18 
The U.S. Army’s definition of unconventional warfare serves as a guideline for the 
purpose of this research. 
In conventional warfare, the opposing armies have similarities in organization and 
follow approximately the same means to achieve the desired end state. In the present 
environment, it is difficult to geographically subjugate an opponent through conventional 
                                                 
17 Carol Strong and Joshua Gillum, “Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Strategic U.S. Military 
Engagement: Asymmetrical Relationships, Unconventional Means and International Conflict,” Paper 
prepared for Cultural Diplomacy and International Relations: New Actors, New Initiatives and New 
Targets Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Annual Conference, Berlin, Germany 15–18 November, 2011. 
18 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (FM 3–05.130) 
(Washington, D.C: Army Publishing Directorate, 2008). 
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war. The forced occupation or unlawful violation of the border by an aggressor may be 
resisted by instruments of global power such as the United Nations, and regional 
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The most distinct 
character of conventional warfare is that it is fought between states and there is little or 
no involvement of non-state actors. 
2. Unconventional Warfare 
The definition of unconventional warfare has been developed over a long period 
due to continuous developments in warfare.19 According to the U.S. Army, the creation 
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II (WWII) was the first step 
towards unconventional warfare. Initially, Unconventional operations were considered 
guerrilla and covert operations behind the enemy lines.20 The first term the U.S. Army 
used to describe unconventional warfare was “partisan warfare.”21  
According to the U.S. Army, unconventional warfare is composed of escape, 
evasion, and subversion activities.22 Over the passage of time, the definition of 
unconventional warfare evolved to incorporate necessary changes based on operational 
events. The definition of unconventional warfare is: 
Operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a 
resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military 
operations.23 
The previously-mentioned definition is considered as the definition of 
unconventional warfare in this research. Unconventional and irregular warfare tends to 
overlap and often perplexes military analysts. However, with the development of the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 31 -20) (Washington, D.C: Army 
Publishing Directorate, 2001). 
21 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (FM 3–05.130) 
(Washington, D.C: Army Publishing Directorate, 2008). 
22 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 31 -20) (Washington, D.C: Army 
Publishing Directorate, 2001). 
23 Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (FM 3–05.130) 
(Washington, D.C: Army Publishing Directorate, 2008). 
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irregular warfare definition, unconventional warfare has been added as an activity of 
irregular warfare. 
3. Irregular Warfare 
Defining irregular warfare is a difficult process, as it encompasses a wide variety 
of events and activities. Summarizing all of the events and activities into one definition 
has remained a gigantic task for military analysts and historians. The draft Irregular 
Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC) acknowledged these difficulties in forming a 
definition for irregular warfare.24 These definitional difficulties in language were then 
used in the September 2007 release of the Irregular Warfare JOC:25 
Irregular Warfare is a complex, messy, and ambiguous social phenomenon 
that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition. This 
JOC uses the term in two contexts. First, Irregular Warfare is a form of 
armed conflict. As such, it replaces the term “low-intensity conflict.” 
Second, Irregular Warfare is a form of warfare. As such, it encompasses 
insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism, raising 
them above the perception that they are somehow a lesser form of conflict 
below the threshold of warfare.26 
Rand Corporation’s monograph “Assessing Irregular Warfare” claims that the 
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense modified the current official definition of irregular warfare from one that first 
emerged during a workshop hosted for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. 
The definition was finally approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on 
April 17, 2006.  
A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and or legitimacy 
of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or 
supporting that authority. Irregular warfare favors indirect approaches, 
though it may apply the full range of military and other capabilities to seek 
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asymmetric approaches, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence 
and will.27 
According to the monograph, this definition has been widely used. However, in 
October 2006, another definition of irregular warfare was introduced, which is now 
widely accepted in the Department of Defense (DOD) as the definition of irregular 
warfare. The definition is: 
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations. Irregular Warfare favors indirect 
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the 
resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.28 
These definitions are somewhat different and are unable to fully eliminate the 
vagueness associated with defining Irregular Warfare. However, they share one 
commonality: the operating environment associated with success in conventional warfare 
is not applicable in irregular warfare. Second, success is dependent on winning 
population support and allegiance rather than on simply defeating the enemy forces. Both 
definitions emphasize that credibility, legitimacy, and will are the central focuses in 
irregular warfare. The political concept of gaining the sympathy of the population along 
with mobilization in favor of the government is largely dependent on indirect and non-
military means. The military approach alone in irregular warfare will not result in 
success. 
4. Activities of Irregular Warfare 
Irregular Warfare is innately a long, drawn-out conflict that tests the resolve of the 
defense forces and nation simultaneously.29 Irregular warfare is also dependent upon 
demography, culture, religion, and the social outlook of society. Irregular warfare is a 
violent struggle, but success is not merely dependent on weaponry, platforms, and 
                                                 
27 Eric V Larson, Derek Eaton, Nichiporuk Brian, and Szayna S Thomas, Assessing Irregular 
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28 Department of  Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC), (Washington D.C: 
Department of Defense, 2007). 
29 Ibid. 
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advanced technology. Success in irregular warfare is centered on winning over the 
population and establishing enduring partnerships at the local level.30  
According to the irregular warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC), there is a 
range of operations that constitute IW activities. The joint operating concept includes: 
Insurgency, counter insurgency operations (COIN), unconventional 
warfare, terrorism, counter terrorism, foreign internal defense, stability 
security, transition and reconstructions (SSTR), strategic communication, 
psychological operations, civil military operations, information operations, 
intelligence and counter intelligence (CI) activities, transnational criminal 
activities (including narcotics trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal 
financial transactions that support or sustain Irregular Warfare) and Law 
enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries.31 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Warfare is undergoing constant evolution due to rapid development of human 
society. The old ways and means by which to achieve success may be becoming obsolete. 
The twentieth century has witnessed transformation of warfare from conventional to 
irregular. There is a noticeable transformation of warfare from the third to the fourth 
generation.32 The major conflicts in which the world is embroiled presently are irregular 
in nature. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Maoist 
Rebels are a few of the major non-state actors playing significant role in fighting modern 
and well-equipped armies. 
These non-state actors are challenging the technological, financial, and 
organizational superiority of the well-trained armies by using irregular warfare. Irregular 
warfare is an instrument in the hands of the perpetrators for subduing large armies. The 
reason for their success is not merely the use of irregular warfare; rather it is ignorance of 
the regular armies of this emerging trend. Armies around the globe are still more focused 
and organized to fight conventional war instead of countering irregular warfare. The 
doctrine, weaponry, and training focus on the third generation of warfare, which is quite 
different from the contemporary requirement. The nine principles of war are considered 
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as guiding principles in conventional warfare for formulation of strategy and execution of 
battles. In irregular warfare the interpretation of these principles require deliberation and 
reconsideration. The difference and similarities between the two generations of warfare 
must be specified for better organizing defense forces. The organizational, training, and 
executional changes require for defeating irregular warfare cannot be carried out without 
an in-depth analysis of both types of warfare. The differences and similarities (if any) can 
help the military decision-maker to reorganize his or her structure of the defense forces.  
The other problem in developing an understanding of the transforming nature of 
warfare is the gap between qualitative and quantitative analysis. Warfare has been studied 
mostly in separate qualitative and quantitative spheres. There is a void between these two 
methods of studying warfare that results in misunderstanding at the executional end. The 
operational research methodology of statistical analysis and combat modeling effectively 
combined with the qualitative approach can be used for discovering the important factors 
for winning battles.  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
1. Research Questions 
This research is guided by the following questions. 
1. What are battle-winning factors for conventional and irregular warfare? 
2. What long-term trends in battles can be identified using historical combat 
data? 
3. What are the major variables that differ between conventional and 
irregular warfare? 
4. What are the means to predict future irregular conflicts based on social 
development indicators? 
2. Methodology 
This thesis differs from previous studies on combat in many ways. The focus of 
this study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to find answers to relevant 
questions on warfare. The study is conducted using statistical analysis of available data 
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on conventional and irregular warfare. The previous work on the subject has been either 
qualitatively or quantitatively focused, and mostly in the domain of conventional warfare. 
Irregular warfare has been neglected by major researchers in the past in favor of a focus 
on conventional warfare. However, for the last decade, most of the conflicts have been 
irregular in nature. This thesis examines in depth both types of warfare using both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The focus of this thesis is to transform analytical, 
mathematical, and combat modeling analysis into simple language so that it can be 
understood and implemented by executors.  
The statistical analysis is done on various datasets separately. First, conventional 
battles are analyzed based on the CDB90G dataset. The analysis is carried out based on 
variables selected in accordance with the principles of war to determine factors affecting 
the outcomes of battle, factors associated with victory, and long-term trends. The U.S. 
military has not maintained any readily available database for irregular conflicts. 
Irregular conflicts are evaluated using different open source databases, which include the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),33 Correlates of War Project 
(COW),34 and the University of Uppsala conflict database.35 These datasets are evaluated 
to determine trends for winning battles, the nature of conflicts, and the likelihood of 
irregular conflicts in the future. 
3. Hypothesis 
Conventional and irregular warfare are vastly different; however many military 
planners seem to have ignored this fact while carrying out planning. The famous 
Clausewitz maxims, which are applicable in conventional warfare, may be interpreted 
differently when dealing with irregular warfare. The overlapping of these two different 
forms of warfare sometime leads to cataclysm. This requires detailed analysis of different 
battles associated with both forms of warfare to identify the commonalities and 
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dissimilarities between the two forms. With identification of these we can determine 
battle-winning factors.  
4. Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II focuses on the literature 
review and statistical techniques in the field of combat analysis. Chapter III begins with 
an overview of the principles of war and selection of variables for the purpose of 
analyzing the conventional warfare datasets. Chapter III incorporates data analysis and 
descriptive statistics for conventional battles between 1600 and 1982. Chapter IV 
analyzes three different datasets to determine trends in irregular warfare between 1818 
and 2013. Chapter IV deals with statistical analysis of data related to irregular warfare 
from the Correlates of War dataset. In Chapter VI, we first model the conventional 
warfare dataset using a classification tree technique to determine important trends and 
variables in conventional battles. Next, we model an irregular conflict dataset using a 
boosted tree technique to determine important factors in irregular warfare. Chapter VII 
provides detailed findings and recommendations for future studies. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Study the past if you would define the future” 
–Confucius 
 
A. STUDY OF WARFARE 
The fundamental reason to study warfare is its continuous and ever-transforming 
nature and its everlasting impact on human civilization.36 In Clausewitz’s concept, war is 
a continuity of politics: it certainly leaves an impact on the participants. If an effective 
prediction had been made available using statistics, the losing side of many battles may 
have opted to surrender rather than dying. The statistical analysis and theory of combat 
might provide the means for increasing the odds of victory.  
The second fundamental reason for studying war is that it provides an opportunity 
to analyze complex human conduct in different conditions. There are no simple 
explanations to these complex dynamics. The study of these conditions can provide 
insight into war and assist in exploring factors involved in winning the battles. The 
resources, strategy, and tactics are the common variables normally associated with 
victory.37 There are two basic methods used by the analyst to predict warfare: statistical 
analysis and combat modeling.  
1. Statistical Analysis 
The study of history should be, as Clausewitz suggested, meant to educate the 
mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, 
not to accompany him to the battlefield; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a 
young man’s intellectual development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the 
                                                 
36 Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
37 C. William Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy. Revised and Expanded 
Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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rest of his life.38 The British historian and military analyst Sir Michael Howard observed 
that studying warfare within a historical perspective helps leaders to gain insight into 
warfare and make wise decisions.39  
Statistical analysis is a method widely used for understanding the complexities 
involved in war and predicting the future based on historical data. Analysts use data 
based on different battles and campaigns to statistically explore and reveal historical 
trends. Thus, statistical analysis can give guidance for executing the war, and military 
leaders should use statistical analysis for their benefit. Analysts in the field have tried to 
answer inquiries that relate to long-term established principles of war, such as attrition, 
rates of advance, force ratios, and battle termination rules.40 According to Helmbold, 
Roman analyst Vegetius did the first statistical work on warfare in 380 AD to calculate 
the rate of advance.41 Helmbold, in his research “Rates of Advance in Historical Land 
Combat Operations,” also compared the works of 34 analysts who studied the rates of 
advance. All of these analyses focused on providing military leaders information 
associated with success in battles. 
2. Combat Modeling  
The second method used by military analysts is combat modeling. A model 
provides a simplified representation of reality (Figure 1).42 According to the Defense 
Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO), a model is defined as “A physical, 
mathematical, or otherwise logical representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or 
process.”43 Models can be of different types, such as physical, engineering, 
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39 Michael Howard, “The Causes of Wars,” The Wilson Quarterly (1984): 90–103. 
40 Muzaffer Coban, “Predicting Battle Outcomes with Classification Trees” (master’s thesis, Naval 
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41 Helmbold L Robert, Rates of Advance in Historical Land Combat Operations. (CAA-RP-90-1). 
Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1990. 
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Digest 26, no. 4 (2005). 
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mathematical, or computer programs depending on the purpose for which they are 
conceived. Combat models are generalizations of conflicts, their situations, and possible 
realizations.44  
Figure 1.  Modeling Process Flow 
 
 
The Kriegsspiel wargames developed in the early nineteenth century by the 
Prussian Army for purposes of training, planning, and testing are considered the earliest 
combat models.45 These models played an important role in the military operations that 
led to the unification of Germany in 1871. The British engineer Frederick Lanchester 
formulated a set of mathematical equations during World War I (WWI) to demonstrate 
opposing force relationships.46 These equations became the famous Lanchester force-on-
force combat model. WWII witnessed the formal development of combat modeling by 
the Allied forces to achieve war objectives. 
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45 Ibid. 
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However, the revolution of computer technology further expanded this field. 
Combat models now have become more complicated, and require detailed analysis.47 
According to Macal and North, “many of these models are high-definition, large 
simulations or agent-based models focusing on modeling conflict by a group of 
individual entities.”48 These models are useful in defining processes, building systems 
such as air defense, determining attrition rates, analyzing trade-offs between different 
factors involved in the acquisition process, determining operational plans, and defining 
long-term organizational goals.49 These models can sometimes be misleading, too, since 
they are just abstractions of reality and not reality in and of themselves. However, it is the 
analysts who, with human judgment, produce useful results. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In the past, various organizations and authors have analyzed the factors for 
winning battles based on historical data and combat models. Some previous studies of 
combat using historical data are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.  
1. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) 
From 1983 to 1984, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) 
prepared a database of 601 battles and engagements from 1600 to 1973 AD for the U.S. 
Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA).50 The HERO database consists of seven tables 
covering battle identification, operational and environmental variables, strengths and 
losses, intangible factors, outcome, factors affecting the outcome, combat forms, and 
scheme of resolution.51 
                                                 
47 Andreas Tolk, Engineering Principles of Combat Modeling and Distributed Simulation (Hoboken, 
NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 
48 Charles M Macal, and North J Michael, “Tutorial on Agent-based Modelling and Simulation,”  
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NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).. 
50 Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Numbers, predictions, and war: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors 
and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Virginia: NOVA Publications 1985). 
51 Helmbold L Robert. and Khan A Aqeel, Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE). 
(CAA-TP-86-2) (Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, 1986). 
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There is an immense amount of data captured on battle experience in this 
database. The time spans a broad range of technologies and hence should allow analysts 
to discover important trends. The database is mainly representative of short, pitched-land 
combat battles fought by division and corps-sized military formations during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and North America. It does not contain any 
sea or air battles; sieges of heavily fortified positions; action from the Korean, Malayan, 
Algerian, or Vietnamese Wars; or extensive data on WWII. It contains hardly any Asian, 
African, Middle East, or South American wars, except for the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967–
1973. The following table summarizes the HERO database: 
Table 1.   Hero Database Descriptive Statistics52 
SCOPE OF DATABASE 
Total Number of Battles 601 
Battle Dates 1600–1973 A.D. 
Total Engaged Strength 89 x106  troops 
Total Engaged Troop Days 1.1 x109  troops 
Total Battle Casualties 19 x 106 troops 
Average Casualty Rate 2% per troop day 
Total Battle Days 2,300 days 
Total Area Gained by Attacker 1.3 x106 sq km 
 
 
2. Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE)  
The database prepared by HERO was unique and of great potential, yet CAA was 
unable to use it directly for studies and analysis because it did not provide quantitative 
trends and interrelations.53 As a result, CAA established the CHASE project in 1984,54 
with the objective of searching for historically-based quantitative results for use in 
military operations research, concept formulation, war-gaming, studies, and analyses. 





These five essential elements of analysis guided the study: factors associated with victory 
in battle, long-term trends in historical combat data, factors influencing rate of advance, 
the effect of air support on battle outcome, and preparation of databases for quantitative 
analysis.55 
CHASE carried out a descriptive analysis of the aforementioned factors 
associated with select battles, measuring battle outcome based on the six “surrogate” 
variables. A detail description of these variables is discussed in succeeding paragraphs:  
(1) Force ratio (FR) is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s number of 
personnel (X0) to the defender’s personnel (Y0). 
FR= X0 / Y0 
Bitterness (EPS) is derived on Lanchester Equations. It is defined as 
EPS = SQRT (Attacker’s Fractional Loss (FX)* Defender’s Fractional 
Loss (FY)) 
Attacker’s Fractional Loss (FX) is defined as 
Attacker Number of Casualties / Attacker Number of Personnel 
Defender’s Fractional Loss (FY) is defined as 
FY = Defender’s Number of Casualties / Defender Number of Personnel 
(2) Casualty exchange ratio (CER) is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s 
casualties (CX) to the defender’s casualties (CY). 
CER = CX/ CY 
(3) Fractional exchange ratio (FER) is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s to 
the defender’s fractional losses. 
FER=FX/FY 
(4) Advantage (ADV) is defender empirical advantage parameter. 
ADV=(1/2)*LOG (FER) 
(5) Residual advantage (RESADV) is residual value of advantage (ADV) 
after the average effects of any differences in force ratio (FR) values are 
removed.56 It is written as 
RESADV= ADV  − a −  b *LOG (FR) 




a and b are the regression coefficients. 
These variables, since the completion of the CHASE study, have been used by 
various authors to study the outcome of war. This thesis also considers these variables. 
a. Non–WWII Battles Data Subset 
The CHASE study used logistic regression as the principal technique to assess the 
degree to which the surrogate variables are related to conventional battle outcome 
categories (win, lose, or draw). The basic results from the logistic regression computation 
are presented in Table 2. The column labeled L(0) gives the log likelihood value from 
logistic regression. The columns labeled a (1,0), a (1,1), a (2,0), and a (2,1) give the 
maximum likelihood parameter values of the logistic function of the non-WWII data 
subset used. The columns labeled SD (1,0), SD (1,1), SD (2,0), and SD (2,1) give the 
standard deviations of the maximum likelihood parameters. 
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Table 2.   CHASE Logistic Regression Results57 
  






















ADV 427 -469 -219 -1.527 0.26 -3.783 0.80 0.247 0.15 -5.997 0.63 
LOG(FER) 427 -469 -219 -1.522 0.26 -1.733 0.37 0.242 0.15 -2.770 0.29 
RESADV 427 -469 -222 -1.214 0.24 -3.477 0.78 0.770 0.16 -6.136 0.63 
LOG(CER) 427 -469 -239 -1.248 0.26 -1.225 0.32 0.888 0.16 -2.308 0.24 
LOG(EPS) 427 -469 -354 -1.832 0.54  0.013 0.22 0.905 0.27 0.164 0.11 
LOG(FR) 435 -478 -362 -1.892 0.25  0.364 0.30 0.468 0.11 0.326 0.16 
 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
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b. Ranking of Variables  
The increase in log likelihood expressed through the quantity (Max.L - L(0) ) 
provides a rough measure of the relative quality of the logistic regression fit. For this 
measure, the variables ADV, LOG (FER), and RESADV are approximately tied for best 
fit. The variable LOG (CER) is next best. The variables LOG (EPS) and LOG (FR) are 
approximately tied for worst fit. Table 2 also shows that the variables ADV and LOG 
(FER) are essentially equivalent with regard to logistic regression. Surprisingly, force 
ratio is an inadequate predictor of victory in battle. Both advantage and fractional 
exchange ratios are much more closely related to victory than is the force ratio. 
3. McQuie’s Benchmarks Study 
McQuie conducted a study in 1988 to identify quantitative measures for 
comparing historical data and the results of simulations and war games.58 The study was 
carried out on a dataset comprising 601 battles generated from various studies over the 
past 25 years by DuPuy.59 These data have been assembled under a contract with CAA 
and now constitute the Army’s database of historical battles. McQuie argued future 
battles would not replicate past ones; however, predicting factors in winning future 
battles requires credible comparisons with past battles. McQuie computed 28 different 
ratios and rates from the data and gave measures of variability, as shown in Table 3. The 





                                                 
58 Robert McQuine, Historical Characteristics of Combat for Wargames. Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army 
Concepts Analysis Agency, 1988. 
59  Dupuy N. Trevor, The Dupuy Institute2015. http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tndupuy.htm. 
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Table 3.   Measures of Variability60 
 











Ratio of High 





High: 1967 Egypt: Israel 17:1 






High: 1945 USA: Japan 50:1 
450:1 





High: 1943 Britain: 
Germany 
132 





High: 1944 USA: Japan 444 





High: 1945 USA: Japan 96% 740:1 







High: 1967 Israel: Syria 92% 






High: 1967 Israel: Egypt 45 
450:1 Low: 1945 USA: Japan 0.1 
 
                                                 
60 Robert McQuine, Historical Characteristics of Combat for Wargames. Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army 
Concepts Analysis Agency, 1988. 
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4. Bracken’s Attrition Model of Ardennes Campaign 
In 1995, Bracken analyzed the Ardennes campaign carried out during World War 
II.61 Bracken presented four Lanchester models of the campaign and estimated their 
parameters.62 Bracken formed homogenous weighted models that comprised elements 
such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and manpower to yield a measure of 
strength to the Allied and German forces. Two of Bracken’s models consisted of five 
parameters: Allied individual effectiveness, German individual effectiveness, exponent of 
shooting force, exponent of target force, and a tactical parameter reflecting which side 
was defending or attacking. The other two Bracken models were formed after removing 
the “tactical parameter, which is not generally known prior to a battle.” Bracken 
concluded that the “Lanchester linear model fits the Ardennes campaign data.” For the 
model consisting only of combat forces, Allied individual effectiveness was greater than 
the Germans’. For the model consisting of both combat and support forces, Allied and 
German effectiveness was equal; the Allies used more forces in combat support, which 
enhanced their individual combat efficiency. 
5. Clemens’s Study of the Battle of Kursk  
Clemens (1997) examined the validity of the Lanchester Models applied to 
modern warfare.63 Clemens applied the Lanchester models to the Battle of Kursk data.64 
Clemens uses two estimation techniques, linear regression and Newton–Raphson 
iteration. His analysis also explores the presented model in matrix form and compares the 
matrix solution to the scalar solution. In his study, he concludes that neither Lanchester 
linear nor square models fit the data, whereas the Lanchester logarithmic model in both 
scalar and matrix forms fits.  
                                                 
61 Jerome Bracken, “Lanchester Models of the Ardennes Campaign,” Naval Research Logistic 42, no. 
4 (1995): 559–577. 
62 Ibid. 
63 SC Clemens, “The Application of  Lanchester Models to the Battle of Kursk,” Unpublished 
Manuscript, Yale University 5, (1997). 
64 Ibid. 
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6. Fricker’s Study of the Ardennes Campaign  
In 1998, Fricker reexamined the Ardennes campaign and Bracken’s model using 
the Lanchester equations.65 He used a different approach than Bracken. Fricker extended 
Bracken’s analysis by using linear regression on the dataset for the entire campaign. 
Fricker explored the complete battle dataset in contrast to Bracken, who only evaluated 
the first ten days of battle data.66 Fricker also included data on air sorties in his study and 
evaluated the impact of air on the battle. Fricker’s conclusions are different from 
Bracken’s: he concluded that Lanchester’s basic models (linear and square) do not fit the 
Ardennes campaign, which is in direct contrast to the Bracken study. 
7. Hartley and Helmbold’s Application of the Lanchester Square Model 
Hartley and Helmbold utilized linear regression to test whether the Lanchester 
square model applies to the Inchon-Seoul campaign of the Korean War.67 Their dataset 
consisted of manpower only, and they attempted to model just United States casualties. 
Hartley and Helmbold use three analysis techniques to examine the data: linear 
regression, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Bozdogan’s consistent AIC 
(CAIC).68 In addition, they introduced the use of change points at certain phases in the 
campaign and then refitted the model at each of these change points. They concluded that 
the data do not fit a Lanchester square law with a constant coefficient and that more real 
data are required for validating the Lanchester square law.69 
                                                 
65 Ronald D Fricker, “Attrition Models of the Ardennes Campaign,” Naval Research Logistics 45, no. 
1 (1998): 1–22. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Dean S. Hartley and Robert L. Helmbold, “Validating Lanchester’s Square Law and Other Attrition 




8. Lucas and Turkes’s Study on the Battles of Kursk and Ardennes 
Lucas and Turkes extend previous research by validating Lanchester’s equation 
with real data.70 They developed an understanding of highly aggregated attrition by 
fitting the homogenous generalized Lanchester model to the time-phased data of the 
battles of Kursk and Ardennes. Their study assisted in developing the campaign-level 
simulation. They followed a new method to discover the optimal factor values and to 
develop an insight into how various factors combined explain the battle. Their study 
concluded that most of the Lanchester model fit the data well if the battle is broken into 
phases. The study also found that choosing correct coefficients would yield consistent 
results irrespective of the law used. The study also proved that the constant attrition 
coefficient does not fit the Lanchester law very well.71 
9. Lucas and Dinges’ Study on the Battle of Kursk 
Lucas and Dinges study the effect of battle circumstances on fitting Lanchester 
equations to the battle of Kursk. Lucas and Dinges used the Center for Army Analysis’s 
data for the southern front of the battle of Kursk. This dataset is unique since it captures 
the daily combat status of all divisional-level units. The dataset categorized units into 
three different categories: first, all combat forces in the campaign; Second, all combat 
forces within contact; and third, all combat forces that are actively engaged. They 
concluded that more of the variation in casualties during the battle of Kursk is explained 
by the category of the force considered and the phases of the battle than by the 
Lanchester variant used. Better fits were obtained by using forces that were actively 
engaged. Moreover, they were able to improve results of their model by dividing battles 
according to natural phases. Finally, they concluded that Lanchester’s linear law fits 
better than the logarithmic law.72 
                                                 
70 Thomas W. Lucas and Turkes Turker, “Fitting Lanchester Equations to the Battles of Kursk and 
Ardennes,” Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 51, no. 1 (2004), 95–116. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Thomas W. Lucas and John A. Dinges, “The Effect of Battle Circumstances on Fitting Lanchester 
Equations to the Battle of Kursk,” Military Operations Research 9, no. 2 (2004), 17–30. 
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10. Yigit’s Thesis  
Yigit explored “important factors in battle through a statistical analysis of data 
from major historical battles.”73 Yigit carried out a comprehensive analysis seeking 
patterns, trends, and relations in combat. Yigit organized the dataset by chronological 
order of the campaigns and focused on exploring force ratio, dispersion, and daily 
casualty rates. The famous force ratio of 3:1 has always dominated military planning and 
remains a point of discussion as one of the most important variables in warfare. Yigit 
explored this important factor and concluded that in 68%of the battles, a force ratio of 3:1 
led to victory. His findings on force ratio are tabulated below: 
Table 4.   Probability of Attacker Win Given Force Ratio74 
  
PROBABILITY OF ATTACKER WIN  
3 or More 3-2.5 2.5-2 2-1.5 1.5-1.4 1.4-1.3 1.3-1-1 1 or less 
0.679 0.657 0.619 0.613 0.461 0.523 0.485 0.513 
 
From Yigit’s findings, if an attacker has numerical superiority, success is likely. 
Yigit concluded with the probability of winning based on force ratio in his statistical 






                                                 
73 Faruk Yigit, “Finding the Important Factors in Battle Outcomes: A Statistical Exploration of Data 
from Major Battles” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000). 
74 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.  Probability of Winning75 
 
 
While analyzing dispersion on the battlefield, Yigit observed that dispersion 
increased as casualties decreased, despite increasing lethality of weapons.  
Table 5.   Density and Dispersion of Troops through History (Man per 
Km2)76 
  
DENSITY AND DISPERSION 








1805 Napoleonic War 4494.420 3232.00 222.498 309.406 
1861 American Civil War 3378.293 2838.674 296.007 352.77 
1870 Franco –Russian War 2125.886 2838.674 296.007 352.77 
1914 WW-I 345.168 186.745 28975.142 5354.895 
1944 WW-II 72.584 30.902 13777.154 32360.108 
1973 Arab –Israel 1973 35.031 29.928 28546.274 33413.389 
 




Yigit identified three trends in daily casualty rates that have generally declined 
over the past four centuries and almost leveled off at the rates experienced in WWII and 
the Arab-Israel wars. The casualty rates of the attackers were almost always lower than 
those of the defenders. Yigit also observed that casualty values decreased as the unit size 
in the battle increased. The daily casualty rates of small units are higher than those of the 
large forces under the same circumstances. He identified two principal reasons: first, 
small combat forces had very few individuals who were not related to combat, and 
second, control over the units is enhanced in the battlefield when the size of the unit 
increased.  
11. Coban’s Thesis  
Coban used classification trees and divided the data into response, objective, and 
relative variables to predict outcomes of battles.77 Coban divided the dataset into five 
subsets, as shown in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Division of Data into Subsets78 
DIVISION OF DATA INTO SUBSETS 
SUBSET 
NO 
SUBSET SIZE TRAINING 
SET 
SIZE TEST SET SIZE 
1 1600-1847 164 1600-1799 109 1799-1847 55 
2 1805-1918 260 1805-1915 178 1916-1918 82 
3 1920-1945 202 1920-1944 131 1944-1945 71 
4 1940-1982 223 1940-1948 150 1950-1982 73 
5 1600-1982 658 1600-1944 435 1940-1982 223 
 
                                                 
77 Muzaffer Coban, “Predicting Battle Outcomes with Classification Trees” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2001). 
78 Ibid. 
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Coban concluded that models using only objective variables resulted in high 
misclassification rates, whereas models based on both objective and relative variables 
resulted in low misclassification rates. He concluded that objective variables alone are 
not reliable predictors of battle outcome. Furthermore, the variables affecting outcomes 
have changed through history. Specifically, earlier battles have fewer relevancies with 
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III. STATISTICAL EXPLORATION 
A. DATA ANALYSIS FOR WARFARE STUDIES 
Military historians predict future warfare based on the prism of history using 
analytical and qualitative analysis. During the nineteenth century, with the evolution of 
modern mathematics, statistics, and operations research techniques, warfare analysis 
became more quantitative. Because history is written by the victors, data are often biased. 
The fog of war, too, makes accurate data collection difficult. However, this limitation can 
be mitigated by applying British Military historian Sir Michael Howard’s concept of 
studying both the depth and breadth of warfare.79 Statistically speaking, we can mitigate 
these effects by sampling a large amount of data (depth) and evaluating a significant 
number of variables for analysis (breadth). This may reduce some forms of bias and will 
hopefully give a fairly balanced picture. 
Correlating battle data can help analysts predict future trends in warfare. This 
research endeavors to determine the important variables in winning battles and war for 
both conventional and irregular warfare. Different datasets are explored during this study: 
the first dataset, CDB90G, is of conventional battles, the second dataset, from ACLED, is 
of politically violent conflicts, and the third dataset, from the Correlate of War (COW) 
project, is of both conventional and irregular warfare.  
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CDB90G DATASET  
For the analysis of conventional battles, the CDB90G dataset is analyzed. This 
dataset is not randomly selected and the compiler of data does not provide information on 
selection criteria for battles to be included in the dataset. This dataset includes 664 battles 
between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. The first battle in the dataset is the 
battle of Nieuport, which was carried out during the Netherlands war of independence at 
Spanish Flanders. The last battle in the dataset is the 1982 battle of Lebanon, which took 
place at Bekka. The dataset has a total of 206 variables; however, analysis does not 
                                                 
79 Howard, Michael. “The Causes of Wars,” The Wilson Quarterly (1984): 90–103. 
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include all of them during modeling. The variables are selected based on theories of war 
and professional military knowledge. Before the selection of each variable, it is essential 
to review the dataset in order to gain insight into missing values. There are a total of 
46,456 missing values in the dataset, details of which are given in Table 7. These missing 
values appear in order of variable name. A codebook for dataset CDB90G contains 
variable names and relevant details. The missing values can cause biases in analysis. 
However, tree modeling can effectively mitigate missing values. 
Table 7.   Missing Values in Data 
MISSING VALUES IN DATA 
NationA NationD ATPBYR2 ATPBMN2 ATPBDA2 ATPBHR2 ATPEYR2 
4 4 564 564 564 564 564 
ATPEMN2 ATPEDA2 ATPEHR2 ATPBYR3 ATPBMN3 ATPBDA3 ATPBHR3 
564 564 564 623 623 623 623 
ATPEYR3 ATPEMN3 ATPEDA3 ATPEHR3 ATPBYR4 ATPBMN4 ATPBDA4 
623 623 623 623 650 650 650 
ATPBHR4 ATPEYR4 ATPEMN4 ATPEDA4 ATPEHR4 ATPBYR5 ATPBMN5 
650 650 650 650 650 656 656 
ATPBDA5 ATPBHR5 ATPEYR5 ATPEMN5 ATPEDA5 ATPEHR5 ATPBYR6 
656 656 656 656 656 656 659 
ATPBMN6 ATPBDA6 ATPBHR6 ATPEYR6 ATPEMN6 ATPEDA6 ATPEHR6 
659 659 659 659 659 659 659 
ATPBYR7 ATPBMN7 ATPBDA7 ATPBHR7 ATPEYR7 ATPEMN7 ATPEDA7 
663 663 663 663 663 663 663 
ATPEHR7 ATPBYR8 ATPBMN8 ATPBDA8 ATPBHR8 ATPEYR8 ATPEMN8 
663 663 663 663 663 663 663 
ATPEDA8 ATPEHR8 ATPBYR9 ATPBMN9 ATPBDA9 ATPBHR9 ATPEYR9 
663 663 664 664 664 664 664 
ATPEMN9 ATPEDA9 ATPEHR9 ATPBYR10 ATPBMN10 ATPBDA10 ATPBHR10 
664 664 664 664 664 664 664 
ATPEYR10 ATPEMN10 ATPEDA10 ATPEHR10    
664 664 664 664    
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In addition to missing values, there are 101 variables whose results for 24,210 
values are unknown. There is a difference between missing and unknown values. While 
there is no numeric descriptor for missing values, unknown values for different variables 
have numeric descriptors. Most of the unknown and missing values are not required for 
our analysis. However, it is essential for future studies that these be identified and 
documented. Details of unknown values are given in Table 8, and the corresponding 
codebook contains detail regarding the variables. 
Table 8.   Unknown Values in Data 
UNKNOWN VALUES IN DATA 
COA WOFA1 WOFD1 YR1 MO1 DA1 Hr1 
42 17 47 629 629 629 652 
WOFA2 WOFD2 YR2 MO2 DA2 HR2 WOFA3 
622 622 629 629 629 653 660 
WOFD3 YR3 MO3 DA3 HR3 Front  Depth 
660 660 660 660 663 50 50 
Time AERO STRA INTSTA REPRA CASA FINSTA 
50 38 -1 128 272 6 188 
STRD INTSTD RERPD CASD FINSTD CAVA TANKA 
1 135 275 4 181 81 19 
LTA MBTA ARTYA FLYA CTANKA CARTYA CFLYA 
94 94 107 132 111 434 326 
CAVD TANKD LTD MBTD ARTYD FLYD CTANKD 
79 20 91 91 121 144 101 
CARTYD CFLYD CEA LEADA TRNGA MORALA LOGSA 
406 269 38 38 38 38 38 
MOMNTA INTELA TECHA INITA WINA KMDA ACHA 
38 38 38 38 2 26 38 
ACHD CRIT QUALA RESA MOBILA AIRA FPREPA 
38 62 38 38 38 38 38 
WXA TERRA LEADAA PLANA SURPA MANA LOGSAA 
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
FORTSA DEEPA PR1A1 PRIA2 PR1A3 SECA1 SECA2 
38 38 11 479 587 502 577 
SECA3 RESOA1 RESOA2 RESOA3 PRID1 PRID2 PRID3 
660 24 277 588 40 424 634 
SECD1 SECD2 SECD3 RESOD1 RESOD2 RESOD3 ATPHR1 
652 658 664 118 532 651 319 
ATPEHRI ATPBHR2 ATPEHR2     
320 1 1     
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C. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
Theorists of military science have pursued through history primary laws or 
theories that explain both the relations of military forces in combat and the outcomes of 
battles.80 Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, and Fuller are prominent military thinkers who 
carried out qualitative analysis on historical battles. On the other hand, theorists such as 
Lanchester carried out quantitative analysis of warfare. These two approaches for study 
are distinct, but the common foundation on which they stand aims to determine 
conditions that facilitate attaining victory.  
Military literature is full of theoretical observations on warfare. Great captains of 
warfare such as Napoleon have always benefitted from the theories of their predecessors 
to ensure success in battle. Napoleon found inspiration from the writings of Reveries on 
the Art of War by Maurice de Saxe and Instructions to His General by Frederick the 
Great of Prussia. Napoleon, although unable to produce a scriptural form of war theory, 
established concepts on the battlefield in an articulated manner. In his correspondence 
and recorded statements, he made it clear that his concepts of war had been derived from 
studying the campaigns of earlier great generals.81 Henry Jomini, a Swedish officer in 
Napoleon’s army, endeavored to explain Napoleon’s theories and tried to model them.  
Carl Von Clausewitz, a contemporary of Jomini’s, wrote about many aspects of 
war, but his approach focused on two particular aspects, activities and characteristics of 
war; some of these characteristics included level of violence and passion, human 
behavior, and politics. Clausewitz’s concept centers on a ratio between two forces based 
on number of troops, variable circumstances, and quality of force. The greater the number 
favors the red and at one the forces are equal. 
Contemporary theorists developed models based on historical records, which have 
helped generations of military students understand warfare from a historical perspective 
and for winning battles. The first great American theorist to compile his own rules 
                                                 
80   Earle Mead Edward, Craig Alexander Gordon, and Gilbert Felix, Makers of Modern Strategy: 
Military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1943). 
 81 GC. D, Aguilar, Napoleon’s Maxims of War with notes by General Burnod (Pennsylvania, Pa: 
David McKay, 1902). 
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relevant to military theory was Dennis Hart Mahan. Although he never tried to produce a 
theory, he is highly respected for his work. Another military theorist who inspired 
generations through his work is Helmuth von Moltke. He gave concept to a combined 
tactical defense with strategic offensive. John F. C. Fuller, the greatest military thinker of 
the twentieth century, synthesized the concepts of earlier military theorists. Fuller, as a 
British officer, studied military history, particularly the campaigns of Napoleon, seeking 
insight into the basic principles of war.82 In 1921, Fuller wrote The Principles of War, 
proposing the following fundamentals of battle.83 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =  (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁)(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁) 
   where 
   b = indices of blue force, 
   r = indices of red force, 
   N= number of troops, 
   V = variable circumstances, 
   Q= quality of force. 
1. Objective 
The objective can also be described as the mission, aim, or purpose. Objective is 
unquestionably the most important of all the principles of war.84 Without an objective, all 
other principles of war are invalid. The objective of war should be clear at all echelons: 
policy makers, public, and the armed forces. Once the objective has been stated and 
understood, the problem is simplified. 
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Mass measures force superiority at the point of contact. In other words, it is 
superiority that must be sustained as long as the situation requires. Mass is not only 
numerical superiority, but also a combination of firepower, skills, weapons, discipline, 
resolve, leadership, administration, and morale.85 
3. Offensive 
The offensive is simply taking the war to the enemy. The ultimate goal for waging 
war is to attain victory, which can only be achieved through offensive spirit. Well-
organized army formations, well-equipped air forces, and large naval fleets are useless if 
no offensive spirit exists. Victory is not won by passive defense, which merely averts 
defeat.86 
4. Surprise 
Surprise is considered the greatest weapon in war. It is essentially one of the most 
effective methods for obtaining victory. Surprise is best defined as the creation of 
unexpected situations for which the enemy has not properly prepared.87 Factors of 
surprise include secrecy, preparation, rapidity of execution, and deception. 
5. Security 
The prevention of hostile interference is known as security. The mission of 
security is to prevent plans from falling into enemy hands and, thus, provide freedom of 
movement. Security means not only denial of information to the enemy but also the 
ability to obtain information about the enemy.88 







Movement is the ability to change the location of forces. Many successful 
commanders of the past were able to defeat their enemies due to their ability to rapidly 
move forces. Movement initiates mass. It is the way in which a force reaches an area to 
achieve an objective. If a commander is able to concentrate a force at a threatened point, 
he will have more opportunities to achieve victory. Movement is dependent on logistics 
and flexibility of planning.89 
7. Economy of Force 
The complement to mass is economy of force, which means employing the fewest 
resources required at a decisive time and place. Economy of force does not denote 
stinginess but intelligence to skillfully use a force. Another term for economy of force is 
force optimization. Its application involves questioning what is and what is not necessary. 
This principle deals with the two demands of dispersion and concentration.  
8. Cooperation 
Cooperation is a unifying principle of war. Whereas the objective designates a 
common aim, cooperation denotes a common methodology for achieving an objective. It 
is a fusion of forces to produce a desired result through a common understanding. 
Cooperation brings the full power of the nation against the enemy’s military, political, 
economic, financial, and psychological domains.90 
9. Simplicity 
Simplicity allows observance of all other principles of war. A simple plan is 
easier to execute than a complex one. Simple and direct methods usually preserve the 
elasticity needed to meet the ever-changing situations of conflicts.91  





D. PRINCIPLES OF WAR: THE U.S. MILITARY 
Fuller’s nine principles of war laid the foundation for theoretical studies of 
warfare in the twentieth century. These principles are interesting guidelines for battles, 
but are neither sacred nor immutable. Blindly following these principles may not always 
lead to victory because war is stochastic in nature and is affected by numerous factors. 
However, based on these principles, different armies have developed principles of war 
that are applicable to their own situations—ones tailored to national needs.  
Warfare has evolved over time; social events and the development of society have 
determined the evolution of conflicts. The conflicts that most armies face today are 
entirely different from conflicts of the past. The principles that Fuller illustrated were 
primarily for conventional conflicts in which adversaries were nation states. Present 
conflicts are more irregular in nature—whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or Africa—
and more ideologically based than past conflicts. The basic principles of war may not be 
applicable in this kind of warfare. This leads to debate among military historians, 
theorists, and researchers over the value of qualitative and quantitative means of analysis. 
However, this thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to assess the 
applicability of these principles in the present environment, based on available data. The 
U.S. Armed Forces have also increased the number of principles of war from nine to 
twelve. The three new principles of war, which have been added to the nine old 
principles, are restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.  
E. SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
The Center for Army Analysis (CAA) CDB90G dataset is very comprehensive, 
with 206 variables, some of which are not relevant for our analysis purpose. To determine 
favorable conditions for victory, it is necessary that relevant variables should be selected. 
This selection of variables is debatable because different analysts may have different 
criteria for judging. In order to overcome individual biases and preferences, the variables 
selected for modeling purpose have been intrinsically drawn based on the principles of 
war. This cautious approach has been taken based on an objective of study that is to 
bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative approaches to warfare. These 
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principles were initially founded by Fuller based on his qualitative analysis of warfare. 
Most of the authors who have written on these principles also adopted a qualitative 
approach. However, modern operations research techniques can be effectively utilized to 
assess the efficacy of these principles.  
The ultimate aim for war is imposing one’s will on the enemy, which can only be 
achieved through victory. In the dataset, victory is represented by a response variable 
denoted by “WINA.” The response variable is predicted based on objective and relative 
variables along with two types of conditions, weather and temperature. Three types of 
models are constructed based on objective variables, relative variables, and conditions. 
The first type of model is formed based only on objective variables. The second type of 
model includes both objective and relative variables. The third type of model includes the 
variables for the first and second type of model along with additional relative variables 
and a few environmental conditions. In Figure 3, the relationship between different types 
of variables and the principles of war is graphically illustrated. The left side includes 
objective variables used for Model 1. The right side includes relative variables, and on 












Figure 3.  Variable Selection Based on Principles of War 
 
 
F. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics is the expression given to the examination of data that helps 
explain, display, or summarize it in a simpler, more meaningful way.92 By using the 
descriptive statistics techniques such as box plots, histograms, and geographical graphs, 
data can be visualized and summarized in meaningful ways. In the succeeding 
paragraphs, descriptive statistics techniques are used to gain insight into the data. 
1. Data Augmentation 
The CDB90G dataset from the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) contains 
descriptive locations of battles; however, the precise longitude and latitude along with the 
                                                 
92 Thomas H. Wonnacott Wonnacott  H Thomas, and Wonnacott J Ronald,  Introductory Statistics. 
Vol. 19690 (New York, NY: John Wiley& Sons, 1972). 
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year in which battles took place were sometimes missing. What the dataset listed were 
regions, countries, cities, or general locations. We augmented the dataset with specific 
longitude and latitude as well as year for each battle. The numbers of battles by 
commencement year are listed in Table 9.  
Table 9.   Number of Battles in Different Centuries 
NUMBER OF BATTLES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER 
YEAR Number of Battles First Battle of Century  Last Battle of Century 
1600-1697 48 1600 1697 
1700-1799 65 1704 1799 
1800-1899 126 1800 1899 
1900-1982 425 1900 1982 
Total 664   
 
The largest number of battles, as shown in Table 9, come from the twentieth 
century. Another noticeable trend is that the number of battles increases with every new 
century. There are two reasons for this. First, with the evolution of the human race came 
an increasing struggle for control of resources, which reached its zenith in the twentieth 
century. Second, advancements in archiving increase the number of battles recorded. For 
instance, the battle accounts for the twentieth century are generally documented in more 
detail than those of the sixteenth century. Based on this argument, it is possible that there 
may have been more battles fought during the sixteenth century than the dataset reflects. 
Another insight, which we can obtain from the dataset, is identifying the years in which 
the most battles took place. Figure 4 represents the intensity of battles over time in the 






Figure 4.  Battle Intensity over Time 
 
 
Figure 4 indicates most battles were fought between 1900 and 1950. This is the 
time frame that reflects two world wars. Although the graph seems quite intuitive and 
logical, there are certain battles for which records have not been available due to 
difficulty in data collection. Viewing the geographic data on a map reveals areas which 










Figure 5.  Battle Locations Based on CDB90G Dataset 
 
 
The data reveal that most of the battles in the dataset were carried out in Europe. 
The dataset reflects 418 battles in Europe, 90 in the Middle East, 82 in the United States, 
57 in the Pacific, eight in Africa, seven in South America, one in India, and one in China. 
This does not mean that the rest of the world was peaceful; there were wars in different 









Figure 6.  Battle Locations With Geographical Distributions 
 
 
2. Battles per Campaign 
The campaigns of dataset CDB90G are subdivided into various battles in the 
dataset. There are a total of 67 campaigns and 664 battles. The details of the battles are 
given in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Number of Battles per Campaigns 
NUMBER OF BATTLES PER CAMPAIGNS 
Campaign Number of Battles 
American Civil War 49 
American Revolution 14 
Arab–Israeli War, 1967 (Six-Day War) 19 
Arab–Israeli War, 1968 2 
Arab–Israeli War, 1973 (October War) 33 
Arab–Israeli, 1948 9 
Arab–Israeli, 1956 4 
Arab–Israeli, 1967 6 
Austro–Italian War 1 
Austro–Prussian (Seven Week’s) War 1 
Austro–Turkish War 4 
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Campaign Number of Battles 
Boer War 5 
Crimean War 2 
Dutch War 5 
Egypt and Sudan 2 
English Civil War 6 
Franco–Prussian War 10 
Franco–Spanish War 1 
Great Northern War 1 
Israel–Lebanon, 1982 1 
Italo–Ethiopian War 1 
Jacobite Rebellion 2 
King William’s War 8 
Korean War 11 
Latin American Wars of Independence 6 
Monmouth’s Rebellion 1 
Netherland’s War of Independence 1 
Polish–Turkish War 1 
Russo–Finish War (1939–1940) 1 
Russo–Japanese War 6 
Russo–Polish War (1920) 2 
Second English Civil War 3 
Spanish–American War 1 
The Balkan Wars 5 
The Fronde 1 
The Manchurian Incident (1938–1939) 5 
The Napoleonic Wars 29 
The Seven Year’s War 18 
The Spanish Civil War 1 
Thirty Year’s War 18 
Transvaal revolt 1 
US–Mexican War 8 
Vietnam 1 
War of 1812 4 
War of Austria with France and Piedmont 2 
War of Texan Independence 1 
War of the Austrian Succession 7 
War of the First Coalition 14 
War of the Second Coalition 7 
War of the Spanish Succession 4 
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Campaign Number of Battles 
World War I 30 
World War I (Eastern front 1914) 9 
World War I (Italian front 1915) 4 
World War I (Serbian front 1914) 2 
World War I (Turkish fronts 1915) 4 
World War I (Turkish fronts 1917) 5 
World War I (Western front 1914) 16 
World War I (Western front 1918) 54 
World War I 32 
World War II (European Theater) 28 
World War II (Italy 1943–1944) 40 
World War II (Italy 1944) 24 
World War II (North Africa 1942–1943) 8 
World War II (Pacific, 1943–1945) 4 
World War II, Eastern Front 29 
World War II, Okinawa 28 
Zulu War 2 
 
3. Battles According to Months 
Sometimes climatic conditions played an important role in initiating battles. It is a 
well-documented fact that campaigns in Russia during winter favored the Russians. 
Likewise, areas that experienced relatively hot summers carried out military campaigns in 
winter. Based on this phenomenon, the dataset was explored to determine the frequency 
of different months in which battles were initiated (see Table 11). The data show that 









Table 11.   Number of Battles in Different Months 
NUMBER OF BATTLES IN DIFFERENT MONTHS 
Months Number of Battles 













These data help in visualizing the battle areas in accordance with campaign 
seasons. Figure 7 depicts battles from December–January, February–March, April–May, 
June–July, August–September and October–November. This figure shows that in the 
Middle East, most battles were fought in October–November, which are relatively cooler 











Figure 7.  Battle Locations in Accordance with Different Months 
 
 
4. Battle Outcome: “WINA”  
In every battle there comes a time when both sides consider themselves 
beaten, then he who continues the attack wins. – Ulysses S. Grant 
The response variable WINA indicates when an attacker won, lost, or had a draw. 
According to the CDB90G dataset, the criteria was did the attacker achieve their 
objective. WINA has four levels: attacker wins (1), defender wins (−1), draw (0), and 
unknown (−9). Out of 664 battles, the attacker won 60.39%, the defender won 32.68%, 
and there was a draw 6.62% of the time. Table 13 and Figure 8 reflect the results of this 





Table 12.   Response Variable 
RESPONSE VARIABLE 
Attacker Wins (1) Defender Wins (-1) Draw (0) Unknown (-9) 
401 217 44 2 
Figure 8.  Battles Won by Attacker/ Defender/ Draw or Unknown 
 
 
5. Force Ratio 
“God indeed sides with the biggest battalions.”   –Ulysses S. Grant 
Force ratio is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s personnel to the defender’s 
personnel. It is assumed that force ratio is a valuable predictor of battle outcome. It is a 
common misconception that larger forces are typically more successful than smaller 
forces. However, in analyzing the history of war, it is apparent that force ratio is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for winning a war. Militaries around the world have adhered to 
an attacker to defender force ratio of 3:1. A statistical analysis of this force ratio is 
performed to examine whether the accepted 3:1 standard is justified. However, force ratio 
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alone cannot reliably predict the outcome of a battle. Force ratio’s relationship with other 
tangible and intangible factors influences the outcome of battle, both directly and 
indirectly. 
The exploration of force ratio provides insight into the 3:1 rule of thumb. Using 
the dataset, we created 13 categories of force ratios on a scale of 0.3 to 16.8. According 
to the data, there were 317 battles in which the ratio was less than 3:1 yet the attacker 
managed to win the battle. Based on this dataset, 69.4% of the time, the attacker wins 
when force ratio is greater than 3:1. The median force ratio for attacker wins is 2, and the 
median for defender win is 1. Table 15 gives a range of force ratios in the dataset along 
with the number of battles won by attackers and defenders. 
Table 13.   Summary Statistics Force Ratio 
FORCE RATIO 
Ratio Attacker Wins (1) Defender Wins (-1) 
0.3:0.9 90 73 
1.0:1.9 155 109 
2.0: 2.9 72 42 
3.0:3.9 29 19 
4.0:4.9 19 11 
5.0:5.9 8 3 
6.3:6.9 10 0 
7.0:7.9 4 3 
8.2:8.5 2 0 
9.5:9.6 3 0 
11.1:11.9 4 0 
12.0:12.4 2 0 
13.8:16.8 3 1 
 
Figure 9 reflects the comparison of force ratios and wins by the defender and 
attacker. The force ratios increase from left to right, and as force ratios increases the 
number of victories decreases. One reason for this is that a force ratio of 6:1 or higher is 
very rare. In this dataset of 662 battles, there were only 32 battles in which there was a 
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force ratio greater than 6:1. Of this group, the attackers won 28 battles, and the defenders 
won four.  
 
Figure 9.  Force Ratio Attacker to Defender 
 
 
6. Tank Ratio  
Tank ratio is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s number of tanks to the 
defender’s tanks. Tank Ratio is based on two variables: attacker tanks and defender tanks. 
Detailed statistics regarding the number of wins by attacker and defender depending upon 
tank use is given in Table 14. The dataset indicates 300 battles in which tanks were used. 








Table 14.   Summary Tank Metrics 
SUMMAR TANK METRICS 
Total Number of Battles in which Tank were used by either side 300 
Defender 
Number of Battles Defender Won Without Tanks when Attacker has 
Tanks 
8 
Number of Battles Defender Won and Attacker has no Tanks 5 
Number of Battles Defender Won when both sides have Tanks 62 
Total Number of Battles Won by Defender 75 
Attacker 
Number of Battles Won By Attacker Without Tanks when Defender 
has tanks 8 
Number of Battles Won By Attacker when Defender has no Tanks 56 
Number of Battles Won by Attacker when both sides have Tanks 135 
Total Number of Battles Won by Attacker 199 
Draw  
Number of Battles Draw when both sides have Tanks 26 
 
The tank ratio mean for when the attacker won is 3.75, the median is 2.16, and the 
standard deviation is 4.21. The tank ratio mean for when the defender won is 1.98, the 
median 1.79, and the standard deviation 1.33. Figure 10 is a box plot representing 
victories by each side. The box plot demonstrates that attackers have more victories than 






Figure 10.  Tank Ratio Attacker to Defender 
 
 
7. Artillery Ratio 
Artillery ratio is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s number of artillery pieces to 
the defender’s artillery pieces. Artillery has played an important role in warfare. Artillery 
is the only weapon that has been used from the first to the last battle in the dataset. Out of 
664 battles, the strength of the attacker’s artillery is unknown in 107 battles. The strength 
of the defender’s artillery is unknown in 121 battles. In 32, neither side had artillery. 
Within the dataset, 492 battles exist in which both sides had artillery. Out of these, the 








Table 15.   Summary Statistics Artillery 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ARTILLERY ATTACKER TO DEFENDER 
Defender Wins Median 1.34 
Defender Wins Mean 1.92 
Defender Win Standard Deviation 2.17 
Attacker Wins Median 1.51 
Attacker Wins Mean 2.55 
Attacker Win Standard Deviation 5.62 
 
The graphical depiction of the artillery ratio is given in Figure 11. Most of the 
victories for both defenders and attackers occur when the artillery ratio is within a range 
of 1–1.09. As the artillery ratio increases in favor of the attacker, the number of victories 
for the defender decreases.  
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Figure 11.  Artillery Ratio Attacker to Defender 
 
 
The box plot of artillery ratio is given in Figure 12. The spreads of the attacker 
and the defender winning ratios are quite close; however, there are more outliers in 
attackers than defenders. 
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Figure 12.  Artillery Ratio Attacker to Defender 
 
 
8. Initial Force Ratio 
Force ratio is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s initial number of personnel to 
the initial defender’s number of personnel. Initial force ratio is another important variable 
that impacts the mass and offensive capabilities of the force. Theoretically, this ratio can 
be one of the major predictors for battle outcome. Initial force ratio is the force strength 
at the beginning of the battle. This variable requires a detailed analysis to determine its 
impact on winning battles. Detailed summary statistics, including the median, mean, and 





Table 16.   Summary Statistics Initial Force Ratio 
SUMMARY STATISTICS INITIAL FORCE RATIO ATTACKER TO 
DEFENDER 
Defender Wins Median 1.31 
Defender Wins Mean 1.92 
Defender Win Standard Deviation 2.23 
Attacker Wins Median 1.66 
Attacker Wins Mean 2.43 
Attacker Win Standard Deviation 5.47 
 
Figure 13 shows the number of victories by the defender and attacker as a 
function of the initial ratio. Most of the victories are within the range of 1–1.96. As the 
ratio in favor of the attacker increases, the number of victories by the defender decreases. 
Figure 13.  Initial Strength Attacker to Defender 
 
 
The spread of defender and attacker winning ratios is given in Figure 16. The 
attacker spread is more than defender, and both have outliers as shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Initial Strength Attacker to Defender 
 
 
9. Cavalry Ratio  
Cavalry ratio is defined as the ratio of the attacker’s number of horses to the 
defender’s horses. Cavalry played an important role during the battles of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. However, with the development of motorized vehicles, cavalry 
started diminishing on battlefields. The dataset contains battles in which cavalry has been 







Table 17.   Cavalry Metrics 
CAVALRY METRICS 





Number of Battles With Cavalry 137 84 49 4 
Number of Battles Without Cavalry on 
both side 423 266 121 36 
Number of Battles with Unknown 
Cavalry 93 48 42 3 
Number of Battles with No Cavalry on 
Attacker Side 2 1 1 0 
Number of Battles with No Cavalry on 
Defender Side 7 2 4 1 
 
Summary statistics for the cavalry ratio are given in Table 18. The winning ratio 
mean for the defender is greater than the attacker mean, whereas the winning median for 
the attacker is greater that of the defender. 
Table 18.   Summary Statistics Cavalry Ratio 
SUMMARY STATISTICS CAVALRY RATIO ATTACKER TO 
DEFENDER 
Defender Wins Median 1.11 
Defender Wins Mean 1.51 
Defender Win Standard Deviation 1.27 
Attacker Wins Median 1 
Attacker Wins Mean 1.29 
Attacker Win Standard Deviation 1.25 
 
As shown in Figure 15, most victories for the attacker fall within the range of 0.1–





Figure 15.  WINA as a Function of Cavalry Ratio 
 
 
Figure 16 gives a spread of the winning cavalry ratios for both attackers and 
defenders. Defenders have more spread than attackers. However, attackers have more 














Figure 16.  Box Plot Winning Cavalry Ratio 
 
 
10. Close Air Support  
The earliest known form of air support is from the Chinese, who used manned 
kites for spying and communication. Around the second or third century, the Kongming 
lantern was invented by the Chinese to use for military communication. In 1794, the 
French Aerostatic Corps at the battle of Fleurus used a tethered balloon to gain a vantage 
point. In 1912, against the Turks at Ain Zara, Italians first used airplanes in battle. Greek 
aviators performed the first naval joint air operation in history during the Dardanelles 
campaign (1915–1916). In the dataset, there were 88 battles in which both sides had air 
support available. There were 332 battles in which both sides had no air support available 




Table 19.   Close Air Support Ratio Metrics 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT RATIO METRICS 





Number of Battles With Close 
Air Support 88 49 35 4 
Number of Battles Without 
Close Air Support on both side 332 188 125 19 
Number of Battles with 
Unknown Close Air Support 132 87 35 10 
Number of Battles with No 
Close Air Support on Attacker 
Side 
342 191 131 20 
Number of Battles with No 
Close Air Support on Defender 
Side 
418 250 140 28 
 
Summary statistics for the air support ratio is given in Table 20. The defender’s 
air support mean, median, and standard deviation are less than those of the attacker. 
Table 20.   Summary Statistics Air Support Ratio 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AIR SUPPORT RATIO 
Defender Wins Median 0.94 
Defender Wins Mean 2.24 
Defender Win Standard Deviation 5.65 
Attacker Wins Median 2.05 
Attacker Wins Mean 5.11 
Attacker Win Standard Deviation 10.45 
 
Figure 17 indicates that most of the victories for the attacker fall within the range 
of 1–1.91, and most victories for the defender fall within ratio of 0.12–0.96. Within the 
range of 0.12–0.96, the defender has more victory. This means that close air support 
matters and plays a role in victory. As air support ratio of the attacker increases, the 
number of victories for the defender decreases. 
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Figure 17.  WINA as a Function of Close Air Support Ratio 
 
 
The box plot in Figure 18 shows that the attacker mean is greater than the 
defender mean. The spread of the attacker’s winning ratio is much more than that of the 
defender. There are more outliers for attackers then there are for defenders. One of the 
most significant outliers was the battle of Lariano, where the attacker to defender air 









Figure 18.  Box Plot Close Air Support Winning Ratios 
 
 
11. Attackers Primary Tactical Scheme  
The attacker primary tactical scheme variable connects with the principles of 
offense and movement. In military terminology, maneuvering is the ways in which 
attackers strike the defender to achieve their objective. Throughout military history, 
armies developed attack techniques to achieve their objectives. These techniques have 
varied based on mission, force, terrain, and availability of resources. The variable of 
attackers primary tactical scheme given in the codebook for this dataset has 13 different 
types. However, information on six types is available in the dataset. Details about each of 





Table 21.   Attacker Primary Tactical Scheme Metrics 
ATTACKERS PRIMARY TACTICAL SCHEME 





Frontal Attack (FF) 563 324 199 40 
Single Envelopment (EE) 41 30 11 0 
Double Envelopment (DE) 19 14 4 1 
Defensive /offensive plan (DO) 1 1 0 0 
River Crossing (RC) 27 22 2 3 
Not Applicable / Not Available 
(OO) 11 10 1 0 
 
The frontal attack is the most common technique used by the attacker. Of the 
database of 662 battles, 563 battles involved frontal attacks. One of the reasons for this is 
the simplicity of the technique as compared to other methods. Figure 19 compares the 














Figure 19.  Attackers Primary Tactical Scheme 
 
 
12. Defender Primary Posture  
The variable defender primary posture defines the type of defensive position 
adopted by the defender. The variable has six levels; an overview of defender primary 
posture is given in Table 22. 
Table 22.   Defender Primary Posture Metrics 
DEFENDER PRIMARY POSTURE (POST1) 





Hasty Defense (HD) 293 164 114 15 
Prepared Defense (PD) 166 110 44 12 
Fortified Defense (FD) 179 107 56 16 
Delaying Action Adopted (DL) 20 16 3 1 
Withdrawal Adopted (WD) 2 2 0 0 
Not Applicable / Not Available 
(OO) 2 2 0 0 
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Figure 20 shows different types of defensive positions and victories by both 
attackers and defenders. Most of these attacks were carried out against a hasty defense.  
Figure 20.  Defender Primary Posture 
 
 
13. Attacker Primary Tactics Versus Defender Primary Posture 
The attacker primary tactics and defender posture variables cannot be explained 
separately because they are proven to be correlated. In Table 23, a detailed summary of 
attacker tactics against defenders lists victories for both sides. The most common tactic 
used by the attacker was a frontal attack against a hasty defense. The second most 
common technique was a frontal attack against a fortified defense. Fifteen observations in 
the dataset contain river crossing against a prepared defensive position. Out of those 15 
times, the attacker achieved success 13 times in overcoming the prepared defensive 







Table 23.   PRIAI Versus POST1 
PRIAI VERSUS POST 1 
Maneuver Scheme WINA (Number of Success) 
PRIAI POST1 Attacker Defender Draw 
 DE FD 1 3 0 
 DE HD 8 1 1 
 DE PD 5 0 0 
 DO HD 1 0 0 
 EE DL 1 0 0 
 EE FD 5 2 0 
 EE HD 17 7 0 
 EE PD 6 2 0 
 EE WD 1 0 0 
 FF OO 1 0 0 
 FF DL 10 3 0 
 FF FD 96 49 15 
 FF HD 136 106 14 
 FF PD 80 41 11 
 FF WD 1 0 0 
 RC OO 1 0 0 
 RC DL 1 0 1 
 RC FD 5 1 1 
 RC HD 2 0 0 
 RC PD 13 1 1 
OO DL 4 0 0 
OO FD 0 1 0 
OO PD 6 0 0 
 
Figure 21 gives an overview of the complete dataset of tactics employed by the 
attacker against the defensive postures. This is militarily intuitive; if the defender takes 
on a hasty defense, an attacker will not waste time in carrying out a difficult maneuver. 
Rather, they benefit by attacking the ill-prepared defensive force. Another noticeable 
trend is that a frontal attack is normally carried out against a hasty defense, withdrawal, 




Figure 21.  WINA as a Function of Attacker Primary Tactics  
Versus Defender Primary Posture  
 
 
14. Momentum Advantage  
Measuring qualitative factors is difficult, and a scale of measurement differs 
according to criteria set by the organization compiling data. Momentum is also one of the 
qualitative criteria in the dataset. The compiling organization does not provide detailed 
criteria of measurement for momentum.  
The relative momentum advantage variable can be correlated with the principles 
of offense, mass, and maneuver. Momentum advantage has 10 different levels, from very 
strongly favoring the attacker to unknown. Table 24 gives a detailed overview of 




Table 24.   Relative Momentum Advantage Metrics 
RELATIVE MOMENTUM ADVANTAGE (MOMNTA) 





Somewhat favors the attacker 147 116 22 9 
Somewhat favors the defender 4 1 3 0 
Favors neither side 475 256 186 33 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 22 indicates WINA as the function of momentum advantage. According to 
the dataset, most of the battles were fought with neither side having a momentum 
advantage over the other. However, in battles where the attacker held the advantage, the 
attacker achieved a high proportion of victories. Another noticeable fact is that the 
defender rarely holds momentum advantage. From a military perspective, this is due to 
the static nature of defensive warfare.  
Figure 22.  WINA as a Function of Relative Momentum Advantage 
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15. Air Superiority in Theatre  
The relative air superiority variable contributes to mass and offensive principles. 
Aerial bombardment contributes significantly to the massing of firepower at particular 
points. Air superiority plays a vital role in the outcome of battle. However, in the dataset, 
there were 339 battles in which neither side had air superiority. Achieving air superiority 
requires tremendous resources. As shown in Table 25, there are 230 battles in which the 
attacker has air superiority and 57 battles in which the defender has air superiority. 
Table 25.   Relative Air Superiority in Theatre Metrics 
RELATIVE AIR SUPERIORITY IN THEATRE 





Attacker has air superiority 230 162 46 22 
Defender has air superiority 57 19 35 3 
Neither side has air superiority 339 192 130 17 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
As indicated in Figure 23, most battles were fought without air superiority on 
either side. However, whenever the attacker had air superiority, the attacker usually won 









Figure 23.  WINA as a Function of Relative Air Superiority 
 
 
16. Initiative Advantage  
Initiative, like momentum, is another important variable that is difficult to 
measure and scale depending upon the criterion of measurement. The attacker usually 
holds a greater relative advantage than the defenders due to the attacker’s ability to 
initiate hostilities. The dataset has defined this initiative with 10 different levels, details 
of which are given in the codebook for the dataset. Table 26 provides an overview of the 





Table 26.   Relative Initiative Advantage Metrics 
INITATIVE ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Strongly favors the attacker 1 1 0 0 
Favors the attacker 14 13 1 0 
Somewhat favors the attacker 402 297 81 24 
Somewhat favors the defender 24 0 22 2 
Favors neither side 185 62 107 16 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 24 indicates that if the attacker holds a relative initiative advantage, the 
attacker will usually succeed. However, in the complete dataset there is only one event in 
which relative initiative strongly favors the attacker. If the defender enjoys the relative 














Figure 24.  WINA as a Function of Attackers Initiative Advantage 
 
 
17. Surprise  
The surprise variable correlates with two principles of war: surprise and security. 
Because a force cannot achieve surprise without ensuring security of information, 











Table 27.   Surprise Metrics  
SURPRISE METRICS (SURPA) 





Minor surprise by attacker 64 50 13 1 
Substantial surprise by attacker 87 64 20 3 
Complete surprise by attacker 20 18 2 0 
Minor surprise achieve by defender 6 1 4 1 
Substantial surprise by defender 6 0 6 0 
Completely surprise by defender 3 0 3 0 
Neither side achieves surprise 476 268 169 39 
 
Data indicate that in most battles, both sides were not able to achieve surprise (see 
Figure 25). However, in case either side achieves surprise, it is usually succesful.  





18. Intelligence Advantage 
Intelligence, in military terminology, is considered as the capability to acquire 
information regarding the enemy. Intelligence has an important role in planning for battle 
since accurate information regarding the enemy can assist in developing good war plans. 
Intelligence is essential for security and surprise. However, surprise requires intelligence. 
Moreover, accurate intelligence usually ensures successful completion of the mission (see 
Table 28). 
Table 28.   Intelligence Advantage  
INTELLIGENCE ADVANTAGE 





Favors the attacker 22 20 2 0 
Somewhat favors the attacker 58 53 4 1 
Favors the defender 2 1 1 0 
Somewhat favors the defender 46 7 34 5 
Favors neither side 498 292 170 36 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 26 indicates that victory is associated with an attacker’s relative 
intelligence advantage. Usually, when the attacker has a relative intelligence advantage, it 
succeeds. When there is relative intelligence which favors the attacker, then the attacker 








Figure 26.  WINA as a Function of Relative Intelligence Advantage 
 
 
19. Leadership Advantage  
Measuring leadership is highly subjective and likely known only after the battles 
occur. Leadership has remained as an important variable in history. Charismatic leaders 
such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Erwin Rommel, and George Patton have played 
decisive roles in securing victories for their countries. In the dataset, the scale of 
measuring leadership advantage is from strongly favoring the attacker to favors neither 
side. A detailed description of these factors is given in Table 29. The table shows that 
whenever attackers or defenders hold a leadership advantage, they secure more victories. 
There are 30 battles in which the relative leadership advantage favors the attacker. Out of 
these, 28 attackers won. Similarly, there are 93 battles in which relative leadership 





Table 29.   Relative Leadership Advantage  
RELATIVE LEADERSHIP ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Strongly favors the attacker 1 1 0 0 
Favors the attacker 30 28 2 0 
Somewhat favors the attacker 137 126 8 3 
Favors the defender 7 2 5 0 
Somewhat favors the defender 93 10 77 6 
Favors neither side 358 206 119 33 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 29 indicates a relative leadership advantage. In most battles, neither side 
had a relative leadership advantage. When leadership advantage somewhat favors the 
attacker, most of the battles are won by the attacker.  
Figure 27.  WINA as a Function of Relative Leadership Advantage 
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20. Combat Effectiveness Advantage  
The combat effectiveness advantage is defined as combat efficiency advantage 
one side has over another. Like other relative variables combat efficiency,is difficult to 
measure and mostly dependent upon how historians define it. The combat effectiveness 
advantage seems to be an important variable based on the results displayed in Table 30. 
There are 20 battles in which combat effectiveness favors the attacker; of these 20 battles, 
the attacker won 18. The defender won 45 out of 76 battles in which combat effectiveness 
somewhat favors the defender.  
Table 30.   Combat Effectiveness  
COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Favors the attacker 20 18 2 0 
Somewhat Favors the attacker 123 102 13 8 
Favors the defender 6 3 3 0 
Somewhat favors the defender 76 24 45 7 
Favors neither side 401 226 148 27 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 28 reflects that most of the battles are fought when neither side has an 
advantage. In cases where relative combat effectiveness favors a side, then that side has 
more victories. According to the information in Figure 28, combat effectiveness tends to 
play an important role in winning the battle. However, in most of the battles, achieving a 






Figure 28.  WINA as a Function of Combat Effectiveness 
 
 
21. Logistic Advantage  
Logistics in the military means a method for efficiently moving resources for 
combat. Logistics has played an important role in determining the outcome of many 
battles. In the dataset, most of the battles are fought without having any logistical 
advantage on one side (see Table 31). The dataset also indicates that in a case where each 
side has a logistical advantage over another, the chance of success for the side having the 







Table 31.   Relative Logistic Advantage  
RELATIVE LOGISTIC ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Favors the attacker 11 10 1 0 
Somewhat Favors the attacker 42 37 3 2 
Favors the defender 1 0 0 1 
Somewhat favors the defender 22 7 13 2 
Favors neither side 550 319 193 38 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
22. Training Advantage  
All great leaders have trained their armies to achieve success in battles. The best-
trained armies were most proficient in handling the rigors of war (see Table 32). This 
variable has a greater impact on the attacker than the defender. There are 13 battles in 
which training advantage favors the attacker. The result of these 13 battles 
overwhelmingly supports the attackers who win 12 out 13 battles.  
Table 32.   Relative Training Advantage  
RELATIVE TRAINING ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Favors the attacker 13 12 1 0 
Somewhat Favors the attacker 98 75 19 4 
Favors the defender 6 1 5 0 
Somewhat favors the defender 96 51 36 9 
Favors neither side 413 234 150 29 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
Figure 29 shows that most of the battles are fought without each side enjoying any 
relative training advantage. When the attacker holds the relative training advantage over 
the defender, results are more pronounced in favor of the attacker. In most of these 
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battles, the attacker was the winner. This is because defense does not require as much 
coordination as offense.  
Figure 29.  WINA as a Function of Relative Training Advantage 
 
 
23. Technology Advantage  
Technology stands for the development of modern weapons systems in a different 
time frame. Technology remains different in each century. During the seventeenth 
century, wars were mainly fought with musketeers and less precise artillery. However, in 
later centuries, automatics and more precise artillery guns replaced these weapons. 
History also witnessed the development of air power that resulted in third dimension 
warfare. In this dataset, most of the battles are fought with neither side having any 
advantage over the other. Whichever side holds the technological advantage is the side 




Table 33.   Relative Technology Advantage  
ATTACKER RELATIVE TECHNOLOGY ADVANTAGE  
 Total Attacker Wins Defender 
Wins 
Draw 
Favors the attacker 6 5 1 0 
Somewhat favors the attacker 20 13 4 3 
Somewhat favors the defender 6 1 5 0 
Favors neither side 594 354 201 39 
Unknown 36 28 6 2 
 
In most cases of conventional warfare, nations with similar capabilities fight with 
each other. There are rare occasions that nations with a large difference in technology are 
pitched against each other. Most of the battles are fought without either side enjoying any 
technological advantage (see Figure 30). In all situations, attackers win more than 
defenders. 




24. Terrain  
Great military leaders study terrain in detail; knowing the terrain is an obvious 
advantage for planning military campaigns. The planning of operations depends largely 
on the terrain. The type of formation, force composition, weapons, and technique for 
attack may all change depending on the type of terrain. An attack in mountains is 
different from an attack in plains or desert. There are 18 types of terrain in the dataset 
made up of three different characteristics (see Table 34). Most battles were fought in the 
RMO type (Rolling, Mixed, Not Available). There are 353 battles in this category, out of 
which attackers won 210, defenders won 117, and draws were 26.  
Table 34.   Terrain Description 
TERRAIN DESCRIPTION 
 Character Total Attacker Wins Defender Wins Draw 
 First Second Third     
OOO NA NA NA 10 8 2 0 
OOU NA NA Urban 6 3 3 0 
FB0 Flat Bare NA 26 13 13 0 
FD0 Flat Desert NA 14 10 3 1 
FM0 Flat Mixed NA 65 37 21 7 
FU0 Flat  Urban NA 1 1 0 0 
FW0 Flat  Heavily Wooded  NA 7 7 0 0 
FWM Flat  Heavily Wooded Mixed 1 1 0 0 
G00 Rugged  NA  NA 1 1 0 0 
GB0 Rugged  Bare  NA 33 19 12 2 
GM0 Rugged  Mixed NA 83 55 25 3 
GW0 Rugged  Heavily Wooded NA 17 11 4 2 
R00 Rolling  NA  NA 2 1 0 1 
RB0 Rolling  Bare NA 15 7 6 2 
RBD Rolling  Bare Desert 2 1 1 0 
RD0 Rolling  Desert NA 19 12 7 0 
RM0 Rolling  Mixed NA 353 210 117 26 




Figure 31 shows that most of the battles are within three levels: RM0 (Rolling, 
Mixed, Not Available), GM0 (Rugged, Mixed, Not Available), and FM0 (Flat, Heavily 
Wooded, Not Available).  






The weather variable has 49 levels that comprise five different characters (see Table 35). The first character is dry or 
wet weather conditions. The second character deals with the specifics of precipitation. The third character is the local 
temperature. The fourth character is for general climate, which includes spring, summer, and winter. The fifth character is 
another general climate factor. Most of battles (145) were fought in DSTST (Dry, Sunny, Temperate, Summer, Temperate). In 
these battles, the attacker won 85, the defender won 52, and there were eight draws. 
Table 35.   Weather Description 
WEATHER DESCRIPTION 





 First Second Third Fourth  Fifth     
OOOST NA NA NA Summer Temperate 1 0 1 0 
DOCWD Dry NA Cold Winter Desert 1 0 1 0 
DOCWT Dry NA Cold Winter Temperate 6 6 0 0 
DOHFD Dry NA Hot Fall Desert 4 3 1 0 
DOHSD Dry NA Hot Summer Desert 10 9 1 0 
DOT$D Dry NA Temperate Spring Desert 2 1 0 1 
DOT$T Dry NA Temperate Spring Tropical 1 1 0 0 
DOT$T Dry NA Temperate Spring Temperate 3 2 1 0 
DOTFT Dry NA Temperate Fall Temperate 3 3 0 0 
DOTWD Dry NA Temperate Winter Desert 2 2 0 0 
DOTWT Dry NA Temperate Winter Temperate 1 1 0 0 
DOCFT Dry Overcast Cold Fall Temperate 3 3 0 0 
DOCWT Dry Overcast Cold Winter Temperate 1 1 0 0 
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 First Second Third Fourth  Fifth     
DOT$T Dry Overcast Temperate Spring Temperate 3 3 0 0 
DOTFT Dry Overcast Temperate Fall Temperate 12 10 0 2 
DOTST Dry Overcast Temperate Summer Temperate 17 11 5 1 
DOTWT Dry Overcast Temperate Winter Temperate 3 1 2 0 
DSCFT Dry Sunny Cold Fall Temperate 3 0 3 0 
DSCWD Dry Sunny Cold Winter Desert 1 1 0 0 
DSCWT Dry Sunny Cold Winter Temperate 9 5 3 1 
DSH$T Dry Sunny Hot Spring Temperate 7 5 2 0 
DSHFT Dry Sunny Hot Fall Temperate 34 20 13 1 
DSHST Dry Sunny Hot Summer Temperate 36 27 6 3 
DST$T Dry Sunny Temperate Spring Temperate 79 38 33 8 
DSTFT Dry Sunny Temperate Fall Tropical 1 1 0 0 
DSTFT Dry Sunny Temperate Fall Temperate 100 63 32 5 
DSTST Dry Sunny Temperate Summer Temperate 145 85 52 8 
DSTWT Dry Sunny Temperate Winter Tropical 1 1 0 0 
DSTWT Dry Sunny Temperate Winter Temperate 23 13 10 0 
W0CWT Wet NA Cold Winter Temperate 4 0 4 0 
WHC$T Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Cold Spring Temperate 1 0 1 0 
WHCFT Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Cold Fall Temperate 3 2 1 0 
WHCWD Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Cold Winter Desert 1 1 0 0 
WHCWT Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Cold Winter Temperate 9 7 1 1 
WHHWT Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Hot Winter Tropical 1 1 0 0 
WHT$T Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Temperate Spring Temperate 13 7 4 2 
WHTFT Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Temperate Fall Temperate 8 7 0 1 
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 First Second Third Fourth  Fifth     
WHTST Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Temperate Summer Tropical 1 0 1 0 
WHTST Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Temperate Summer Temperate 8 5 3 0 
WHTWT Wet 
Heavy 
Precipitation Temperate Winter Temperate 4 3 1 0 
WLC$T Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Cold Spring Temperate 3 0 3 0 
WLCFT Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Cold Fall Temperate 10 8 0 2 
WLCWT Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Cold Winter Temperate 14 7 4 3 
WLT$T Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Temperate Spring Temperate 16 10 4 2 
WLTFT Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Temperate Fall Temperate 27 10 15 2 
WLTST Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Temperate Summer Temperate 20 15 4 1 
WLTWT Wet 
Light 
Precipitation Temperate Winter Temperate 5 1 4 0 
WOTFT Wet Overcast Temperate Fall Temperate 1 1 0 0 
WOTST Wet Overcast Temperate Summer Temperate 1 0 1 0 
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IV. SUMMARY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF IRREGULAR 
WARFARE DATASETS 
Irregular warfare is different in many aspects from regular warfare. These 
differences lead to different analytical approaches for driving quantifiable results from 
the datasets. In order to identify the important variables influencing the outcome of 
irregular warfare, it should be studied in depth from different perspectives and 
approaches. In this chapter, different datasets are analyzed to develop an understanding of 
irregular warfare. These datasets are unique and were compiled by different 
organizations. By analyzing different datasets, we are able to form a common picture of 
irregular conflicts. The recording of data in conflicts is a difficult task, and it becomes 
more daunting when the other side involved is a non-state actor. In the case of 
conventional war, data can be compiled using archives and official records of either side. 
In the case of irregular warfare, access to non-state actor data is limited. In simple terms, 
data collection for irregular warfare is difficult and prone to more mistakes than regular 
warfare data. 
A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND EVENT DATA 
PROJECT (ACLED) 
Armed Conflict and Event Data (ACLED) is a collection of data related to 
conflicts in developing countries.93 ACLED primarily focuses on conflict and political 
violence in African countries from 1997 to present day. The project also has information 
on some Asian countries. ACLED is the combined effort of many analysts under the 
leadership of Professor Clionadh Raleigh at the University of Sussex.94 The data are 
derived from a variety of different sources, which include media, humanitarian agencies, 
and research publications. The project presently has five different variants of its dataset. 
Versions one and five of the dataset contain information about conflicts in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Haiti, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and all African countries. This 
                                                 
93 Clionadh Raleigh, Linke Andrew, Hegre Havard and Karlsen Joakim, “Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research 47(5) 1–102015.  
94 Ibid. 
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chapter focuses on versions one and five of the dataset. ACLED is human-coded and 
contains conflict event data related to various groups involved in conflicts; violent 
activities between non-state groups, records of attacks on civilians, records of territorial 
control between state and non-state agents; establishment of military bases; and 
information pertaining to riots and protests. The actors and events mentioned in the 
datasets of ACLED are elaborately explained in its codebook. However, for the reader’s 
convenience, each variable described in the ACLED codebook is briefly discussed in the 
succeeding paragraphs.95 
1. Actors  
ACLED distinguishes between actors including the government, rebels, militia, 
active political organizations, and civilians.96 These actors interact with each other over 
various issues seeking power. The governments in the dataset are recognized as sovereign 
and legitimate regimes. The rebels in the dataset are defined as groups of individuals 
acting against sovereign governments. Rebels use violence as their primary means and 
are recognized by people other than their own group. The specific groups use political 
militias for violence.97 Militias do not normally seek the dismissal of governments; 
rather, they are instruments of power in the hands of the elite for political movements.98 
The dataset also contains information about unidentified armed groups, identity militias, 
civilians, and others (e.g., hired mercenaries and private security firms). 
2. Events 
An event, as defined by ACLED, “is the use of force by one or more groups for a 
political end although there are some instances, like protests, and non-violent activities, 
that are also included in the dataset.”99 An event occurs between two or more actors at a 
                                                 





99  Ibid. 
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specific location and time. ACLED has divided these events into the following nine sub-
events: 
a. Battle No change of Territory100 
b. Battle Non-State Actors Overtake Territory101 
c. Battle Government Regains Territory102 
d. Headquarters or Base Established103 
e. Non-Violent Activity by Conflict Actor104 
f. Riots /Protests105 
g. Violence Against Civilians106 
h. Non-Violent Transfer of Territory107 
i. Remote Violence108 
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country located in South Asia, west of Pakistan and 
east of Iran. Afghanistan has been embroiled in political violence and conflict at least 
since 1979, after its invasion by the Soviet Union.109 The Soviet defeat and withdrawal 
did not return peace to Afghanistan. The period after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union 
witnessed political instability and civil war resulting in the emergence of the Taliban 
government. The U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) overthrew the 
Taliban government following the September 11 attacks. The United States and its 
partners remained in Afghanistan since 2001 and have faced a mounting insurgency from 










109 Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the use of Force in Soviet 
Foreign Policy, 1986). 
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various actors. The insurgency has resulted in heavy losses to troops from the 
international coalition as well as to the civilian population. 
The dataset contains 17 variables and information from 2004 to 2010 about 
insurgents and politically violent activities in Afghanistan. There is no “win or lose” 
variable in the dataset regarding the outcome of certain events. This limitation restricts 
the analysis to a more confined statistical exploration of data and identification of trends.  
1. Type of Events in Afghanistan 
The dataset for Afghanistan contains eight different categories of events. The 
detailed description of these events has already been given in the description of the 
ACLED dataset. The maximum number of events occurred in 2009, and the second most 
in 2008. The total dataset contains 820 events of violence against civilians, and out of 
these, 618 took place from 2008 to 2009 alone. During this time frame, there was a 
majority of battles no change of territory. One can infer from this that the insurgents tried 
to subjugate security forces but failed. This led to a breakdown in the strength of the 




Table 36.   Type of Events in Afghanistan 
TYPE OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Type of Event 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Battle-Government 
Regains Territory 1  1 52 8 2 64 
Battle-No Change of 
Territory 156 7 247 699 1159 163 2431 
Battle-Rebel Gains 
Territory    1   1 
Battle-Rebels 
overtake territory 1  4 7 4  16 
Non–violent activity 
by a conflict actor 15 1   3 1 20 
Non-Violent Rebel 
Activity    25   25 
Violence Against 
Civilians  73 4 81 243 375 44 820 
Riots/Protest 4 1  2   7 
Total 250 13 333 1029 1549 210 3384 
 
Figure 33 indicates different events in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2010. The most 
violence against civilians is done in the year 2009. The most number of incidents of 
taking over territory by rebels took place in 2008. The population has always been 
considered the focal point of insurgency, and violence against the population is normally 
carried out to undermine the legitimacy of the government. In the case of Afghanistan, 
the struggle of the insurgents was against the government, which had foreign support. As 
a result, violence was used as an instrument to coerce the population and undermine the 
authority of the government. Another important conclusion that can be drawn from this is 
that in irregular warfare, force attrition can be attributed to civilian protection missions. 
There is a consumption of force in protecting civilians.  
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2. Seasonality Effect in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan has harsh terrain and weather. For these reasons, forces normally carry out operations in summer. In order 
to validate this hypothesis, data were analyzed for a seasonality effect. For detailed results, see Table 37 and Figure 34. From 
the results, we can see that the peak violence against civilians occurs between August and October, after which it decreases. 
The maximum attempts by rebels to overtake territory fall between May and August. The most battles with no change in 
territory occur in October, after which there is a downfall in occurrence. Figure 34 indicates that December to March is the 
season of relative inactivity. 
Table 37.   Categorization of Events per Month 































Jan 1 206   2 1 74 1 285 
Feb 2 161   1 1 66  231 
Mar  125   1 7 48  181 
Apr 4 151   1 2 38 1 197 
May 3 175  1  3 77  259 
Jun 4 173  2 3 3 56  241 
Jul 3 154  5  3 61  226 
Aug 31 236  3 2 3 89 1 365 
Sep 8 242 1  2  95 2 350 
Oct 1 347  3 4  88 2 445 
Nov 5 278  2 3  73  361 
Dec 2 183   1 1 55  242 
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Figure 34.  Categorization of Events as per Month 
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3. Actors Involved in Conflict 
Irregular warfare differs from conventional in terms of the actors involved. 
Conventional warfare is normally between two countries or between countries against 
other groups of countries. However, in irregular warfare, there are numerous actors that 
play significant roles. The Afghan situation is a quagmire that illustrates how complex 
irregular warfare is due to the number of different players involved in it. One of the most 
important actors that appears from the analysis of the Afghanistan data is the civilian 
population, because in most of the actions civilians are target. 
The ACLED dataset does not significantly differentiate between two sides as in 
contrast to the CDB90G dataset in which the attacker and defender were clearly 
identified. The dataset contains multiple entries for the ISAF partners that have been 
condensed to ISAF, and the same methodology is used for other key players. The data 
also contain multiple entries for the Afghan government based on the time period, which 
are also condensed to the Afghan Government. The analysis of both sides has been 
carried out and a relationship matrix has been established to identify the key players in 
Afghanistan’s conflict (see Table 38).  
The Taliban (Afghanistan) is the largest player, with a total of 1004 conflicts with 
various actors. The Taliban has 341 conflicts with civilians, 229 with police forces, 193 
with ISAF, 143 with Afghanistan armed forces, 32 with the Afghan Government, 28 with 
unknown forces, 27 with private security, five with the United Nation Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNMA), two with an unidentified armed group of Afghanistan, two with 
tribes, one with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and one with Afghan local 




Table 38.   Relationship Matrix Afghan Actors 
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4. Geographical Location of Events in Afghanistan 
The dataset contains additional information about locations of different events in 
Afghanistan. This information can be useful in determining the high, medium, and low 
threat areas. The geographical locations become more relevant in irregular warfare 
because of the significant role of the population in determining the outcome of conflicts 
as well as the lack of established front lines. In this case, most of the events were close to 
Pakistan. This may be due to the porous border and tribal affiliations between the two 
countries.  
Figure 35.  Geographical Location of Events in Afghanistan 
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR CAMBODIA 
Cambodia is located in Southeast Asia. Cambodia is bordered in the northwest by 
Thailand, northeast by Laos, east by Vietnam, and in the southwest by the Gulf of 
Thailand.110 Elections were held in Cambodia in 1993 in accordance with the Paris Peace 
Accord of 1991. Prince Norodom Ranariddh’s party, named the National United Front for 
an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), secured 
the most votes, followed by Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party and the Buddhist 
Liberal Democratic Party.111 After a brief period of political negotiation, Prince 
Ranariddh became the first, and Hun Sen the second, prime minister of Cambodia. This 
arrangement did not last long, and in 1997, fighting between their two political parties 
erupted. This resulted in a short but politically violent conflict between various players in 
Cambodian politics. This conflict was smaller than the 1970 conflict. However, it still 
resulted in injuries and lost lives. 
The ACLED dataset for Cambodia contains 17 variables. The data are organized 
using the same pattern as the sets for Afghanistan and other countries. The dataset is 
explored statistically to visualize various trends such as the type of events, seasonality, 
role of different actors, and geographical locations. 
1. Type of Events in Cambodia from 1997 to 2010 
There are seven different kinds of events that happened in Cambodia from 1997 
to 2010. The most common type of event was the battle no change of territory, which 
took place 140 times. The second most common event was violence against civilians, 
which took place 111 times. The third most common event recorded in the database was 
riots/protest, which took place 86 times. For a detail summary of events, see Table 39. 
                                                 
110 D David P Chandler, The Land and People of Cambodia (New York, NY: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1991). 
111 Kheang Un, Democratization without Consolidation: The Case of Cambodia, 1993–2004(DeKalb, 
IL: Northern Illinois University, 2004). 
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Table 39.   Type of Events in Cambodia 
TYPE OF EVENTS IN CAMBODIA 
Type of 
Event 




territory 2            8 4 14 
Battle-No 
change of 




territory 6              6 
Non-violent 
activity by a 
conflict 
actor 5  1 1           7 
Non-violent 
transfer of 
territory 1              1 
Riots/
Protests 11 25 13 12 2  3 2 3 2 6 3 2 2 86 
Violence 
against 
civilians 25 25 5 6 5 6 9 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 111 
Total 112 105 21 21 7 7 18 8 9 9 12 10 8 10 357 
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Figure 36 displays trends for the different types of events. Most events were 
recorded between 1997 and 1998. The least violent years were between 2001 and 2002. 
Moreover, it can be concluded that there was a gradual decrease in the violent events in 
Cambodia over the span. 
Figure 36.  Type of Events in Cambodia between 1997 and 2010 
 
 
2. Seasonality Effect in Cambodia 
The most events took place in January and July. In both of these months, 
significant events were battle no change of territory and violence against civilians. 
However, most violence against civilians occurred in April. In April, there were 15 
events of violence.  
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Table 40.   Categorization of Events in Cambodia per Month  






















































































































Jan  18    11 9 38 
Feb 1 11    12 13 37 
Mar  10    7 9 26 
Apr 3 14  2  6 15 40 
May  11  1  10 7 29 
Jun  6    4 8 18 
Jul  13 2 2  7 14 38 
Aug  10    7 9 26 
Sep 1 9 3   13 11 37 
Oct  18  1  2 5 26 
Nov  6   1 2 6 15 
Dec 1 14 1 1  5 5 27 
Total 6 140 6 7 1 86 111 357 
 
A seasonality effect applies to Cambodia (see Figure 37). There are four visible 
peaks in the months of February, April, July, and October. Events can also be divided 
into small campaigns of violence between January to March, March to May, June to 







Figure 37.  Categorization of Events in Cambodia per Month 
 
 
3. Actors Involved in Conflict 
Cambodia’s relationship matrix is less complex than that of Afghanistan, but still 
involves a significant number of actors. One noticeable trend is that civilians are at the 
center of the conflict, with 91 events involving different actors. In 44 events, civilians 
encountered unidentified armed groups. Other important players in the game are 
FUNCINPEC, the Khmer Rogue Militia, and unknown forces.  
Another noticeable trend in both Afghanistan and Cambodia datasets is the 
involvement of foreign actors in the conflicts. In Afghanistan, the Taliban of Pakistan 
was involved in carrying out attacks. In Cambodia, unidentified armed groups from 
Vietnam carried out attacks (see Table 41). We have already hypothesized that irregular 
warfare is a complicated phenomenon involving a large number of actors. This 
hypothesis seems to be validated by our initial examination of Afghanistan and Cambodia 
datasets. 
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Table 41.   Relationship Matrix For Cambodian Actors 














































































































































































































Civilians   1  2 1 21 8 8 6      44  91 
CPP: 
Cambodian 

















Militia   4 1  3 38          46 
Khmer Serei 
Militia       1          1 
KRAF: 
Khmer Royal 
Armed Forces      3          1 4 
Military 
Forces of 
Cambodia  1 1 3   5  7       1  18 
Military 
Forces of 





(1993–1997)       2          2 
NUA: 
National 
United Army       4          4 
Opposition 
Parties    1             1 
Police Forces 
of Cambodia    1      1 22  1 2 1 1  29 
Protesters 
(Cambodia)         2        2 
Protestors 
(International)         1        1 
Protestors 
(Vietnam)          1       1 
SRP: Sam 
Rainsy Party 




(Cambodia)   11    1  1 1     1  15 
Unidentified 
Armed Group 
(Vietnam)         1        1 
Unknown    2 1 2 1  1 45 5  5    62 
Total 1 2 20 20 2 35 112 15 13 69 5 1 7 1 53 1 357 
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4. Geographical Location of Events in Cambodia 
There were 13 events that were not confined within the territorial limit of 
Cambodia. These events happened in Vietnam or close to the Vietnamese border (see 
Figure 38). Most events occurred close to the Vietnamese and Thai borders. This trend 
was also observed in Afghanistan, where most events were close to the Pakistani border. 
This can be interpreted as terrorists taking advantage of unguarded borders for movement 
and safe hide outs.  




D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR HAITI 
Haiti is located in the Caribbean, and it occupies the western portion of the island 
of Hispaniola. Haiti shares Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic. In 1994, the U.S. 
government carried out Operation Uphold Democracy to restore the democratic 
government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.112 The military operation under the 
United Nations (UN) mandate ended in March 1995 with a transfer of power to United 
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).  
Elections were carried out in 1996 to restore democracy and transfer power to the 
people. However, things did not improve as the people had wished. In 1997, poverty, a 
low living standard, and economic conditions erupted in violence. Port-Au-Prince, the 
capital of Haiti, suffered violent protests, strikes, and gang war, which immediately 
spread all over the country. These conflicts led Haiti into another era of political violence 
and disturbance. The fight to achieve power among various groups resulted in irregular 
conflict.  
1. Type of Events in Haiti  
The Haiti dataset contains information between 1997 and 2010. It has 20 variables 
with a record of 1,076 different events. An analysis of the Haiti dataset was carried out in 
a similar way to Afghanistan and Cambodia. There are seven types of events in Haiti. 
Most of the events that took place in Haiti fall within the riots/protests category, followed 
by 344 events of violence against civilians, and 258 events of no change in territory (see 
Table 42).  
                                                 
112 Kretchik Edward Walter. Invasion, Intervention,” Intervasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. 
Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing, 1998). 
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Table 42.   Type of Events in Haiti 
TYPE OF EVENTS HAITI 




territory        6 1      7 
Battle-No 
change of 
territory 13 7 20 15 10 14 28 65 39 15 6 6 10 10 258 
Battle-Rebels 
gain territory      1  24       25 
Headquarters/
Base 
established      1         1 
Non-violent 
Rebel Activity      1 2 26 2     1 32 
Non-violent 
transfer of 
territory        14       14 
Riots/Protests 10 2 18 28 15 19 103 111 17 6 2 20 24 20 395 
Violence 
Against 
Civilians 33 10 19 45 27 13 55 77 37 4  1 10 13 344 
Total 56 19 57 88 52 49 188 323 96 25 8 27 44 44 1076 
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Most events occurred in 2004. The second highest number of events took place in 2003. These two years are the peak 
of violence (see Figure 39). Despite these two years, the events remain fairly well below 100 incidents for the rest of the years.  





2. Seasonality Effect in Haiti 
Most events took place between December and February, with a record number of events within a month taking 
place in February (181 incidents). This trend corresponds with the coolest and driest month in Haiti, which is 
January.113 The numbers of events between March and November are almost the same, except for those in July and 
August, which dip significantly. This decline correlates with weather because July and August are the hottest months in 
Haiti.  
Table 43.   Categorization of Events in Haiti per Month 

























































































































Jan  27   3  62 32 124 
Feb 3 32 21  13 12 55 45 181 
Mar 1 34   4  28 32 99 
Apr  18     39 23 80 
May  18     19 28 65 
Jun  21     34 19 74 
Jul  12   3 1 10 12 38 
                                                 
113 “Port-Au-Prince, Haiti,” World Weather and Climate Information., , http://www.weather-and-climate.com/average-monthly-Rainfall-
Temperature-Sunshine,Port-Au-Prince,Haiti. 
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Aug  11 1    10 25 47 
Sep 1 25 1 1 1  19 12 60 
Oct  24   2  38 34 98 
Nov  12   3  36 36 87 
Dec 2 24 2  3 1 45 46 123 
Total 7 258 25 1 32 14 395 344 1076 
 
There is a gradual drop in violence against civilians in February, and from July to August, there is a flat trend in the 
events, after which the violence starts rising (see Figure 40).  
Figure 40.  Categorization of Events per Month 
 
 118 
3. Actors Involved in Conflict 
In Haiti’s dataset, like Afghanistan’s and Cambodia’s, the population emerged as one of the major players. 
From the dataset, the most important actor in Haiti is the civilian population. Civilians have been in 287 different 
conflicts with other actors. After civilians, the second largest actor is the protester followed by the rioter (see Table 44). 
Rioters and protestors are documented as a separate group even though they are also civilians.  
Table 44.   Relationship Matrix Haiti Actors 
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Another important trend in the Haiti dataset, which is common also in 
Afghanistan and Cambodia, is the presence of foreign players in conflict. In the case of 
Haiti, we can see the presence of the Armed Group of the Dominican Republic. 
4. Geographical Location of Events in Haiti 
There are 14 events in the Haiti dataset that took place outside Haiti. This trend 
has been observed in other countries, including Afghanistan and Cambodia. From this 
trend it can be seen that in irregular warfare, sometimes incidents occur outside of the 
geographical limits of the primary country. Moreover, low, medium, and high conflict 
areas can be clearly identified. 
Figure 41.  Geographical Location of Events in Haiti 
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E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR LAOS 
Laos is a landlocked country bordering China to the northwest, Thailand to the 
west, Vietnam to the east, and Cambodia to the south. After independence from Japan in 
1945, Laos went under French rule until 1949.114 After achieving independence from 
France, Laos became a constitutional monarchy under Sisavang Vong. This government 
faced a civil war initiated by the communist party, which resulted in a regime change. 
Since 1975, Laos has been under communist rule. The dataset for Laos is a collection of 
politically violent events between 1998 and 2010. 
1. Types of Events in Laos from 1998 to 2010 
Laos’s dataset is relatively small compared to the other datasets. There are only 
three types of events and 67 in total. However, like the other datasets, most events 
involved violence against civilians. 
                                                 
114 Gunn, C. Geoffrey Political struggles in Laos, 1930–1954: Vietnamese Communist Power and the 
Lao Struggle for National Independence (Bangkok, Thailand: Editions Duang Kamol, 1988). 
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Table 45.   Type of Events in Laos 
TYPE OF EVENTS LAOS 
Type of Event 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Battle-No 
Change of 
Territory   6   2 1       9 
Riots/Protests  2 1 1    1  2 1   8 
Violence 
Against 
Civilians 1  14 1 1 9 4 1 5 3 8 2 1 50 
Total 1 2 21 2 1 11 5 2 5 5 9 2 1 67 
 
Most of events took place in 2000. After 2000, the second most events took place in 2003. In other years the 
number of events are less than nine. (see Figure 42).  
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Figure 42.  Types of Events in Laos between 1998 and 2010 
 
 
2. Seasonality Effect in Laos 
The maximum number of the events in Laos took place in May. The fewest took 
place in August. In August, the temperature in Laos is hot and humid in comparison to 
other months. As far as May is concerned, climatic conditions favor violent action since 










Table 46.   Categorization of Events in Laos per Month  
CATEGORIZATION OF EVENTS IN LAOS PER MONTH 
 







Jan  1 4 5 
Feb 1  2 3 
Mar 2  3 5 
Apr   3 3 
May  1 10 11 
Jun  1 6 7 
Jul 4 1 4 9 
Aug  1  1 
Sep 1  4 5 
Oct  2 5 7 
Nov 1 1 1 3 
Dec   8 8 
Total 9 8 50 67 
 
Most violence against civilians was carried out in May (see Figure 43). In all 











Figure 43.  Categorization of Events per Month 
 
 
3. Actors Involved in the Conflict 
The types of actors involved in Laos conflicts are fewer than in Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, or other countries involved in irregular warfare. However, the trend of 
violence against civilians also holds true in this dataset. The second most noticeable trend 
is the involvement of foreign elements in irregular warfare. In the case of Laos, there was 
one event involving Muslim militia from Thailand, one event involving military forces 





Table 47.   Relationship Matrix for Laos Actors 












































































































































































Laos Militia           1 1 
Military Forces of 
Laos  2 3 2         6 
Military Forces of 
Thailand (1997–
2001)   1         1 
Police Forces of 
Laos (1998–-
2001)          2  2 
Police Forces of 
Thailand (2006–
2008)          2  2 
Grand Total 2 9 4 1 11 4 1 1 1 8 25 67 
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4. Geographical Location of Events in Laos 
Most events occurred within the geographical limits of Laos. However, a few 
incidents also took place in Thailand (see Figure 44). This is common to irregular 
warfare, as a similar pattern was observed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other country 
datasets. 




F. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR MYANMAR 
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a country located in Southeast Asia bordering Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, 
and Thailand. Myanmar gained independence from Great Britain in 1948. Myanmar remained democratic until 1962, when a 
military coup resulted in the military takeover of the country. The military regime in Myanmar ended in 2011. During the 
military rule, efforts by the public to restore democracy resulted in political violence. The dataset is focused on events between 
1996 and 2009. 
1. Statistical Analysis of Data for Myanmar  
The dataset for Myanmar includes total of 330 events. Most events (159) are categorized as battle no change of 
territory. The second highest number (104) is categorized as violence against civilians. 
Table 48.   Type of Events in Myanmar 
TYPE OF EVENTS IN MYANMAR 
Type of 
Event 




territory  1   1 1 4 2 2 8 7 1 2 1 30 
Battle-No 
change of 





territory    1  1 2      1  5 
Non-violent 
activity by a 
conflict 
actor 6 3  2 3 2 2 1 5 4 2    30 
Non-violent 
transfer of 
territory        1       1 
Riots/
Protests            1   1 
Violence 
Against 
Civilians 3 2 11 6 6 16 16 13 1 3 10 3 2 12 104 
Total 13 10 25 20 26 42 48 23 14 31 28 14 9 27 330 
 
Most events took place in 2002, and the second most took place in 2001. The fewest events took place in the year 2008. 






Figure 45.  Types of Events in Myanmar from 1996–2009 
 
 
2. Actors Involved in the Conflict 
The relationship matrix of Myanmar involves foreign elements such as military forces from India and Thailand. 
Besides foreign militaries, there were other foreign actors also involved in the conflict, including the police force of 
Thailand, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang. There 
are 103 recorded events in which civilians were involved. Moreover, civilians in Myanmar emerged as the key players, 
as in other irregular conflicts (see Table 49).  
 135 
Table 49.   Relationship Matrix for Myanmar Actors 
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3. Geographical Locations of Event in Myanmar 
Most events happened within the geographical boundaries of Myanmar. However, 
there are a few events that took place in Bangladesh and Thailand (see Figure 46). This 
pattern is common to other countries where irregular warfare took place.  
Figure 46.  Geographical Location of Events in Myanmar 
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G. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR NEPAL 
Nepal is a landlocked country located in South Asia. Nepal is bordered by China to the 
north and by India to the south, east, and west. Nepal remained under the Shah dynasty of kings 
between 1768 and 2008. Civil war broke out between 1996 and 2006. The war resulted in losses 
to both Maoist and government forces alike, along with heavy losses to civilians. The civil war 
between Maoist and government forces ended in 2006 with a comprehensive peace accord.  
1. Statistical Analysis of Data for Nepal 
The dataset for Nepal contains seven different types of events. Most events in Nepal 
are categorized as battle no change of territory, for a total of 1724 times. The second highest 
number is categorized as violence against civilians for a total of 1,055 times. The trend of 









Table 50.   Type of Events in Nepal 
TYPE OF EVENTS IN NEPAL 
Type of Event 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Battle-
Government 
regains territory       8 2 5 3 1   19 
Battle-No change 
of territory 3 2 13 48 80 129 627 236 383 171 28 2 2 1724 
Battle-Rebels 
overtake territory       2       2 
Non-violent 
activity by a 
conflict actor   2 2 12 14 33 17 56 41 2 5  184 
Non-violent 
transfer of 
territory         1     1 
Riots/Protests      4  5 15 8 8 4  44 
Violence against 
civilians 1 3 7 10 47 74 272 135 290 164 26 12 14 1055 
Total 4 5 22 60 139 221 942 395 750 387 65 23 16 3029 
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Most events took place in 2002 and 2004. Between1996 and 2004, there was a gradual increase in the number of 
events. After 2004, there was a gradual decrease in events.  




2. Seasonality Effect in Nepal 
Most events took place in April. However, from June to August, there is relatively 
less activity. This is the period in which there is heavy rainfall in Nepal, and the weather 
is humid and hot (see Table 51 and Figure 48).  
Table 51.   Categorization of Events in Nepal per Month  









































































































Jan 4 148  11  3 82 248 
Feb 2 138  10  3 73 226 
Mar 2 183  14  1 76 276 
Apr 1 193  28  19 132 373 
May 6 134 2 17  4 107 270 
Jun  128  6  3 69 206 
Jul  95  13   53 161 
Aug 2 97  18  2 75 194 
Sep 1 164  13  5 132 315 
Oct  128  12   70 210 
Nov 1 145  18  2 106 272 
Dec  171  24 1 2 80 278 










3. Actors Involved in Conflict 
The numbers of actors involved in Nepal’s conflict were fewer than those of other conflicts. Another important factor, 
which differentiates Nepal from the rest of the countries, is that there were no foreign elements involved in the conflict. The 
communist force of Nepal emerged as the biggest player in the highest number of conflicts. After the communist party of 
Nepal, civilians emerged as the biggest players. The most conflicts involved the Maoist force against the military force of 
Nepal. 
Table 52.   Relationship Matrix Nepal Actors 



















































































































Maoist 964  1 1 362 323  1 189 1841 
Madhesi 
Tigers         1 1 
Military 
Forces of 








Front 1     1    2 
Police 
Forces of 
Nepal 26 75   1  13   115 
Protesters 
(Nepal)  2   3 17   5 27 
Rioters 
(Nepal)      2   1 3 
Royal 
Nepalese 
Army  1        1 





(Nepal) 24 6   1 1    32 
Unknown 1 4    1   2 8 








4. Geographical Locations of Event in Nepal 
In the case of Nepal, most of the events were widely spread across the country. 
However, another trend, which was identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and other 
countries, was that the frequency of events is more in close vicinity to international 
borders (see Figure 49). Most incidents happened in the area bordering India. There were 
less events in the areas bordering China. 




H. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR PAKISTAN 
The global war on terrorism has significantly impacted Pakistan. War drastically 
impacted internal security and left both short- and long-term imprints on the socio-
economic dynamics of Pakistani society. The Afghan war’s proximity to Pakistan 
resulted in the emergence of extremist and radical Jihadi organizations within Pakistan. 
This spread of radicalization engulfed society, resulting in chaos and widespread 
terrorism. Terrorism coupled with sectarian conflicts resulted in heavy losses to life and 
material. Pakistan’s dataset is not a complete picture of the conflict; it only contains data 
from 2005 to 2009. These five years of data include 4,759 events, which are higher than 
any other country in the dataset. 
1. Statistical Analysis of Data for Pakistan 
Pakistan’s dataset contains all nine types of events. The maximum number of 
events happened in 2007. In 2009, there were 1,523 events. According to the dataset, 
only one event happened in 2005; this may not be correct. There is a possibility that data 
for Pakistan might not have been recorded or reflect only a small portion of the year. 
Most events (1,966) fall within the battle no change of territory category. The second 











Table 53.   Type of Events in Pakistan 
TYPE OF EVENTS IN PAKISTAN 
Type of Event 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Battle-Government regains 
territory   13 15 32 60 
Battle-No change of territory 1 221 331 547 866 1966 
Battle-Rebels overtake territory  1 3 5 6 15 
Headquarters or base established  1    1 
Non-violent activity by a conflict 
actor  112  23 97 232 
Non-violent rebel activity   36   36 
Non-violent takeover of territory   1   1 
Riots/Protests  39 810 5 14 868 
Violence against civilians  228 354 490 508 1580 
Total 1 602 1548 1085 1523 4759 
 
Because data from Pakistan spans only five years, we cannot determine any 
significant trend. The only observation that can be made is that incidents have generally 








Figure 50.  Types of Events in Pakistan from 2005–2009 
 
 
2. Seasonality Effect in Pakistan 
The seasonality effect cannot be exactly determined because events were widely 
spread over the entire country. Moreover, Pakistan has four distinct seasons and different 
weather conditions in each region. To more precisely model the seasonality effect in 
Pakistan, regions and the number of events in each region are analyzed separately. For all 
of Pakistan, the most events took place between October and November. In these months, 
the event battle no change of territory and riots/protests happened with the highest 
frequency, relatively. This trend can be attributed to weather conditions because weather 
in these two months in all regions is fairly pleasant (see Table 54). 
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Table 54.   Categorization of Events in Pakistan per Month  

















































































































































Jan 5 137   23 1  62 142 370 
Feb 1 108 2  17 3 1 75 179 386 
Mar 1 118 2  19 4  81 147 372 
Apr 6 105 2  23 1  17 119 273 
May 7 140   21   2 108 278 
Jun 4 156 1  21   2 117 301 
Jul 2 157 2  11 2  30 119 323 
Aug 3 189 3  14   30 118 357 
Sep 3 195  1 8 5  129 133 474 
Oct 7 244 1  14 8  125 118 517 
Nov 12 253 2  20 8  209 172 676 
Dec 9 164   41 4  106 108 432 
Total 60 1966 15 1 232 36 1 868 1580 4759 
 
From October to November, there is an increase trend of events (see Figure 51). 






Figure 51.  Categorization of Events per Month 
 
 
3. Geographical Location of Events in Pakistan 
The geographical map for Pakistan shows widespread events across all regions. 
The most populated events occurred in the northwestern portion of Pakistan known, as 
Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). These areas have been in the limelight since 
the commencement of the global war on terrorism.  
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Figure 52.  Geographical Location of Events in Pakistan 
 
 
I. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA FOR AFRICA 
Africa is the second largest and second most populous continent. Africa is 
bordered to the north by the Mediterranean Sea; to the northeast by the Suez Canal, Red 
Sea, and Sinai Peninsula; to the southeast by the Indian Ocean; and to the west by the 
Atlantic Ocean. Africa comprises 55 recognized states, of which 54 are members of the 
African Union. Africa remained under European colonialism into the twentieth century, 
which resulted in underdevelopment of the continent compared to the rest of the world. 
Underdevelopment combined with an abundance of natural resources on the continent 
has resulted in large-scale political violence and conflict. The dataset contains 
information for 49 countries of the continent, but it does not have information regarding 
the islands of Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. A holistic 
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analysis of Africa is carried out in this research, and countries are not segregated for 
analysis. Therefore, the seasonality effect is not modeled for Africa. 
1. Number of Events in Africa  
The ACLED dataset for Africa includes 25 variables and 99,549 events. Its data 
span events between 1997 and 2014. Unlike the datasets for the aforementioned countries 
in this chapter, this dataset includes the number of fatalities. Nevertheless, this dataset is 
organized after the same pattern as the other ACLED dataset. The numbers of events, by 
country, are given in Table 55. The top five countries in terms of event frequency are 
Somalia; the Democratic Republic of Congo; Nigeria; Sudan; and Egypt; with 15,150; 
8,876; 6,781; 6,505; and 5,739 incidents of violence; respectively. These totals are much 
higher than those recorded for other countries. The five countries ranking lowest in terms 
of violence are Benin, Gambia, Djibouti, Botswana, and Equatorial Guinea, with 100, 95, 
91, 43, and 38 incidents, respectively. The mean for the number of events in Africa’s 
dataset is 1,990.9; the median is 670.5; the standard deviation is 2,847.7; and the standard 




Table 55.   Summary Number of Events in African Countries 



























































Algeria 115 49 35 170 124 41 49 105 27 202 317 237 283 124 194 234 314 289 2909 
Angola 264 523 1379 345 323 27 7 7 3 6 15 10 13 9 20 16 25 9 3001 
Benin 2 4 2 1 3 1 2 5 2 1 3 1 2 10 12 18 13 18 100 
Botswana 1 2 1 1   2 10 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 1 5 43 
Burkina Faso 4 5 33 22 6 7 1 4 6 8 1 12 1 6 63 17 25 139 360 
Burundi 217 116 165 505 631 440 216 78 74 133 29 104 76 102 30 20 13 79 3028 




41 20 14 12 41 59 67 31 19 48 100 85 95 156 14 84 503 1061 2450 




293 305 558 178 349 439 274 176 308 332 267 446 705 304 891 1116 837 1098 8876 
Djibouti 1 2 7 1 2 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 6 10 6 2 12 28 91 
Egypt 43 19 10 49 25 51 15 11 62 13 36 92 53 134 370 444 2617 1695 5739 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
3 2  2 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 8 1 1 3 1 4 38 
Eritrea 2 62 157 79 3 2 8 9 5 10 5 21 7 3 5 7 7 4 396 
Ethiopia 32 68 76 137 59 240 116 124 129 91 49 112 105 190 90 162 139 71 1990 
Gabon 1 2 3 2 4 1 1 3 1 4  2 8 3 4 7 32 29 107 
Gambia 2 1 4 8 14 13 11 5 3 3 2 4 2 4 4 3 5 7 95 
Ghana 5 4 2 10 9 7 17 7 3 3 5 11 17 14 12 48 53 50 277 
Guinea 3 34 45 184 71 14 10 12 15 8 47 15 41 25 10 38 94 39 705 
Guinea-Bissau 5 64 18 9 3 5 5 7 14 21 2 3 9 4 9 18 8 5 209 
International       1  3  1  1 1     7 
Ivory Coast 17 18 81 177 38 138 181 105 50 32 6 25 5 133 240 85 115 118 1564 
Kenya 117 177 211 200 166 198 84 72 153 103 434 418 127 131 158 436 668 467 4320 
Lesotho 4 35 4 3 2 2 4 1 1 3 2 2 2 3 4 20  12 104 
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Liberia 30 30 45 89 179 149 242 26 30 22 9 17 9 13 32 21 70 122 1135 
Libya 2 10 3 5 4 5 3 7 7 7 1 7 6 7 715 292 594 1367 3042 
Madagascar 5 4 1 4 6 116 18 22 11 10 17 1 103 17 3 91 73 134 636 
Malawi 1 5 2 16 23 11 15 5 6 6 6 5 4 4 35 15 24 40 223 
Mali 15 4 10 7 7 2 4 4 2 10 11 21 10 20 29 300 339 171 966 
Mauritania 5 1 3 4 1 3 13 3 9 3 4 15 10 22 38 82 68 61 345 
Morocco 14 14 20 24 15 16 21 8 19 16 21 16 11 22 99 91 123 173 723 
Mozambique 12 1 4 11 17 3 28 32 20 7 11 21 49 29 18 39 110 149 561 
Namibia 8 4 55 76 20 7 13 10 9 12 19 20 10 12 16 118 88 76 573 
Niger 34 44 10 13 9 42 6 18 9 8 31 28 16 12 10 12 26 27 355 
Nigeria 153 159 209 171 105 153 202 271 202 114 188 207 232 504 349 991 1043 1528 6781 
Republic of 
Congo 
95 42 76 6 5 45 3 7 10 1 3  9 5 1 7 4 13 332 
Rwanda 125 138 13 19 27 5 4 2 5 12 20 12 17 54 41 56 21 12 583 
Senegal 52 34 33 86 61 40 19 11 11 29 24 20 22 24 36 63 74 176 815 
Sierra Leone 1026 1735 945 499 225 5 20 14 5 1 3 14 21 11 9 10 10 21 4574 
Somalia 25 27 86 103 66 110 387 335 288 320 847 843 694 1325 1406 2192 3140 2956 15150 
South Africa 48 37 58 53 61 96 55 45 101 57 104 91 143 65 86 1243 1111 1086 4540 
South Sudan               44 192 382 1025 1643 
Sudan 211 213 187 205 205 328 70 217 315 154 115 303 289 234 285 788 1054 1332 6505 
Swaziland 7 7 2 8 2 5 8 2 5 5 4 12 1 7 11 55 22 12 175 
Tanzania 10 5 8 17 34 24 8 37 68 16 6 26 9 5 53 94 77 67 564 
Togo 9 13 3 4 4 3 4 3 25 1 1 3 4 18 13 20 58 14 200 
Tunisia 3 2 3 4 5 8 5 6 10 1 2 1 1 19 310 405 341 327 1453 
Uganda 92 345 261 275 140 500 739 387 305 296 104 111 131 124 138 181 132 120 4381 
Zambia 13 18 15 22 19 4 50 31 61 95 143 24 51 18 37 63 108 117 889 
Zimbabwe 22 91 83 341 318 784 353 324 273 122 207 793 225 225 298 262 160 194 5075 
Total 3218 4513 4954 4187 3447 4168 3382 2655 2754 2477 3351 4316 3688 4192 6271 10483 14783 16709 99548 
 
Figure 53 depicts trends by country over the time span. In terms of event frequency, 2014, then 2013, are the most 
violent years. The graph shows that Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, and Egypt emerge as the 
countries experiencing the most violence over the past two decades. 
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2. Type of Events in Africa 
Table 56 indicates all nine types of events in African countries. The most common event that occurred was battle no 
change of territory, which happened 30,131 times. Violence against civilians ranks second in frequency, occurring in 29,001 
events. The third most common event was the riots/protest category, with 22,267 events. 
Table 56.   Summary of Type of Events in African Countries 




























































territory 156 200 208 84 91 75 64 19 41 68 37 65 77 36 82 100 110 149 1662 
Battle-No change of 














0 1714 2330 3804 4395 30131 
Battle-Non-state actor 
overtakes territory 156 172 156 66 96 203 121 19 10 49 21 41 51 12 132 112 100 144 1661 
Headquarters or base 
established 101 133 63 88 27 42 26 2 1 8 5 13 13 49 40 36 46 30 723 
Non-violent activity by a 
conflict actor 352 444 419 211 212 126 92 99 107 103 88 181 261 279 551 1208 929 1014 6676 
Non-violent transfer of 
territory 214 636 308 202 95 30  4 8 19 17 41 40 20 60 93 70 152 2009 
Remote violence 
102 109 163 178 108 118 149 131 22 85 153 131 196 301 575 787 863 1247 5418 
Riots/Protests 
339 392 405 439 324 437 371 379 714 432 618 537 690 733 1478 3281 5359 5339 22267 
Violence against civilians 















































Figure 54 shows trends of different events by country. Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, 
and Egypt have the most events, as indicated by the blue bars and lines for event frequency 




3. Number of Fatalities  
Figure 55 indicates the fatalities according to different events between 1996 and 2014. The orange color in the bar 
reflects the fatalities due to battle no change of territory, gray reflects battle due to riots, and light green is violence against the 
civilians. The most fatalities, which are 30,131, occurred because of battle no change of territory; 29,001 fatalities were 
because of violence against civilians; and 22,267 fatalities occurred because of riots/protests. There is an increased trend of 
violence in Africa. 
Figure 55.  Number of Fatalities per Year According to Events 
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4. Geographical Location of Events in Africa 
Event density in Africa is given in Figure 56, reflecting 99,548 total events.  
Figure 56.  Geographical Location of Events in Africa 
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V. STATISTICAL ANALYIS OF CORRELATES OF WAR AND 
UPPSALA DATASETS 
A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CORRELATES OF WAR PROJECT 
DATASET 
Professor J. David Singer from the University of Michigan founded the Correlates 
of War (COW) project in 1963, with a goal of carrying out a scientific analysis of 
warfare. Singer later partnered with Melvin Small to collect precise data on the wars 
related to the post-Napoleonic period.115 In 1972, Singer and Small published The Wages 
of War and defined terminologies on warfare.116 This initial work became the theoretical 
basis for numerous studies on warfare. The aim of the COW project was to identify 
variables that systematically explained temporal and spatial variations in warfare. 
Initially, efforts were made to measure variables that ostensibly resulted in war, such as 
national capacity, treaties and alliances, and location in the post-Napoleonic era.  
The project has expanded over the years, beyond data collection, to include 
various empirical studies about warfare. According to Singer and Small’s definition, war 
involves violence, and the dominant characteristic of war is brutality.117 Based on this 
definition, they measure war against two criteria: battle related casualties and 
participants on two sides. Singer and Small declared 1,000 battle-related casualties as the 
threshold for differentiating war from other conflicts.118 Initially, Singer and Small 
defined war topology by type of participants and focused on inter-state system or states. 
According to them, wars can be divided into international wars and civil wars.119 They 
further subdivided international war into two categories: inter-state and extra-systemic. 
Civil war was defined as military action internal to the state system with active 
participation of national government and resistance from both sides.  
                                                 
115 David Joel Singer and Small Melvin. The Wages of War, 1816–1965: A Statistical Handbook. 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 1972). 
116 Ibid. 
117 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 




In 1994, a new topology was introduced by the COW project to accommodate 
additional types of armed conflict that fell outside the existing categories. The primary 
addition to the COW project was incorporation of non-state actors.120 The details of the 
two topologies are given in Table 57. In this chapter, datasets from the COW project 
related to intra-state wars are examined, since we are only considering irregular warfare 
in this chapter. 
Table 57.   COW Project’s Typologies of War121 
TYPOLOGIES OF WAR 
TRADITIONAL TYPOLOGY EXPANDED TYPOLOGY 
I. International wars I. Inter-state wars 
 A. Inter-state wars II. Extra-state wars 
 B. Extra-systemic wars  A. Colonial-conflict with colony 
  1. Colonial  B. Imperial state vs. Non-state 
  2. Imperial III. Intra-state wars 
II. Civil wars  A. Civil wars 
   1. For central control 
   2. Over local i\ssues 
  B. Regional internal 
  C. Inter-communal 
 IV. Non-state wars 
  A. In non-state territory 
  B. Across state borders 
 
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COW INTRA-STATE WAR 
The COW project breaks intra-state war into three sub categories: civil, regional 
internal, and inter-communal wars. Civil war is between a defined government of state 
and a non-state entity. Civil war is further subdivided into two types: for control of the 
central government and for local issues.122 Regional war is between a government of a 
regional subunit and a non-state entity. Inter-communal war involves combat between 





two or more non-state entities within the state. A central government has de facto control 
over territory regardless of its legality. The dataset contains wars between 1818 and 2007. 
The first war in the dataset is the First Caucasus, fought in 1818. The last battle in the 
dataset is the second Yemen cleric fight between Yemen and Zaidi Muslims in 2007. 
1. Types of Wars and Regions 
Most intra-state wars fall within the category of civil war for central control, with 
a total of 250. There are 161 wars within civil war over local issues, 11 wars within 
regional internal war, and 20 wars within internal communal war. The intra-state dataset 
divides wars into six regions: the Western Hemisphere, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, 
Asia, and Oceania. The highest numbers of wars were fought in Africa. These results are 
close to what we observed in the ACLED dataset in which most violence was also carried 
out in Africa. After Africa, Asia ranks second in terms of intra-state war. A detailed 
summary of the different types of war and regions in which they were fought is given in 
Table 58. 
Table 58.   Types of Wars in COW Intra-State War Dataset 
TYPOLOGIES OF WAR 
Type of War W. 
Hemisphere 
Europe Africa Middle 
East 
Asia Oceania Total 
Civil War for 
Central 
Control 
62 40 73 31 44 - 250 
Civil War over 
Local Issues  
17 48 24 27 45 - 161 
Regional 
Internal War  
2 1  6 2 - 11 
Inter- 
communal  
 2 7 8 3 - 20 
Total 81 91 104 72 94 - 442 
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2. Outcome of War 
The COW’s intra-state war dataset is partitioned into seven categories. These 
categories include winning by side A (government), winning by side B (insurgents/non-
state groups), compromise between two sides, transformation of war into another type, 
continuity of conflict, stalemate, and continuity of war below war level. Side A is 
government and side B is mostly insurgents or non-state groups. According to the dataset, 
221 wars were won by side A, 105 by side B, 45 wars resulted in compromise, 2 conflicts 
are ongoing, 24 resulted in stalemate, and 17 continue below war level. The two conflicts 
that continue today include the Eighth Colombia War between Colombia and FARC, 
drug lords, and the Second Sri Lanka Tamil war between Sri Lanka and the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, this is not accurate, because LTTE was 
defeated by Sri Lankan armed forces in 2009.123 
Table 59.   Types of Wars and Outcomes 
TYPOLOGIES OF WAR 















116 100 2 3 221 
Side B 
(Insurgents) Wins 
76 19 6 4 105 
Compromise 34 9  2 45 
Transformed 10 15 3  28 
Ongoing 12/31/
2007 
 2   2 




7 7  3 17 
Total 250 161 11 20 442 
                                                 
123 Neil DeVotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and The Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri 
Lanka,” Asian Survey (2009): 1021–1051. 
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3. Number of Casualties 
There are 171 wars in which the number of casualties for side A is unknown, and 
42 wars in which the number of casualties for side B is unknown. The greatest number of 
casualties suffered by side A was 475,000 in the Russian civil war from 1917 to 1921. 
This war falls under the category of civil war for central control. There were two wars 
that had zero casualties for side A: (1) the First Liberia war, fought during 1990 between 
Liberia and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and (2), the Bosnian-Serb 
Rebellion during 1995 between the United States and Bosnian Serbs. In this war, other 
allied countries besides the United States were present; however, the dataset only 

















Figure 57.  Box Plot Casualties Side A (Government) 
 
 
The greatest number of casualties suffered by side B was 872,400 during the 
Chinese Civil war between 1946 and 1950. The Chinese communists initiated war against 
the Chinese government; the communists were ultimately successful in establishing their 
government. The fewest casualties on side B (insurgents) was 40, during the Greek 







Figure 58.  Box Plot Casualties Side B 
 
 
4. Duration of Different Wars 
The COW’s intra-state war dataset consists of 442 wars. There are some 
limitations in modeling the wars since some wars do not have start or end dates. The 
Second Bosnia, Bolivian Perez Rebellion, and Yellow Cliff Revolt are the wars that are 
not included in analysis since they occurred during one year, but their start date and start 
month is unknown. There other wars in the dataset that span over more than one year, and 
information regarding start date, start month, end date, and end month is not available. 
These are estimated by using fixed start and end dates. Figure 59 displays the duration of 
different wars; it appears that civil war for central control and civil war over local issues 
are longer in duration than regional internal and inter-communal wars. The regional and 
inter-communal wars are spread over a relatively short span of time. 
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Figure 59.   Duration of Wars 
 
 
The summary statistics reveal different means, standard deviations, minimums, 
and maximums for all four war types. The mean days for civil war for central control, 
civil war over local issues, regional internal, and inter-communal war is 769.06, 870.94, 
225.54, and 379.05, respectively. The standard deviation in days for civil war for central 
control, civil war over local issues, regional internal, and inter-communal war is 
1,084.044; 1,177.82; 179.71; and 508.60. 
5. War Duration and Number of Casualties 
Intuitively, there should be more casualties if a war is extended over a greater 
number of days. The actual data proves this false. In the cases in which the casualties of 
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only one side is known, only those casualties are considered. There are certain wars for 
which casualties on both sides are unknown; these battles are not included in the analysis. 
Figure 60.  Duration of Wars and Casualties 
 
 
Figure 60 indicates that the majority of the conflicts took place between zero and 
2,000 days, which is the equivalent of 5.64 years. The greater number of casualties 
occurred from the Chinese Civil War, which are within the 1,000 and 2,000 days range. 
Another significant factor is that regional and inter-communal wars are relatively short in 
duration, typically within a range of zero and 1,000 days. For example, wars with long 
durations such as the Philippines-NPA do not significantly reflect more casualties. 
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C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF COW NON-STATE WAR 
The Correlates of War project for non-state war includes conflict between non-
state entities. According to COW, these entities include non-state autonomous parties 
that do not fulfill the criteria of inter-state systems, non-territorial entities (NTEs), or 
non-state armed groups (NSAs).124 The COW project for non-state war includes two 
types of wars. The first type is war between non-state entities; those take place in a non-
state territory. The second type is war between non-state armed groups (NSAs); those 
take place across state borders. The dataset contains 62 non-state wars, out of which 61 
wars are of the first type, and one war is of the second type.125 The first war in the dataset 
is the First Maori Tribal war, which took place between 1818 and 1824; the last war is the 
Hemda-Lendu conflict from 1999 and 2005. 
1. Types of War and Different Regions 
The majority of wars in the dataset took place in Asia and Africa. Europe is 
unique in that no-war of this category took place in Europe. One of the reasons for this 
may be the strong nation-state system that exists in Europe. Table 60 gives a detailed 










                                                 
124 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Non-State Wars (Version 4.0),” Definitions and Variables.Correlates of 
War Project (2010b). 
125 Ibid. 
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Table 60.   Types of Wars in COW Non-State War Dataset 
TYPOLOGIES OF WAR 
Type of War W. 
Hemisphere 
Europe Africa Middle 
East 




State territory 15 - 18 5 19 4 61 
War between 
NSAs across 
State border - - 1 - - - 1 
Total 15 - 19 5 19 4 62 
 
2. Outcome of Wars 
In this dataset there is no clear difference between side A and side B since mostly 
both sides are non-state. The dataset consists of 62 wars, out of which 28 wars were won 
by side A and 17 by side B. As far as the latter wars are concerned, two resulted in 
compromise, eight transformed into another type of conflict, five resulted in stalemates, 
and two continue as conflicts below the war level. From a military perspective, the 
outcome of war does not provide detailed information regarding attacker, defender, or 
winner as was given in the CDB90G dataset. However, it gives information regarding 
stalemate and transformation of conflict into other form, which is also useful for military 








Table 61.   Types of Wars and Outcome  
OUTCOME OF NON-STATE WARS 
Type of War War between Non-State 
entities in Non-State 
territory 
War between 
NSAs across State 
border 
Total 
Side A Wins 28 - 28 
Side B Wins 17 - 17 
Compromise 2 - 2 
Transformed 8 - 8 
Stalemate 4 1 5 
Conflict Continues Below 
War level 
2 - 2 
Total 61 1 62 
 
The Mexico-Yaqui Indian and Dogra-Tibet were two conflicts that resulted in 
compromise. The First Haiti-Santo Domingo, Han-Nien, First Boer-Basuto, Dhofar 
Rebellion Phase-1, and Hemda-Lendu wars resulted in stalemates. The First Australian 
Aboriginal and Second Australian Aboriginal wars are the conflicts that continued below 
war level. 
3. Number of Casualties 
There are 26 wars in the dataset in which total numbers of casualties are 
unknown. There are 14 wars in which casualties of neither side are known; for these 
wars, one-sided casualties make up the total. The greatest number of casualties for side A 
took place in the Viang Chan–Siamese conflict, for a total of 24,000. The greatest 







Figure 61.  Box Plot Casualties of Non-State Wars 
 
 
4. Duration of Wars 
The analysis of the duration of non-state wars has been carried out in the same 
way as intra-state war. For purposes of analysis, three wars have not been considered 
because their start and end dates were unknown, and all three wars lasted less than one 
year. These wars include the Kuch and Khoja Uprising, First Boer-Basuto conflict, and 
Rabih Zubayr Bornu conflict, which occurred during years 1857, 1858, and 1893, 
respectively. For wars in which either the start date or end date was missing, that date has 
been approximated to the first day of the nearest month. In cases where a war spans more 
than one year and where the start and end date is not provided with information about 
exact day or month, that the missing information has been approximated by using the 
complete year. For example, in the case of the Burma Assam War, we only have the year 
when the war commenced (1819) and year when the war ended (1822). The other 
information, such as start date/month and end date/month, is missing. In order to 
determine the number of days for these kinds of cases, the number of years is used (i.e., 
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three years or 1,092 days). There are two wars that span less than one day, which are the 
First Zulu Internecine and Nejd-Hejaz wars. There is only one war between non-state 
armed groups (NSAs) across state borders, which continued for 2,070 days. 
Figure 62.  Box Plot Duration of Non-State Wars 
 
 
5. Duration of Different Wars and Number of Casualties 
Duration of war and the number of casualties seem to be directly proportional. 
This was verified by analyzing the duration of 35 wars against the total number of 
casualties. There are 24 wars in which the casualties of both sides is unknown, and three 






Figure 63.  Casualties and War Duration 
 
 
The mean for casualties is 8,269.6 persons, with a standard deviation of 
12,369.38. The mean duration for wars is 712.1 days, which is approximately 1.95 years. 
The longest war in the dataset is the Taiping Rebellion, which is not included in the 
analysis of casualties and war duration since the number of casualties for it is not 
available. The second longest war in the dataset is the Second Australian Aboriginal war, 
and the number of casualties in this war are slightly greater than the casualty mean for the 
dataset.  
D. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a project of the Department of 
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, of Sweden. The project has a 
comprehensive database covering various aspects of armed violence since 1946. The 
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UCDP is considered as one of the most accurate and well-documented data sources on 
global armed conflict. The database of UCDP is regularly updated to incorporate ongoing 
conflicts. The UCDP consists of various datasets, which are geo-referenced,126 external 
support,127 actor, armed conflict,128 monadic conflict onset and incidence, dyadic,129 
conflict termination,130 peace agreement,131 conflict database categorical variables,132 
non-state-conflict,133 one-sided violence,134 intra-state low intensity conflict (MILC)135 
and managing intra-state conflict (MIC) Africa.136 However, for the purpose of this 
research, non-state conflict and one-sided violence are analyzed since in this chapter we 
are focusing primarily on irregular warfare. 
E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF UPPSALA NON-STATE CONFLICT 
DATASET 
The non-state conflict dataset is developed by Uppsala University in collaboration 
with Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada. The project defines non-state conflict 
as: “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the 
                                                 
126 Clionadh Raleigh, Linke Andrew, Hegre Havard and Karlsen Joakim, “Introducing ACLED: An 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Special Data Feature,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 
(2010): 651–660. 
127 Croicu, Cătălin Mihai, Högbladh Stina, Pettersson Therése, and Themnér Lotta, “UCDP External 
Support Project Primary Warring Party Dataset Codebook” (2011): 1–2011. 
128 Harbom Lotta, Högbladh Stina, and Wallensteen Peter, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,” 
Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 (2006): 617–631. 
129 Harbom, Lotta. “UCDP Dyadic Dataset Codebook,” Uppsala Conflict Data (2009). 
130 J Joakim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243–250. 
131 Lotta Themnér and Wallensteen Peter, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2011,” Journal of Peace Research 
49, no. 4 (2012): 565–575. 
132 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University. “UCDP Database Categorical Variables 
1989–2008” (1989-2008). 
133 Ralph Sundberg,  Eck Kristine, and Kreutz Joakim, “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 2 (2012): 351–362. 
134Ralph Sundberg, “Revisiting One-Sided Violence–a Global and Regional Analysis,” States in 
Armed Conflict, Ed.Lotta Harbom and Ralph Sundberg.Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet (2009). 
135 Erik Melander, Frida Möller and Magnus Öberg, “Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Armed 
Conflict 1993–2004: A New Dataset,” International Interactions 35, no. 1 (2009), 58–85. 
136 Erik Melander and Uexkull von Nina, “Sustained Third Party Engagement and Conflict 
Termination: An Introduction of the UCDP Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) Dataset.”2011. 
 179 
government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”137 
According to the project, there are two different types of groups: formally organized and 
informally organized groups.  
The formally organized groups, according to the project, are the ones which 
consist of “any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their 
group and using armed forces against another similarly formally organized group.”138 
The project also defines an informally organized group as “any group without an 
announced name, but who uses armed force against another similarly organized group, 
where there is a clear pattern of violent incidents that are connected and in which both 
groups use armed force against the other.” The dataset contains information on the type/
level of organizations carrying out actions, belligerents, start date, end date, number of 
casualties, and region. There are a total of 784 conflicts in the dataset between 1989 and 
2013.139 
1. Type of Organizations and Conflicts in Different Regions  
The Uppsala Non-State dataset consists of three different types of organizations 
that have been involved in conflicts in five different regions.140 According to the UCDP 
Non-State Conflict Codebook version 2.5-2014, the organization level one is formally 
organized groups; these include rebel groups and other organizations that are highly 
organized to participate in state-based armed conflict category; for example, Ansar-ul-
Islam, Afganistan.141 The organizational level two is an informally organized group; 
these are groups associated with political parties. According to the codebook of the 
dataset in this category there is also fighting between groups composed of supporters of 
other organizations, such as the supporters of the Al-Ahly football team fighting against 
the supporters of the Al-Masry football team in Egypt 2012. The organization level three 
                                                 
137 Ralph Sundberg,  Eck Kristine, and Kreutz Joakim, “Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict 






is informally organized group; these are groups that are not organized for fighting but 
organize themselves for fighting on a required basis; for example, Hindus of India 
fighting against Muslims of India. These three levels of organization reflect the expertise 
of various groups, and we use information from the dataset to evaluate which groups are 
mostly involved in conflicts. The maximum numbers of conflicts are carried out by 
organizations having skill level three, or in other words, informally organized groups. 
The maximum numbers of conflicts are carried in Africa with 520 conflicts. These results 
are quite similar to the results of the ACLED dataset in which most of the non-state 
conflicts were in Africa. Table 62 gives complete details of the conflicts in different 
regions with different types of organizations. 
Table 62.   Uppsala Non-State Conflict Regions 
NON-STATE CONFLICT REGIONS 
Type of Organization Europe Middle East Asia Africa America Total 
Organization Level 1 
(Formally Organized 
Groups) 
9 43 78 153 63 346 
Organization Level 2 
(Informally 
Organized Groups) 
- 2 5 21 2 30 
Organization Level 3 
(Informally 
Organized Groups) 
4 6 48 346 4 408 
Total 13 51 131 520 69 784 
 
2. Duration of Conflicts 
The dataset contains 784 battles, but start and end dates for all conflicts are not 
given. There are 231 conflicts with no end date and three conflicts with an end date 
before the start date. The conflicts with end date before start date are Hizb-i-Wahdat 
versus Hizb-i-Wahdat-Akbari faction, Taliban-Ali Dad versus Taliban-Mola Khel 
faction, and Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (Republican Forces of Ivory Coast), 
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abbreviated as FRCI versus Movement for the Liberation of Western Ivory Coast, 
abbreviated as MILOCI.  
There are 123 conflicts that terminate in one day. The longest conflict in the 
dataset is between Christians and Muslims of Nigeria, which lasted for 7,770 days and 
was carried out by organization of level three (informally organized group). The longest 
conflict for formally organized group was Hizb-i-Islami versus Taliban that continued for 
6,095 days. The mean duration of conflict for organization levels 1, 2, and 3 is 667.38, 
879.9, and 975.17 days with standard deviations of 1,055.12; 145.82; and 1,678.58; 
respectively. The medians for duration of conflict are 223, 123.5, and 130 days. Figure 64 
shows box plots of duration of conflicts based on three different types of organizations; 
most wars are below the threshold of 1,000 days. 
Figure 64.  Duration of Non-State Conflicts Uppsala Dataset 
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3. Fatalities and Duration of Conflicts 
Most conflicts in the dataset are within the range of zero to 1,000 days. Maximum 
casualties are also within the same range. The maximum number of casualties in the 
dataset took place in the conflict between the Republic of Somaliland versus SNM—
”Calan-cas” which was carried out for 221 days and resulted in approximately 2,500 
fatalities. The longest conflict in terms of duration is the conflict between Christians and 
Muslims of Nigeria; however, the number of casualties during the conflict were low in 
comparison to the Somaliland war. The mean for casualties in the dataset is 118.07 with a 
standard deviation of 227.61. The maximum casualties in the dataset are 2,500 and 
minimum casualties are 25. Figure 65 demonstrates the relationship between duration and 
casualties.  
Figure 65.  Fatalities and Duration of Conflicts 
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F. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF UPPSALA ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE 
DATASET 
The one-sided violence dataset is a collaborative project of the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) and Human Security Report Project, Simon Fraser University, 
Vancouver, Canada. According to the project, a one-sided violence is defined as “use of 
armed force by the government of a state or formally organized group against civilians, 
which result in at least 25 deaths. This does not include extrajudicial killing.”142 The 
dataset defines state as “an international sovereign government controlling a specified 
territory or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory 
whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign 
government previously controlling the same territory.”143 The dataset has 12 variables 
with 795 entries between 1989 and 2013. It covers five different regions. 
1. Type of Actors and One-Sided Violence in Different Regions 
The one-sided dataset has two types of actors committing violence:  non-
government and government. Table 63 shows the number of events by both categories of 
the actors in different regions. The maximum number of one-sided violence has been 
carried out in Africa by both government and non-government. Asia ranks second after 
Africa with 244 events of one-sided violence.  
Table 63.   Uppsala One-Sided Violence Conflict Regions 
ONE SIDEDVIOLENCE CONFLICT REGIONS 
Type of Organization Europe Middle East Asia Africa America Total 
Non-Government 19 47 181 238 41 526 
Government 14 25 63 151 16 269 
Total 33 72 244 389 57 795 
                                                 
142Kristine, Eck, and Hultman Lisa, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War Insights from 
New Fatality Data,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 2 (2007): 233–246. 
143 Ibid. 
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2. One-Sided Violence During Different Years 
The dataset contains events of one-sided violence between 1989 and 2013. The 
dataset provides years of incidents for a particular event that occurred without giving 
complete temporal details. Figure 66 indicates different events according to different 
years and regions. The red line representing Africa clearly indicates that Africa remained 
on top of one-sided violence as compare to the other regions. The line also indicates that 
there is still an inclining trend of violence in Africa. In other regions of the world, there 
has been a decrease in violence. The most one-sided violence witnessed by Africa is 
during 2002. Figure 66 also shows that America and Europe have less one-sided violence 
than Africa and Asia do. 
Figure 66.  One-Sided Violence in Different Years 
 
 
3. Fatalities from One-Sided Violence  
The dataset has recorded fatalities in three different categories: best, low, and 
high. For the purpose of analysis we use the best category, which is the most accurate 
estimation of casualties. The mean fatalities for one-sided violence is 938.75, with a 
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standard deviation of 17,763.99. The minimum fatalities during any particular event are 
25 and maximum are 500,000. Figure 67 shows a box plot of fatalities for one-sided 
violence. 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 187 
VI. CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREE MODELS 
This chapter uses Tree techniques to confirm the results of the descriptive 
statistics covered in Chapter III and determines the important variables for winning 
battles in conventional warfare. In this chapter, classification models are made based on 
the CDB90G dataset to predict the outcome of conventional battles based on variables 
discussed in Chapter III. The CDB90G dataset is modeled using R.144 Moreover, the 
ACLED dataset is modeled to determine casual factors for irregular conflicts using the 
boosted tree methodology in JMP.145  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Trees are a method used in data mining and machine learning for predictive 
modeling.146 Trees are of two types: classification and regression trees. Regression trees 
are used when the response variable is numeric or continuous; for example, price related 
to different items. If the response variable is discrete or a finite set of values, 
classification tree methodology is used. The CDB90G dataset is examined using 
classification tree methodology. 
Classification tree uses predictor variables to predict the classification of a 
response variable. The response variable can have different classes, such as Yes or No, 
Male or Female, Apples or Oranges, etc. In a classification tree, data are split to 
maximize dissimilarity among the resulting subsets based on the likelihood ratio of 
statistics and deviance measures.147 In other words, data are to increase the homogeneity 
of the two sub-nodes.  
                                                 
144 R. Core Team, R Language Definition (2000). 
145 JMP Pro, v10, SAS (2012). 
146 Breiman, Leo, Jerome Friedman, Stone J Charles, and Olshen A Richard, Classification and 
Regression Trees (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1984). 
147 Matthew Hansen, Dubayah R.and DeFries R., “Classification Trees: An Alternative to Traditional 
Land Cover Classifiers,” International Journal of Remote Sensing 17, no. 5 (1996), 1075–1081. 
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To further simplify the concept of classification trees, we discuss a simple 
example in which we have two variables, age and sex, which predict whether a person 
will sign up at a gym. Our training data reflect that 85% of the persons who are above 40 
years old signed up for a gym. Taking the criterion of age into account, we split the data, 
and age becomes a top node in the tree. According to Faraway, in classification trees  a 
split divides the observations within a node so that the class types within each split are 
mostly the same.148 The purity of a node in a classification tree can be measured by 
several means, which include Deviance, Entropy and the Gini index.149 All these 
measures will be minimized when node members are the same. Tree models are often 
preferred since they are simple and provide a clear picture of the data. They are 
considered a good tool for initial data inspection and provide highly intuitive insight into 
interactions between various variables.150 Moreover, tree models are robust toward 
missing predictor variables and tend to accurately predict even when the data have high 
variability.  
In the succeeding paragraphs, the CDB90G dataset is modeled into three different 
types of models. The first type consists of objective variables, as selected in Chapter III. 
The second type includes both objective and relative variables. The third model also 
includes conditions of weather and terrain, along with the objective and relative variables 
of Models 1 and 2.  
B. MODEL 1 (OBJECTIVE VARIABLES) 
The first types of models are built based on only objective variables. These 
objective variables include force size, tank, artillery, initial force, cavalry, and close air 
support ratios, along with attacker primary tactical scheme and defender primary posture. 
Models are built in the chronological order in which battles took place. This gives us 
trends of changing variables in winning the battles. 
                                                 
148 Julian J. Faraway, Extending the Linear Model with R: Generalized Linear, Mixed Effects and 
Nonparametric Regression ModelsCRC press, 2005). 
149 Ibid. 
150 Michael J. Crawley, The R Book (Hoboken, NJ:  John Wiley & Sons, 2012). 
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1. Model 1.1 (1600–1697) 
Model 1.1 consists of 47 battles of the seventeenth century, including the era from 
1600 to 1697. The complete era has been divided into a test and training set. The training 
set consists of 27 battles from 1600–1650, and the test set consists of 20 battles from 
1651–1697. In this dataset, cavalry emerges as one of the most important winning factors. 
The misclassification rate on the training dataset is 0.259, and on the test dataset it is 
0.20. The misclassification rate on the test dataset is lower than on the training dataset, 
which indicates that model is predicting with reasonable accuracy.  
Figure 68.  First Split of Tree Model 1.1: Battles between 1600 and 1697 
 
 
Figure 68 represents that the tree has accurately predicted 15 times when the 
attacker has won the battle. There are only four times on this branch when the model was 
unable to accurately predict the outcome. In the case of the defender, the model has 
predicted accurately five times. There are three times on this branch when the model was 
unable to predict the accurate outcome for defenders. This model is very accurate, but it 
is primarily based on one variable. For the purpose of military analysis, we need to grow 
the tree bigger in order to predict other important variables for attaining victory. 
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Figure 69.  Tree Model 1.1a: Battles between 1600 and 1697 
 
Figure 69 represents a bigger tree in order to capture other variables required to 
win battles during the seventeenth century. This model shows that force ratio is another 
important variable for winning battles in addition to cavalry. The misclassification rate 
for the training set in this case is zero and for the test set is 0.3, which indicates that this 
model is likely over-fitted. However, both models give statistical insight on winning 
battles in the seventeenth century.  
2. Model 1.2 (1704–1799) 
Model 1.2 is based on battles of the eighteenth century. The dataset  comprises 63 
battles between 1704 and 1799. This dataset shows that cavalry and artillery appear as 
important variables in winning battles. Cavalry holds its position as the most important 
battle-winning factor. The misclassification rate for the training dataset is 0.244, and for 








Figure 70.  Tree Model 1.2: Battles between 1704 and 1799 
 
3. Model 1.3 (1800–1893) 
Model 1.3 consists of 122 battles between 1800 and 1893. The training set 
comprises83 battles between 1800 and 1863. The test set consists of 39 battles from 
1864–1893.The misclassification for the training set is 0.180 and for the test set is 0.48. 
This model is comparatively less accurate than the other two models. However, variables 










Figure 71.  Tree Model 1.3: Battles between 1800 and 1893 
 
4. Model 1.4 (1900–1920) 
Model 1.4 consists of battles between 1900 and 1920. There are 125 total battles 
in the dataset. The training set comprises 95 battles, and the test set consists of the 
remaining 30 battles. The misclassification for the train dataset is 0.24 and for the test 
dataset is 0.19, which is lower than the training dataset. This model is accurate in 
prediction, and two variables that appear to be important during this time frame are 








Figure 72.  Tree Model 1.4: Battles between 1900 and 1920 
 
5. Model 1.5 (1937–1945) 
This model consists of battles between 1937 and 1945. There are 182 battles in 
total in the dataset. The misclassification rate for the training dataset is 0.187, and for the 
test dataset is 0.186. The tank ratio, attacker primary tactical scheme, force ratio, and 
close air support emerge as important variables. Despite noise in the data, this model is 
predicting quite accurately. 
Figure 73.  Tree Model 1.5: Battles between 1937 and 1945 
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6. Model 1.6 (1951–1982) 
Model 1.6 consists of 69 battles between 1951 and 1982. These battles have a lot 
of variation since this was an era in which technology was rapidly changing. The two 
most significant variables that emerge in this model are close air support and the 
defender’s primary posture of defense. The misclassification rate for the training dataset 
is 0.133 and for the test set is 0.66. 
Figure 74.  Tree Model 1.7: Battles between 1951 and 1982 
 
7. Model 1.7 (1600–1982) 
This model consists of a complete dataset of battles between 1600 and 1982. In 
this dataset there are 618 battles. The purpose of this model is to determine important 
variables and explore variables that are not identified in previous models. Interestingly, in 
this dataset tank ratio, attacker primary scheme of maneuver, artillery ratio, force ratio, 
initial force ratio, and close air support emerge as prominent variables. All these variables 
have been identified in previous models, but tank ratio emerges as the most important 
variable in this model. The likely reason for this is the presence of a large number of tank 
battles in the dataset. The misclassification rate for this model is 0.237. 
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Figure 75.  Tree Model 1.8: Battles between 1951 and 1982 
 
C. MODEL 2 (OBJECTIVE AND RELATIVE VARIABLES) 
Model 2 subsets are formed using objective and relative variables. The objective 
variables such as ratios of force, tanks, artillery, initial force, cavalry, and close air 
support as well as attacker primary tactical scheme and defender primary posture are not 
enough to predict warfare outcomes. Warfare is a complex phenomenon and requires 
intrinsic analysis for determining war-winning factors and long-term trends. It involves 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis with insight into numbers and intangible 
variables, which are difficult to measure according to a specific scale. The Model 2 
subsets focus on both objective and relative variables to identify factors that remain 
dominant during the past for winning battles. 
1. Model 2.1 (1600–1697) 
Model 2.1 is comprised of 47 battles between 1600 and 1697. The data are 
divided into two sets: a training set consisting of battles between 1600 and 1650, and the 
test set consisting of battles between 1651 and 1697. The training set has 27 battles and 
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the test set has 20 battles. The misclassification rate for the training set is 0.18 and the 
test dataset 0.1. This model is quite accurate in predicting the outcome of battles. The 
most important variable that emerges during this model is relative leadership advantage. 
It is also important to note that leadership judgments were made subjectively long after 
the battles took place. The tree based on this model accurately predicts attacker victory 
14 times and defender victory eight times (see Figure 76). 
Figure 76.  Tree Model 2.1: Battles between 1600 and 1697 
 
Model 1.1, which consists of only objective variables, has a higher 
misclassification rate than Model 2.1. Moreover, in Model 1.1 the most important split is 
cavalry ratio, whereas in this model the most important variable is relative leadership 
advantage. If we consider the time frame of this dataset and correlate historically, the 
variables identified by this model can be intuitively observed.  
2. Model 2.2 (1704–1799) 
Model 2.2 comprises 63 battles from the eighteenth century. The dataset consists 
of battles between 1704 and 1799. The training set has 40 and the test set has 23 battles in 
it. The misclassification rate for the training dataset is 0.15 and the test dataset is 0.14. In 
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this model, a misclassification rate is improved in comparison to the misclassification 
rate for Model 1.2, which consists of only objective variables for the same time frame. 
Figure 77.  Tree Model 2.2: Battles between 1600 and 1697 
 
In this model, leadership and artillery ratio appear to be important variables. The 
primary splits for node one in this model consist of relative variables such as leadership, 
intelligence, combat effectiveness, and surprise. The only objective variable in the 
primary split for node one is force ratio. The surrogate split for node one consists of 
combat effectiveness and artillery ratio.  
3. Model 2.3 (1800–1893) 
Model 2.3 consists of battles between 1800 and 1893. In this dataset, there are a 
total of 122 battles. The training set consists of 76 battles and the test set consists of 46 
battles. The variability in this dataset is higher than in the other model due to the wide 
spread of battles between 1800 and 1893. Development of new techniques and 
technologies during that era has also increased the variability of data. The 
misclassification rate for the training dataset is 0.105 and the test dataset is 0.369, which 
is lower than in with Model 1.3 that only includes objective variables. 
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Figure 78.  Tree Model 2.3: Battles between 1800 and 1893 
 
The primary splits for node one in this model are leadership advantage, initiative, 
combat effectiveness, artillery, and initial force ratio. The surrogate splits for node one 
include combat effectiveness, artillery, force, initial force, and cavalry ratio. The 
important variables in this model are leadership advantage, combat effectiveness, cavalry, 
artillery, force, and initial force ratios. 
4. Model 2.4 (1900–1920) 
Model 2.4 consists of battles between 1900 and 1920. There are a total of 125 
battles in the dataset. The training dataset comprises 95 battles and the test dataset 
consists of the remaining 30 battles. The misclassification rate for the training dataset is 
0.21 and for the test dataset is zero. This model is more accurate than Model 1.4 that only 





Figure 79.  Tree Model 2.4: Battles between 1900 and 1920 
 
5. Model 2.5 (1937–1945) 
Model 2.5 consists of battles between 1937 and 1945. There are a total of 182 
battles in the dataset. The misclassification rate for this model is higher than the rate for 
Model 1.5. The training dataset misclassification rate is 0.233 and the test dataset 
misclassification rate is 0.27. The primary splits at node one are initiative advantage, tank 
ratio, and relative air superiority in theatre, initial force, and force ratio. The surrogate 
splits are relative leadership, combat effectiveness, intelligence, momentum advantage, 






Figure 80.  Tree Model 2.5: Battles between 1937 and 1945 
 
6. Model 2.6 (1951–1982) 
Model 2.6 consists of battles between 1951 and 1982. The variation in the dataset 
results in the highest misclassification rate for the test dataset. From 1951 to 1982 there 
was tremendous change in technology and warfare. The misclassification rate for the 
training dataset is 0.15 and the test dataset is 0.38. The primary splits for node one consist 
of air superiority, close air support, artillery, and attacker primary scheme. The surrogate 
splits consist of close air support, artillery, force, initial force, and intelligence. 
Figure 81.  Tree Model 2.6: Battles between 1951 and 1982 
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7. Model 2.7 (1600–1982) 
Model 2.7 consists of the complete dataset of battles between 1600 and 1982. In 
this dataset there are 618 battles. The purpose of this model is to determine important 
variables. The misclassification rate for this model is 0.16. The misclassification rate for 
this model is lower than the misclassification rate of Model 1.7, which is modeled on 
only objective variables. 
Figure 82.  Tree Model 2.7: Battles between 1600 and 1982 
 
 
The important variables that appear in this model are initiative, close air support, 
leadership advantage, and force ratio. The primary splits for node one in this model 
consist of initiative, leadership, combat effectiveness, tank ratio, and air superiority. The 




D. MODEL 3 (OBJECTIVE VARIABLES, RELATIVE VARIABLES AND 
CONDITIONS) 
Model 3 subsets are based on objective variables and the relative variables of 
Model 2, along with three more relative variables, which are logistic, training, and 
technology advantages. Moreover, terrain and weather have also been incorporated into 
Model 3. The Model 3 subsets consist of up to 19 predictor variables and one response 
variable. The modeling is carried out based on the same time line in order to carry out 
analysis of additional variables in Model 3. As far as logistic, training, and technology 
advantages are concerned, military planners have considered them important. However, 
in the CDB90G dataset, information regarding these variables is noisy and very limited. 
In spite of this, these variables are modeled along with the other variables to determine if 
they have any significant impact on the outcome of battles. The descriptive statistics for 
these variables have been discussed in Chapter III. However, for recapitulating important 
information, it is essential to inform readers that in the dataset, logistic, training, and 
technology advantages neither favor attacker nor defender in 550, 413, and 594 battles, 
respectively. This means that there is very little descriptive information available on these 
variables. The Model 3 subsets are an extension of the two basic models. 
1. Model 3.1 (1600–1697) 
Model 3.1 is based on battles of the seventeenth century between 1600 and 1697. 
There are 47 battles in this subset. The misclassification rate for the training dataset is 
0.18 and for the test dataset is 0.1. The leadership advantage appears to be an important 
variable in this model. In Model 1.1 and 2.1, cavalry and leadership advantage emerged 







Figure 83.  Tree Model 3.1: Battles between 1600 and 1697 
 
 
2. Model 3.2 (1704–1799) 
Model 3.2 consists of 63 battles from the eighteenth century. The 
misclassification rate for the training and the test dataset in this model is 0.13 and 0.22, 
respectively. In model 1.2 for the same subset, major splits were cavalry, artillery, force 
ratio, and leadership. In model 2.2 major splits were leadership and artillery ratio. 










Figure 84.  Tree Model 3.2: Battles between 1704 and 1799 
 
 
The primary splits for node one in this model are leadership, combat 
effectiveness, training, weather, and intelligence. The surrogate splits in this case for 
node one are combat effectiveness, weather, surprise, cavalry, and artillery ratio. 
3. Model 3.3 (1800–1893) 
Model 3.3 consists of nineteenth century battles from 1800–1893. Total battles in 
model 3.3 are 122. The training set includes 76 and the test set includes 46 battles. The 
misclassification rate for this model is exactly same as model 2.3; for the training set it is 








Figure 85.  Tree Model 3.3: Battles between 1800 and 1893 
 
4. Model 3.4 (1900–1920) 
Model 3.4 consists of battles between 1900 and 1920. There are a total of 125 
battles in the dataset. The misclassification rate for the training and the test dataset is 0.2 
and 0.03, respectively. 
Figure 86.  Tree Model 3.4: Battles between 1900 and 1920 
 
In model 2.4 on the same subset of data, splits were based on initiative and force 
ratio. In this case besides initiative, the model is splitting on artillery ratio. The primary 
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splits for node one in this model consist of initiative, leadership, weather, combat 
effectiveness, and terrain. The surrogate split for node one consists of weather, defensive 
posture, surprise, leadership and terrain. 
5. Model 3.5 (1937–1945) 
Model 3.5 consists of battles between 1937 and 1945. There are a total of 182 
battles in this dataset. The misclassification rate for this model is 0.18 and for the training 
dataset is 0.33. The misclassification rate for the test dataset is higher than Models 1.5 
and 2.5. The model is carrying out the first split on weather and second splits on air 
superiority and initial force ratio. 
Figure 87.  Tree Model 3.5: Battles between 1937 and 1945 
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6. Model 3.6 (1951–1982) 
Model 3.6 consists of battles between 1951 and 1982. The variation in dataset 
results in the highest misclassification for the test dataset. From 1951 to 1982, there is a 
tremendous change in technology and warfare. The misclassification rate for the training 
dataset is 0.019 and the test data is 0.84. Model 2.6 was taking into account only air 
superiority, whereas in this model splits are based on weather, close air support, initial, 
and force ratio.  
Figure 88.  Tree Model 3.6: Battles between 1951 and 1982 
 
7. Model 3.7 (1600–1982) 
Model 3.7 consists of a complete dataset between 1600 and 1982. In this dataset 
there are 618 battles. The purpose of this model is to determine important variables. The 
misclassification rate for this model is 0.13. The misclassification rate for this model is 
lower than the misclassification rate of Models 1.7 and 2.7. 
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Figure 89.  Tree Model 3.7: Battles between 1600 and 1982 
 
E. ANALYSIS OF THE MODELS 
Mathematical modeling for the outcome of the battles based on different types of 
predictor variables was carried out in the previous paragraphs. The last two models 
(Model 2 and 3) are systematically built on the first model by adding additional predictor 
variables.  
The simplest form of the model is Model 1 that only considers objective variables 
such as force, tank, artillery, initial force, cavalry, and close air support ratios. Model 2 is 
an extension of Model 1 in which additional relative and subjective variables such as 
momentum, air superiority, initiative, surprise, intelligence advantage, leadership, and 
combat effectiveness have been added. Model 3 consists of the objective and the relative 
variables included in Model 2 along with three additional relative variables, which are 
logistics, training, and technology advantages. Model 3, besides these additional 
variables, also considers weather and terrain conditions.  
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All three models yield different misclassification rates for the test and the training 
datasets for different time periods. In terms of misclassification rates for the subset 
consisting of all the battles between 1600 and 1982, Model 3 is best, followed by Model 
2, and Model 1. The misclassification rate decreases by adding relative variables to 
Model l. The misclassification rate for both the test and the training dataset for each type 
of model is given in Table 64.  
Table 64.   Misclassification Table 
MISCLASSIFICATION TABLE 
Period Subset Model1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Train Test Train Test Train Test 
1600–1697 1 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 
1704–1799 2 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.22 
1800–1899 3 0.18 0.48 0.10 0.36 0.10 0.36 
1900–1920 4 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.03 
1937–1945 5 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.18 0.33 
1951–1982 6 0.13 0.66 0.15 0.38 0.01 0.84 
1600–1982 7 0.23 0.16 0.13 
 
Based on the misclassification rates, Model 2 appears to be more accurate and 
resilient across different time periods. Model 1 has a higher misclassification rate than the 
other two models. Model 3 has a lower misclassification rate for the first four subsets. 
However, the misclassification rate for subset five and six in the case of Model 3 is 
higher than Model 2. Besides mathematical modeling and statistical analysis, it is 
pertinent to identify important variables that have been instrumental in the outcome of 
battles. In order to identify these important variables, a separate analysis of all three 
models has been carried out. The first three splits for each subset have been considered in 
order to ascertain the most important factors for winning battles. 
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1. Analysis Model 1 (Objective Variables) 
Model 1 accounts for objective variables. In this model, there are six subsets that 
represent different time frames between 1600 and 1982. The variables selected in Figure 
90 are based on the first three splits. In the case of subset one there is only one split based 
on cavalry. The split also corresponds to many qualitative analyses of warfare in which 
several historians identified cavalry as an important factor in winning battles. Another 
important aspect, which can be identified from the splits and from Figure 90, is that 
warfare has been evolving over time.  
In the seventeenth century, cavalry was the prominent force for deciding the 
outcome of battle. In the eighteenth century with the development of modern artillery 
pieces, artillery gained prominence along with cavalry. In the nineteenth century, artillery 
changed the trend and became significant for deciding the outcome of battles. The 
domination of artillery continued between 1800 and 1920. However, between 1900 and 
1920, force ratio also started to play a significant role in the outcome of battles. This was 
the era of trench warfare, where both artillery and force ratio were required to achieve 
victory. Between 1937 and 1945 (overlapping with World War II), tanks gained 
prominence along with scheme of maneuver and force ratio. During the period between 
1951 and 1982, air superiority in theater of operation gained significant importance. This 
era includes battles between Arabs and Israel. With development in air warfare, the 









Figure 90.  Model 1: First Three Splits 
 
 
2. Analysis Model 2 (Objective and Relative Variables) 
Model 2, as discussed earlier, is built on Model 1 with additional relative 
variables such as momentum, air superiority, initiative, surprise, intelligence, leadership, 
and combat effectiveness. The duration for subsets in this case are the same as in Model 
1. The graphical representation of the first three splits is given in Figure 91. With the 
integration of relative variables, leadership appears to be the most vital instrument in 
deciding the outcome of battles between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries. 
Artillery and cavalry also played their role during this era. However, from 1900 to 1945, 
initiative is ranked first in comparison to artillery and tank ratio, which were the most 
important variables in Model 1. Initiative can be correlated with tanks since tanks were 
widely used by attackers for gaining initiative. Air superiority between 1937 and 1945 
emerged as an important variable and continued with its prominence until 1982. The 
development in science and technology has a direct impact on the important factors 
associated with warfare, which can be visualized in Figure 91. Figure 91 shows that with 
the development of modern aircraft, aircraft became one of the most important variables 
for winning the battles. 
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Figure 91.  Model 2: First Three Splits 
 
 
3. Analysis Model 3 (Objective Variables, Relative Variables, and 
Conditions) 
Model 3 is built on Models 1 and 2, by incorporating three more relative variables 
along with terrain and weather conditions. Leadership remained important between 1600 
and 1899. Another important factor during this era was cavalry. However, two other 
variables, which emerged during the seventeenth century, are force ratio and initiative. 
Terrain also emerged as an important variable during the eighteenth century. Between 
1937 and 1982, weather and initial force ratio appeared as the important factors. The 
weather in those days had a relationship with air superiority and close air support. Clear 






Figure 92.  Model 3: First Three Splits 
 
 
4. Important Variables 
Warfare is transforming, and it is difficult to identify consistent winning factors. 
However, in each time frame there are different factors which can be identified based on 
the previous three models which can act as guidelines for military planners to plan future 
battles. Moreover, the battles of the recent past have more relevance to future battles as 








Table 65.   Important Variables 
IMPORTANT VARIABLES IN WINNING BATTLES 
Period Important Variables 
1600–1697 Leadership, Cavalry, Force Ratio, and Initiative 
1704–1799 Leadership, Cavalry, Artillery, and Terrain 
1800–1899 Cavalry, Leadership, and Artillery 
1900–1920 Artillery, Force Ratio, and Initiative 
1937–1945 Air Superiority, Tank Ratio, Force Ratio, Initial Force Ratio, Artillery, 
Scheme of Attack, and Weather 
1951–1982 Close Air Support, Air Superiority, Force Ratio, Initial Force Ratio, 
Defensive Posture, and Weather 
 
The important variables previously mentioned are selected based on the battles 
given in the dataset. These variables do not guarantee winning battles. Rather, they 
provide guidelines for military campaign planners for organizing their campaigns based 
on mathematical analysis of historical battles. In addition, these variables also validate 
the principles of war discussed in earlier chapters. 
F. MODELLING FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Irregular warfare, as discussed earlier, is different in nature from conventional 
warfare. Moreover, quantified and well-documented information on various battles is less 
available. All three datasets analyzed during the course of this study contain information 
in different templates and are mainly focused on the social side of warfare instead of the 
military aspects. However, this endeavor is carried out to identify indicators of irregular 
conflicts. For identifying potential indicators of irregular conflicts, information from 
different datasets is combined and analyzed.  
During the process, the number of events occurring in each country between 2006 
and 2015 from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset is 
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taken as a response variable.151 Predictor variables initially consist of 20 different World 
Bank development152 and governance indicators153 that were later reduced to five. These 
are Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (growth), GDP (current), Government Effectiveness, 
Political Stability, and Employment to Population Ratio. Moreover an additional 
predictor variable, status on the Fragile State Index managed by Fund For Peace,154 was 
also incorporated. The Fragile State Index itself is composed of 12 different variables. 
These variables are demographic pressure, refugees, and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), group grievances, human flight, uneven development, poverty and economic 
decline, legitimacy of the state, public service, human rights, security apparatus, 
factionalized elites, and external intervention.155 
 It is pertinent to discuss the scale of these predictors variable for the purpose of 
clarity to readers. Government Effectiveness is on ascending scale the higher the more 
number more effective is government. For example, Government Effectiveness of South 
Africa is 69.02 and Sudan is 11.21, which means the government of South Africa is more 
effective than Sudan. Political Stability is also on an ascending scale like Government 
Effectiveness. In the case of South Africa, the Political Stability score is 47.11, while in 
Sudan it is1.93, which means that South Africa is more politically stable than Sudan. 
Fragile state index is on a descending scale: the smaller the number, the better it is. The 
countries that are highly stable, such as Norway, have a very low number. The Fragile 
State index for 2015 has a score of 20.8 for Norway. 
The purpose of our Irregular Model is to determine indicators that associated with 
political violence/irregular warfare using statistical techniques. 
                                                 
151 Clionadh Raleigh, Linke Andrew, Hegre Havard and Karlsen Joakim, “Introducing ACLED: An 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Special Data Feature,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 
(2010): 651–660. 
152 World Bank Group, ed. World Development Indicators 2012. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Publications, 2012. 
153  Daniel Kaufmann, Kraay Aart, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3, no. 02 (2011): 220–246. 
154 Foreign Policy, “Fund for Peace.(2006),” Failed States Index . 
155 Ibid. 
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1. Irregular Warfare Model 1  
The Irregular Warfare Model (IW Model 1) is built using a decision tree in JMP 
Pro by SAS.156 The model uses the number of events of violence as the response 
variable. Predictor variables in this model include Fragile State Index status, Gross 
Domestic Product (current), Gross Domestic Product (growth), Government 
Effectiveness, Employment to Population Ratio, and Political Stability. The R Squared 
for the training dataset is 0.475 and for the validation dataset is 0.495. The tree splits 
based on two variables, political stability and GDP (current).  
Figure 93.  Model-1: Irregular Warfare 
 
 
The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) for the training dataset is 264.80 and for 
the validation dataset is 262.07. The JMP software enabled us to find the contribution of 
various predictor variables in the construct of a model. In this case, there are only two 
variables based on which this model is built and that are Political Stability with 0.66 
percentage of contribution to model and GDP (current) with 0.33 percentage of 
contribution to model. IW Model 1 suggest that by increasing Political Stability and 
                                                 
156 Pro, v10 
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improving GDP, the number of violent events may be reduced. Irregular warfare is 
dynamic and varies in different situations. As a result, it is difficult to capture all 
underlying causes of this kind of conflict in a small model. IW Warfare Model 1 focuses 
on very limited variables and indicators due to the scope of this research and limited 
availability of time. 
Figure 94.  Actual Versus Predicted Plot Model-1 for Irregular Warfare 
Training Set Validation Test 
  
 
2. Irregular Warfare Model 2 
Irregular Warfare Model 2 (IW Model 2) is developed using a boosted tree on the 
same dataset. Boosting is the method of building a large, additive decision tree by fitting 
a sequence of smaller trees. Each of the smaller trees is fit on the scaled residuals of the 
previous tree. The trees are combined to form the larger final tree. The process can use 
validation to assess how many stages to fit, not to exceed the specified number of stages. 
The tree at each stage is short, typically one to five splits.157 After the initial tree, each 
stage fits the residuals from the previous stage. The process continues until the specified 
number of stages is reached, or, if validation is used, until fitting an additional stage no 
                                                 
157 A. JMP and Marcel Proust, “Specialized Models,” 2013. 
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longer improves the validation statistic. The final prediction is the sum of the estimates 
for each terminal node over all the stages.158 
Model 2 has higher R Squared for both the training and the validation sets. 
Moreover, Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is also lower then IW Model 1. The R 
Squared for the training set in IW Model 2 is 0.851 and for the test set is 0.801. The Root 
Mean Squared Error for the training set is 146.23 and the validation set is 135.0652. The 
number of layers in the boosted tree model is 115, splits per tree are three, and the 
learning rate is 0.1. Learning rate is a number such that 0 < r ≤ 1.159 Learning rates close 
to one result in faster convergence on a final tree, but also have a higher tendency to over 
fit data.160 According to Friedman, empirical studies have shown that a learning rate of .1 
or less usually leads to better models (with better predictive validity).161 The learning 
















161 Jerome Friedman, Hastie Trevor, and Tibshirani Robert, “Additive Logistic Regression: A 
Statistical View of Boosting,” The Annals of Statistics 28, no. 2 (2000): 337–407. 
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Figure 95.  Cumulative Validation Model-2: Irregular Warfare 
 
 
Besides Political Stability and GDP (current) other variables contribute to the 
model. With respect to the contribution of various variables, IW Model 2 includes 0.6 
proportion contribution of Political Stability, 0.2 percentage contribution of GDP 
(current), 0.05 of Employment to Population Ratio, 0.05 of Fragile State Index, 0.04 of 
GDP (growth), and 0.07 percentage of Government Effectiveness. Although this model 
utilizes more variables for predicting the outcome, it is still unable to capture all of the 







Figure 96.  Actual Versus Predicted Plot Model-2 for Irregular Warfare 












VII. FINDINGS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
Chapter VII focuses on important findings of this research. Moreover, it lists 
future possible studies that can be carried out on the subject.  
A. IMPORTANT FINDINGS 
Warfare is a complex phenomenon. It is difficult to sum up details of warfare in a 
solitary study. The variables involved in warfare are difficult to measure, since it involves 
both qualitative and quantitative measurements. Intangible factors such as leadership, 
momentum, and intelligence are not only difficult to measure, but their scale may also 
differ based on the method of measurement. Moreover, as it is commonly said, the victor 
writes history. This impacts the collection of data related to warfare. Data collected after 
a culmination of war at times tend to be biased in favor of the victor. These biases affect 
subsequent analysis, and sometimes the tactical brilliance of soldiers is shadowed by 
strategic failures of their leaders. 
The data collection in irregular warfare tends to be more difficult than for 
conventional warfare. The numbers of participants in irregular warfare can be greater 
than conventional warfare, and there is no archiving of data by non-state actors. 
However, despite all of these drawbacks, this research has endeavored to use 
authenticated, well-documented, and credible datasets to reduce the effect of biases and 
get insight into warfare. Moreover, well-established principles of wars have been 
intrinsically correlated with various variables to find mathematical solutions to the 
complex process of winning battles. This research analyzed four different datasets 
containing information on different kinds of battles. 
B. IMPORTANT FINDINGS ON CONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The CDB90G dataset was compiled by the Center for Army Analysis. This 
dataset includes 664 battles between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. The first 
battle in the dataset is the battle of Nieuport, which was carried out during the 
Netherlands war for independence at Spanish Flanders. The last battle in the dataset is the 
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1982 battle of Lebanon, which took place at Bekka. This dataset focused on conventional 
battles. The major findings related to conventional battles from the CDB90G dataset are 
the following: 
1. In military planners’ opinions, offense is the best form of defense. The 
operational research has converted this opinion to fact by mathematically 
establishing that the attacker tends to have an advantage over the defender. 
The analysis reveals that the attacker is successful 60.93% of the time, the 
defender 32.6%, and 6.62% of the battles result in a draw. This important 
fact reveals that while planning for future battles, emphasis should be laid 
on offensive strategy as compared to defensive. 
2. Climatic conditions played a major role in deciding a time frame of 
battles. From the analysis of the dataset, it is revealed that military leaders 
prefer to carry out campaigns in moderate temperatures. In the countries in 
which weather is hot, most campaigns were carried out in winter. In the 
countries with cold temperatures, campaigns were mostly carried out in 
summer. We can confidently establish that climate based on geographical 
location affects campaign planning. 
3. Force ratio has always been of paramount importance to military leaders. 
The rule of thumb 3:1 attacker-to-defender force ratio is applicable 
worldwide. The question under discussion is whether this established rule 
has some empirical evidence or if it is hypothetically drawn. From 
analysis of the dataset, we conclude that there are only 121 battles in 
which attacker-to-defender ratio was equal to or more than 3:1. Of these 
121 battles, the attacker won 84 battles and the defender won 37 battles. 
The percentage of attacker victories when force ratio is equal to and more 
than 3:1 is 69.4%. However, another fact that can be established from 
analysis of force ratio is that most of the battles (317 in this dataset) were 
fought below a 3:1 ratio. This indicates that mustering a 3:1 force ratio is a 
difficult task in wars since the commander will always be short of 
manpower. This limitation of manpower can be overcome by imparting 
rigorous training to forces. 
4. From the analysis of the CDB90G dataset, it is revealed that the presence 
of tanks on the battlefield has a direct impact on the outcome of wars. 
There are 300 battles in which tanks were used. Of these 300 battles, the 
attacker won 199 battles when both sides had tanks and won 56 when the 
defender did not have tanks. This confirms that tanks play a vital role, 
especially in offensive battles. It supports the adage that “heavy forces 
beat light forces.” 
5. Artillery is an important component of all armies. From the analysis of the 
dataset, it is revealed that if artillery ratio is in favor of the attacker, the 
chances of winning the battle increases. 
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6. The analysis reveals that warfare remains dynamic throughout history, and 
technology has directly impacted warfare. During the fifteenth century, 
leadership, cavalry, force ratio, and initiative dominated warfare. In the 
sixteenth century, leadership, cavalry, artillery, and terrain became 
significant variables for winning battles. In the nineteenth century, 
cavalry, leadership, and artillery remained as the most significant variables 
for deciding the outcome of battles. In the twentieth century, due to rapid 
development in science and technology, different variables dominated 
warfare. We can segment the twentieth century into three different 
portions. The first period, between 1900 and 1920, is dominated by 
artillery, force ratio, and initiative. The second period, between 1937 and 
1945, is dominated by air superiority, tank ratio, force ratio, initial force 
ratio, artillery, scheme of attack, and weather. The third period, between 
1951 and 1982, is dominated by close air support, air superiority, force 
ratio, initial force ratio, defensive posture, and weather. 
7. Weather does not appear in earlier battles as an important factor, but for 
later periods of the twentieth century it attained significant importance. 
The reason for this is the use of air power in later periods; airplanes can be 
hindered by weather conditions, so this variable gained importance.  
8. The dataset contains battles until 1982. After 1982, there is major 
development in technology; the dataset does not contain that data. It would 
be interesting to look at the battles and conflicts after 1982 to see how 
satellites, drones, and other weapons impact modern battles. 
9. The most import conclusion that we can draw from the analysis of this 
dataset is that warfare has been changing with time, and in order to win 
battles commanders must keep their forces equipped with the latest 
technologies. Moreover, human factors such as leadership and initiative 
will keep playing a role in future battles. There is no substitute for human 
decision-making so far. 
C. IMPORTANT FINDINGS ON IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Irregular warfare is a complex phenomenon since it involves a wide variety of 
different groups and reasons for conflict, and varies based on geographical location and 
type of participants. Historically, irregular warfare has remained one of the major forms 
of warfare, yet there is very little mathematical analysis of it. In the recent past, irregular 
warfare has dominated the globe because of ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Most military analysts think that future conflicts will be dominated by this kind of 
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warfare.162 In order to understand irregular warfare, we analyzed three different datasets 
to reveal trends in irregular warfare and determine related factors for these kinds of 
conflicts. Important findings based on the analysis of these datasets are discussed in the 
succeeding paragraphs. 
1. Findings Based on Analysis of ACLED  
a. ACLED is a collection of data on political violence focused on 
Asian and African countries. Analysis of the dataset reveals that 
most events (36,809) that took place were battle no change of 
territory. The second greatest number of events (33,065) that 
occurred were violence against civilians. The battle no change of 
territory is an activity which seems to be common during protracted 
irregular conflicts. These results also validate an important cliché 
that a population is the center of irregular warfare. In all of these 
conflicts, civilians were the major targets of all the actors. This 
reflects how important winning or suppressing the support of the 
population is in irregular warfare. 
b. Another trend that can be observed from ACLED is that in irregular 
warfare, conflict tends to occur in close vicinity to international 
borders. We can infer that insurgents require support and safe 
havens from across the border. This also suggests that if borders are 
not safeguarded properly, insurgents can use them to their own 
advantage. This trend is obvious in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, 
Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and in African countries. 
c. Seasonality effects are very prominent in irregular conflicts. Most 
of the time insurgents carry out operations during a time of year that 
is moderate. This seasonality effect is visibly identified in 
Afghanistan, Haiti, Laos, and Cambodia. In Afghanistan, the 
campaign season is mostly in summer since winters in Afghanistan 
are harsh and do not support campaigns. 
d. Irregular warfare is heterogeneous as far as the actors involved are 
concerned. The complexity of irregular warfare has multiplied due 
to the presence of different groups. It has been established through 
analysis of data that there are normally more than 10 actors 
involved in irregular conflicts. In cases such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the situation is more complex due to the involvement of 
the large number of players. 
e. In all the countries that were analyzed, except Nepal, there are 
foreign participants involved in the conflicts. The participants are 
                                                 
162 John Arquilla  and Ronfeldt David,  Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and 
Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001). 
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on the sides of both the government and the insurgents. For 
example, in Afghanistan there is the presence of al-qaeda with the 
Taliban and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the 
Afghan national government. 
f. From the ACLED dataset, we observed the trend that events are not 
confined to geographical boundaries of the country in which 
conflict or political violence is occurring. Sometimes, events occur 
in neighboring countries. This tendency of events to occur in 
neighboring countries was observed in all countries except Nepal. 
g. In all the countries that were analyzed in ACLED, insurgent 
movements tend to follow a definite pattern. In this pattern, initially 
they start with fewer events, then reach a peak, and then 
subsequently die down. 
h. There is a trend of violence in countries with low income, fragile 
government, low GDP, and poor economic conditions. These 
factors favor the instigating and flourishing of violence. 
i. Africa has the highest number of events with an exponential growth 
of violence. This trend of violence in Africa is growing. This may 
be due to the growing population of Africa and inability of the 
governments to incorporate the growing population in the society. 
From the military perspective, these circumstances provide valid 
reasons to explore Africa as a potential future conflict area for 
irregular warfare. The data also showed a presence of Islamic 
militants in Africa. These militants have a presence in different 
African countries, and they can use Africa as the new base to 
initiate terrorism across the globe. In the dataset, Africa was 
observed in the holistic approach as a continent. If each country is 
analyzed separately, more insight could be obtained. 
j. The ACLED dataset was modeled using different World Bank 
indicators to determine factors that are associated with irregular 
conflicts. During modeling, it was established that for predicting 
irregular conflicts governance indicators play a more significant 
role in comparison to development indicators. Important factors 
such as political stability, GDP, employment to population ratio, 
and government effectiveness can reduce the possibility of these 
kinds of conflicts. In other words, if efforts are made to improve 
these factors, we may be able to considerably reduce violence. 
k. Research identified Africa as a major trouble spot, and the trend 
seems likely to continue into the future as well. In order to avoid 
future irregular conflicts, the world community along with 
international aid agencies should focus on the previously-mentioned 
variables to minimize future conflicts in Africa. 
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2. Findings Based on COW 
a. From COW it is established that most numbers (250) of intra-state 
war are carried out for central control. The second most number of 
wars were over local issues (161). The maximum number of 
conflicts occurred in Africa. The highest numbers of conflicts (73) 
in Africa are also for central control. The two datasets, ACLED and 
COW, are verifying the trend towards political instability in Africa. 
b. The number of casualties in civil war for central control and civil 
war for local issues are within the same range and are more than 
regional internal war and inter-communal wars. 
c. The duration of civil war for central control and civil war for local 
issues is more than regional internal and communal wars. The mean 
length for civil war for central control is 769.06 days, and for civil 
war over local issues it is 870.94 days. Whereas, the mean for 
regional internal war is 225.54 and inter-communal war is 379.05. 
This reflects that civil war for central control and over local issues 
tends to be longer in duration.  
d. The casualties and duration of war established that most of the 
casualties happened within the first 1,000 days, and after that, the 
number of casualties did not increase substantially for all kinds of 
war. We can conclude that during most wars, both sides initially 
suffer more casualties, and then subsequently the number of 
casualties tends to decrease. Another inference that can be drawn 
based on this mathematical analysis is that the initial days of war 
are more intense, and then subsequently activities tend to be less 
significant in terms of casualties. 
e. The analysis of non-state wars of the COW project indicates that the 
maximum number of non-state wars occurred in Africa and Asia. 
This confirms our finding based on ACLED that Africa has the 
potential to be a breeding space for terrorists and insurgents due to 
its political instability, poor government, increasing population, and 
potential of young manpower to be exploited by extremists. 
f. The casualties in non-state wars are higher than in other types of 
wars. The mean for casualties in non-state war is 8,269.6, which is 
higher than other types of conflict in the COW dataset. This 
indicates that non-state war tends to be casualty intensive.  
g. The maximum number of casualties in non-state war are typically 
within the first 300 days; after that there are fewer casualties.  
3. Finding Based on Uppsala 
a. The Uppsala non-state conflict dataset indicates that most events 
(520) are carried out by organization level three, which are 
informally organized groups. In other words, these are groups that 
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operate in loosely connected networks and have the ability to 
connect for carrying out many kinds of activity. 
b. The duration of conflict for organization level three, which are 
loosely connected or informally organized groups, is more than for 
the other two organizations. The mean duration for organization 
level three is 975.17 days. This means that the loosely organized 
group can be involved in long conflicts while keeping itself hidden 
from law enforcement agencies. From a military standpoint, it 
suggests that in order to tackle these groups, a strategy should be 
formulated to observe their network and strike at critical nodes that 
incapacitate their ability to become active.  
c. The dataset also showed that organizations of all three levels that 
are discussed in Chapter V operate on a system of networks. These 
networks are not essentially confined to a particular geographical 
area; rather, they tend to spread out in different areas. The one way 
to effectively counter these networks is to identify the main hubs on 
which other nodes are dependent for operation. 
d. The analysis of Uppsala one-sided violence indicates that most 
(389) of the one-sided violent conflicts happened in Africa. This 
trend has been identified in all three different datasets that we 
examined.  
D. FUTURE STUDIES 
As already stated, warfare is an extremely complex phenomenon. It is difficult to 
capture all of the details in one research paper. This research is a small endeavor to gain 
insight into winning aspects and trends of warfare based on available data. There are 
many other possible opportunities for future research that will further enhance our 
understanding of warfare. In subsequent paragraphs, we discuss these opportunities with 
the prospect that application of operation research techniques will assist military planners 
to solve future conflicts. 
1. Only a few of the variables in the CDB90G dataset have been explored in 
this research. There are possibilities of exploring more variables to 
identify what other factors can be added for predicting outcomes of 
battles. The research focuses on decision tree methodology for predicting 
outcome of battles; application of other techniques such as neural 
networks may give additional insights. 
2. Another option for future research is simulating the data and then carrying 
out analysis of available data with simulated data to gain a more holistic 
picture of warfare. 
3. The ACLED, COW, and Uppsala dataset are not explored completely. 
They have a lot of information that can be explored to get more insight 
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into irregular warfare. Specific study focused on each dataset will surely 
reveal interesting new information related to conflicts. 
4. The COW and Uppsala datasets can be modeled to determine a 
mathematical relationship between casualties and the number of days of 
conflict. This study will provide military leaders with risk indicators 
associated with future campaigns. 
5. Few development and governance indicator future were explored to 
determine relationships between violent activity, political instability, and 
socio-economic conditions. This is a vast area in which operations 
research can assist military leaders to more accurately predict future 
conflicts. This will give militaries an advantage to prepare and train for 
future conflict well in advance. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The research has endeavored to capture details of both conventional and irregular 
warfare from the perspective of a military and operations research analyst. However, the 
availability of data, time constraints, and the vastness of the subject remained the core 
issue. Thus, only selected variables could be explored. This research is just a first step on 
discovery on a most important road. This research can be taken as an initiation step that 
can be further explored using both quantitative and qualitative techniques to discover 




The appendixes A to C consist of three different types of tree model based on the 
CDB90G dataset. These models are output results for readers who wanted to get 
complete statistical insight into models. Since Chapter VI only gives graphical 
representation of the tree models, these details are displayed here especially for the 
operational research students who are more interested in gaining statistical insight in 
comparison to ordinary military readers. 
     
1. MODEL 1.1 
 
1) root 27 9 Attacker Wins (0.6666667 0.3333333)  
2) Cav.Ratio< 1.035714 19 4 Attacker Wins (0.7894737 0.2105263) * 
3) Cav.Ratio>=1.035714 8 3 Defender Wins (0.3750000 0.6250000) * 
 
2. Model 1.2 
 1) root 45 17 Attacker Wins (0.6222222 0.3777778)  
 2) Cav.Ratio>=0.05 38 12 Attacker Wins (0.6842105 0.3157895)  
 4) Arty.Ratio>=1.521237 10 1 Attacker Wins (0.9000000 0.1000000) * 
 5) Arty.Ratio< 1.521237 28 11 Attacker Wins (0.6071429 0.3928571)  
 10) Cav.Ratio< 0.8928571 7 1 Attacker Wins (0.8571429 0.1428571) * 
 11) Cav.Ratio>=0.8928571 21 10 Attacker Wins (0.5238095 0.4761905)  
 22) Force.Ratio>=0.827068 14 5 Attacker Wins (0.6428571 0.3571429) * 
 23) Force.Ratio< 0.827068 7 2 Defender Wins (0.2857143 0.7142857) * 
 3) Cav.Ratio< 0.05 7 2 Defender Wins (0.2857143 0.7142857) * 
 
3. Model 1.3 
 
 1) root 83 40 Defender Wins (0.4819277 0.5180723)  
 2) Arty.Ratio< 0.7876244 18 3 Attacker Wins (0.8333333 0.1666667) * 
 3) Arty.Ratio>=0.7876244 65 25 Defender Wins (0.3846154 0.6153846)  
 6) Cav.Ratio< 0.3403922 8 1 Attacker Wins (0.8750000 0.1250000) * 
 7) Cav.Ratio>=0.3403922 57 18 Defender Wins (0.3157895 0.6842105)  
 14) Cav.Ratio>=1.104403 22 10 Attacker Wins (0.5454545 0.4545455)  
 28) Initial.Force.Ratio< 1.252513 11 2 Attacker Wins (0.8181818 0.1818182) * 
 29) Initial.Force.Ratio>=1.252513 11 3 Defender Wins (0.2727273 0.7272727) * 
 15) Cav.Ratio< 1.104403 35 6 Defender Wins (0.1714286 0.8285714) * 
 
4. Model 1.4 
 
1) root 95 43 Attacker Wins (0.5473684 0.4526316)  
 230 
      2) Arty.Ratio< 196 87 36 Attacker Wins (0.5862069 0.4137931)  
      4) Force.Ratio>=0.8366652 78 29 Attacker Wins (0.6282051 0.3717949)  
      8) Arty.Ratio< 0.9791667 18 3 Attacker Wins (0.8333333 0.1666667) * 
9) Arty.Ratio>=0.9791667 60 26 Attacker Wins (0.5666667 0.4333333)  
18) Arty.Ratio>=1.009225 41 12 Attacker Wins (0.7073171 0.2926829) * 
19) Arty.Ratio< 1.009225 19 5 Defender Wins (0.2631579 0.7368421) * 
 5) Force.Ratio< 0.8366652 9 2 Defender Wins (0.2222222 0.7777778) * 
 3) Arty.Ratio>=196 8 1 Defender Wins (0.1250000 0.8750000) * 
 
 
5. Model 1.5 
 
1) root 133 51 Attacker Wins (0.6165414 0.3834586) 
2) Tank.Ratio>=3.785833 48 7 Attacker Wins (0.8541667 0.1458333) * 
3) Tank.Ratio< 3.785833 85 41 Defender Wins (0.4823529 0.5176471) 
6) PRIA1=DE,RC 13 2 Attacker Wins (0.8461538 0.1538462) * 
7) PRIA1=EE,FF 72 30 Defender Wins (0.4166667 0.5833333) 
14) Force.Ratio>=1.389386 45 22 Attacker Wins (0.5111111 0.4888889) 
28) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=7.5 8 1 Attacker Wins (0.8750000 0.1250000) * 
29) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 7.5 37 16 Defender Wins (0.4324324 0.5675676) 
58) Force.Ratio< 3.305437 29 14 Attacker Wins (0.5172414 0.4827586) 
116) Arty.Ratio>=2.221951 7 1 Attacker Wins (0.8571429 0.1428571) * 
117) Arty.Ratio< 2.221951 22 9 Defender Wins (0.4090909 0.5909091) 
234) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 0.06164384 9 3 Attacker Wins (0.6666667 
0.3333333) * 
235) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=0.06164384 13 3 Defender Wins 
(0.2307692 0.7692308) * 
59) Force.Ratio>=3.305437 8 1 Defender Wins (0.1250000 0.8750000) * 
15) Force.Ratio< 1.389386 27 7 Defender Wins (0.2592593 0.7407407) * 
6. Model 1.6 
 
1) root 51 18 Attacker Wins (0.6470588 0.3529412)  
2) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=2.725877 25 1 Attacker Wins (0.9600000 
0.0400000) * 
      3) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 2.725877 26 9 Defender Wins (0.3461538 0.6538462)  
      6) POST1=DL,FD,PD 15 6 Attacker Wins (0.6000000 0.4000000) * 
7) POST1=HD 11 0 Defender Wins (0.0000000 1.0000000) * 
 
7. Model 1.7 
 
1) root 618 217 Attacker Wins (0.6488673 0.3511327)  
2) Tank.Ratio>=3.785833 111 13 Attacker Wins (0.8828829 0.1171171) * 
      3) Tank.Ratio< 3.785833 507 204 Attacker Wins (0.5976331 0.4023669)  
6) PRIA1=0,DE,DO,EE,RC 74 13 Attacker Wins (0.8243243 0.1756757) * 
7) PRIA1=FF 433 191 Attacker Wins (0.5588915 0.4411085)  
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14) Arty.Ratio< 0.3601619 72 21 Attacker Wins (0.7083333 0.2916667) * 
15) Arty.Ratio>=0.3601619 361 170 Attacker Wins (0.5290859 0.4709141)  
30) Force.Ratio>=1.329388 189 76 Attacker Wins (0.5978836 0.4021164)  
60) Arty.Ratio< 156 182 69 Attacker Wins (0.6208791 0.3791209)  
120) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=13.8 16  2 Attacker Wins (0.8750000 0.1250000) 
* 
121) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 13.8 166 67 Attacker Wins (0.5963855 
0.4036145)  
 242) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 0.06164384 128 45 Attacker Wins (0.6484375  
0.3515625)* 
 243) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=0.06164384 38 16 Defender Wins (0.4210526 
0.5789474)  
 486) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=0.8055556 25 11 Attacker Wins (0.5600000 
0.4400000)  
 972) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 2.1 13  3 Attacker Wins (0.7692308 0.2307692) * 
 973) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=2.1 12  4 Defender Wins (0.3333333 0.6666667) 
* 
 487) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 0.8055556 13  2 Defender Wins (0.1538462 
0.8461538) * 
 61) Arty.Ratio>=156 7  0 Defender Wins (0.0000000 1.0000000) * 
 31) Force.Ratio< 1.329388 172 78 Defender Wins (0.4534884 0.5465116)  
 62) Initial.Force.Ratio< 1.268086 159 78 Defender Wins (0.4905660 0.5094340)  
 124) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=1.789583 18  5 Attacker Wins (0.7222222 
0.2777778) * 
 125) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 1.789583 141 65 Defender Wins (0.4609929 
0.5390071)  
 250) Tank.Ratio< 0.8546171 132 64 Defender Wins (0.4848485 0.5151515)  
 500) Force.Ratio>=0.8026549 87 40 Attacker Wins (0.5402299 0.4597701)  
 1000) Force.Ratio< 0.8974898 18  4 Attacker Wins (0.7777778 0.2222222) * 
 1001) Force.Ratio>=0.8974898 69 33 Defender Wins (0.4782609 0.5217391)  
  2002) Arty.Ratio< 0.983871 15  5 Attacker Wins (0.6666667 0.3333333) * 
  2003) Arty.Ratio>=0.983871 54 23 Defender Wins (0.4259259 0.5740741)  
  4006) Force.Ratio>=1.128129 23  9 Attacker Wins (0.6086957 0.3913043)  
  8012) Force.Ratio< 1.239983 14  3 Attacker Wins (0.7857143 0.2142857) * 
  8013) Force.Ratio>=1.239983 9  3 Defender Wins (0.3333333 0.6666667) * 
  4007) Force.Ratio< 1.128129 31  9 Defender Wins (0.2903226 0.7096774) * 
  501) Force.Ratio< 0.8026549 45 17 Defender Wins (0.3777778 0.6222222)  
  1002) Force.Ratio< 0.4477727 7  2 Attacker Wins (0.7142857 0.2857143) * 
  1003) Force.Ratio>=0.4477727 38 12 Defender Wins (0.3157895 0.6842105) * 
  251) Tank.Ratio>=0.8546171 9  1 Defender Wins (0.1111111 0.8888889) * 









1. MODEL 2.1 
1) root 27 9 Attacker Wins (0.66666667 0.33333333)  
2) LEADA>=0.5 15 1 Attacker Wins (0.93333333 0.06666667) * 
3) LEADA< 0.5 12 4 Defender Wins (0.33333333 0.66666667) * 
 
2. MODEL 2.2 
 
1) root 40 15 Attacker Wins (0.6250000 0.3750000)  
2) LEADA>=-0.5 32 7 Attacker Wins (0.7812500 0.2187500)  
3) Arty.Ratio>=1.015957 12 0 Attacker Wins (1.0000000 0.0000000) * 
4) Arty.Ratio< 1.015957 20 7 Attacker Wins (0.6500000 0.3500000)  
10) LEADA>=0.5 11 2 Attacker Wins (0.8181818 0.1818182) * 
11) LEADA< 0.5 9 4 Defender Wins (0.4444444 0.5555556) * 
3) LEADA< -0.5 8 0 Defender Wins (0.0000000 1.0000000) * 
3. Model 2.3 
1) root 76 35 Defender Wins (0.46052632 0.53947368)  
2) LEADA>=0.5 26 1 Attacker Wins (0.96153846 0.03846154) * 
3) LEADA< 0.5 50 10 Defender Wins (0.20000000 0.80000000)  
6) Cav.Ratio< 0.6976321 9 3 Attacker Wins (0.66666667 0.33333333) * 
7) Cav.Ratio>=0.6976321 41 4 Defender Wins (0.09756098 0.90243902) * 
 
4. Model 2.4 
1) root 95 43 Attacker Wins (0.5473684 0.4526316)  
2) INITA>=0.5 50 10 Attacker Wins (0.8000000 0.2000000) * 
3) INITA< 0.5 45 12 Defender Wins (0.2666667 0.7333333)  
6) Force.Ratio>=3.363226 8 3 Attacker Wins (0.6250000 0.3750000) * 
7) Force.Ratio< 3.363226 37 7 Defender Wins (0.1891892 0.8108108) * 
5. Model 2.5 
1) root 133 51 Attacker Wins (0.6165414 0.3834586)  
2) INITA>=0.5 90 22 Attacker Wins (0.7555556 0.2444444)  
3) AEROA>=-0.5 72 11 Attacker Wins (0.8472222 0.1527778) * 
4) AEROA< -0.5 18 7 Defender Wins (0.3888889 0.6111111) * 
3) INITA< 0.5 43 14 Defender Wins (0.3255814 0.6744186)  
6) Arty.Ratio>=2.221951 19 9 Attacker Wins (0.5263158 0.4736842) * 
7) Arty.Ratio< 2.221951 24 4 Defender Wins (0.1666667 0.8333333) * 
6. Model 2.6 
1) root 51 18 Attacker Wins (0.6470588 0.3529412)  
2) AEROA>=0.5 37 6 Attacker Wins (0.8378378 0.1621622) * 




7. Model 2.7 
 
1) root 618 217 Attacker Wins (0.64886731 0.35113269)  
2) INITA>=0.5 393 82 Attacker Wins (0.79134860 0.20865140)  
3) LEADA>=-0.5 362 56 Attacker Wins (0.84530387 0.15469613)  
8) LEADA>=0.5 143  4 Attacker Wins (0.97202797 0.02797203) * 
9) LEADA< 0.5 219 52 Attacker Wins (0.76255708 0.23744292)  
18) Force.Ratio>=1.08765 182 27 Attacker Wins (0.85164835 0.14835165) * 
19) Force.Ratio< 1.08765 37 12 Defender Wins (0.32432432 0.67567568) * 
5) LEADA< -0.5 31  5 Defender Wins (0.16129032 0.83870968) * 
3) INITA< 0.5 225 90 Defender Wins (0.40000000 0.60000000)  
6) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=0.9775281 70 23 Attacker Wins (0.67142857 
0.32857143)  
12) MOMNTA< -5 25  3 Attacker Wins (0.88000000 0.12000000) * 
13) MOMNTA>=-5 45 20 Attacker Wins (0.55555556 0.44444444)  
26) Force.Ratio>=3.894631 14  1 Attacker Wins (0.92857143 0.07142857) * 
27) Force.Ratio< 3.894631 31 12 Defender Wins (0.38709677 0.61290323) * 
7) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 0.9775281 155 43 Defender Wins (0.27741935 
0.72258065)  
14) LEADA>=0.5 18  5 Attacker Wins (0.72222222 0.27777778) * 





1. MODEL 3.1 
 
1) root 27 9 Attacker Wins (0.66666667 0.33333333)  
2) LEADA>=0.5 15 1 Attacker Wins (0.93333333 0.06666667) * 
3) LEADA< 0.5 12 4 Defender Wins (0.33333333 0.66666667) * 
 
2. MODEL 3.2 
 
1) root 45 17 Attacker Wins (0.6222222 0.3777778)  
2) LEADA>=-0.5 36 8 Attacker Wins (0.7777778 0.2222222)  
3) TERRA1=RM0,RW0 30 4 Attacker Wins (0.8666667 0.1333333) * 
4) TERRA1=00U,FM0,RB0 6 2 Defender Wins (0.3333333 0.6666667) * 
5) LEADA< -0.5 9 0 Defender Wins (0.0000000 1.0000000) * 
 
3. MODEL 3.3 
1) root 76 35 Defender Wins (0.46052632 0.53947368)  
2) LEADA>=0.5 26 1 Attacker Wins (0.96153846 0.03846154) * 
3) LEADA< 0.5 50 10 Defender Wins (0.20000000 0.80000000)  
4) Cav.Ratio< 0.6976321 9 3 Attacker Wins (0.66666667 0.33333333) * 
5) Cav.Ratio>=0.6976321 41 4 Defender Wins (0.09756098 0.90243902) * 
 
4. Model 3.4 
1) root 95 43 Attacker Wins (0.54736842 0.45263158)  
2) INITA>=0.5 50 10 Attacker Wins (0.80000000 0.20000000) * 
3) INITA< 0.5 45 12 Defender Wins (0.26666667 0.73333333)  
4) WX1=DOT$T,DSTST,DSTWT,WLCFT 21 10 Attacker Wins 
(0.52380952 0.47619048)  
12) Force.Ratio>=1.657281 8 2 Attacker Wins (0.75000000 0.25000000) * 
13) Force.Ratio< 1.657281 13 5 Defender Wins (0.38461538 0.61538462) * 
5) WX1=DOTST,DOTWT,DSCFT,DSHST,DST$T,DSTFT,WHC$T,WHT$
T,WHTST,WLT$T,WLTFT,WOTST 24 1 Defender Wins (0.04166667 
0.95833333) * 
 
5. Model 3.5 
1) root 133 51 Attacker Wins (0.6165414 0.3834586)  
2) WX1=DOCFT,DOTFT,DOTST,DOTWT,DSCWD,DSCWT,DST$T,DST
FT,DSTST,WHCFT,WHCWD,WHCWT,WHHWE,WHTFT,WHTWT,W
LCFT,WLT$T,WLTST 96 24 Attacker Wins (0.7500000 0.2500000)  
3) AEROA>=-0.5 81 14 Attacker Wins (0.8271605 0.1728395) * 
4) AEROA< -0.5 15 5 Defender Wins (0.3333333 0.6666667) * 
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3)WX1=D0CWD,D0T$T,DSCFT,DSHST,DSTWT,W0CWT,WLC$T,WLC
WT,WLTF T,WLTWT 37 10 Defender Wins (0.2702703 0.7297297)  
6) Initial.Force.Ratio>=1.453048 24 10 Defender Wins (0.4166667 
0.5833333)  
12) POST1=HD,PD 10 3 Attacker Wins (0.7000000 0.3000000) * 
13) POST1=DL,FD 14 3 Defender Wins (0.2142857 0.7857143) * 
7) Initial.Force.Ratio< 1.453048 13 0 Defender Wins (0.0000000 1.0000000) * 
6. Model 3.6 
1) root 51 18 Attacker Wins (0.64705882 0.35294118)  
2) WX1=D0HFD,D0HSD,D0T$E,D0T$T,D0TWT,DSHST,WLT$T,WLTST 
35 3 Attacker Wins (0.91428571 0.08571429)  
3) Initial.Force.Ratio>=-1750 32 1 Attacker Wins (0.96875000 0.03125000) 
* 
4) Initial.Force.Ratio< -1750 3 1 Defender Wins (0.33333333 0.66666667)  
5) Close.Air.Support.Ratio>=26 1 0 Attacker Wins (1.00000000 
0.00000000) * 
6) Close.Air.Support.Ratio< 26 2 0 Defender Wins (0.00000000 
1.00000000) * 
3) WX1=DSHFT,DSTFT,WHTST 16 1 Defender Wins (0.06250000 
0.93750000)  
6) Force.Ratio>=6.243036 1 0 Attacker Wins (1.00000000 0.00000000) * 
     7) Force.Ratio< 6.243036 15 0 Defender Wins (0.00000000 1.00000000) * 
 
7. Model 3.7 
1) root 618 217 Attacker Wins (0.64886731 0.35113269)  
2) INITA>=0.5 393 82 Attacker Wins (0.79134860 0.20865140)  
3) LEADA>=-0.5 362 56 Attacker Wins (0.84530387 0.15469613)  
8) LEADA>=0.5 143  4 Attacker Wins (0.97202797 0.02797203) * 
9) LEADA< 0.5 219 52 Attacker Wins (0.76255708 0.23744292)  
18) Force.Ratio>=1.08765 182 27 Attacker Wins (0.85164835 0.14835165) * 
19) Force.Ratio< 1.08765 37 12 Defender Wins (0.32432432 0.67567568)  
38) WX1=D0CWT,DSHST,DSTFT,WHCWT,WLCFT 10  3 Attacker Wins    
(0.70000000 0.30000000) * 
39) WX1=DOTST,DSCWT,DST$T,DSTST,WLCWT,WLTST 27  5 
Defender Wins (0.18518519 0.81481481) * 
5) LEADA< -0.5 31  5 Defender Wins (0.16129032 0.83870968) * 
3) INITA< 0.5 225 90 Defender Wins (0.40000000 0.60000000)  
6) 
WX1=D0HFD,D0HSD,D0T$D,D0T$E,D0T$T,D0TFT,D0TWD,D0TWT,DO
CFT,DOT$T,WHCWT,WHTFT,WLCFT,WLTST 35  3 Attacker Wins 





T,WHTWT,WLC$T,WLT$T,WLTFT,WLTWT,WOTST 190 58 Defender 
Wins (0.30526316 0.69473684)  
14) Force.Ratio>=4.074323 23  7 Attacker Wins (0.69565217 0.30434783)  
28) WX1=DSHFT,DST$T,DSTFT,DSTST,DSTWT,WLTFT 13  0 Attacker 
Wins (1.00000000 0.00000000) * 
29) WX1=DSH$T,DSHST,W0CWT,WHT$T,WHTSE 10  3 Defender Wins 
(0.30000000 0.70000000) * 
15) Force.Ratio< 4.074323 167 42 Defender Wins (0.25149701 0.74850299)  
30) LEADA>=0.5 19  6 Attacker Wins (0.68421053 0.31578947) * 
31) LEADA< 0.5 148 29 Defender Wins (0.19594595 0.80405405) * 
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